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The Middle East: Regional diplomacy filling the vacuum
The incompetence of US policy in the Middle East is creating new realities on the ground, says Amr Hamzawi*
The Middle East is having to adjust itself to two political realities: US inefficacy and the growing diplomatic activity of regional parties. This extends beyond the Doha agreement that engineered a truce between Lebanese factions and the indirect Syrian- Israeli negotiations mediated by Turkey, in both of which the US was absent as an operative factor. There are other regional actions of varying origins and aims all intended to promote the peaceful management of the crises and conflicts that have beset the region and to restore equilibrium after the upheavals of recent years.
Many colleagues, notably Hassan Nafaa and Gamil Matar, have discussed at length, on the pages of Al-Hayat, the causes of the failure of US Middle East policy, placing particular emphasis on two major phenomena: the extremely costly occupation of Iraq and its enormous strategic reverberations, as epitomised in the rise of Iran's regional influence and the expanding scope of its operations; and, secondly, the decline in Washington's ability to promote a two-pronged agenda consisting of a security component (the war against terrorism) and an ideological component (a coalition of moderates versus an axis of evil) and which, in its extreme simplicity, does not intersect with the intricate realities of the region and, hence, fails to contribute to the creation of a realistic departure point for a drive to control the various crises in the region that would simultaneously serve to protect US interests. While I thoroughly concur with this analysis, I would like to raise three additional factors that explain the failure of Washington's Middle East policy.
Firstly, the Bush administration marginalised a key instrument that the US had always depended on in the exercise of its role and implementation of its policy in the Middle East: diplomacy, with both its incentive and punitive dimensions. Instead, this administration threw all its weight behind confrontationist and containment strategies, and their combative instruments, notably the military machine, arms pacts and security/intelligence activities. By the time the Bush administration, yielding to the pressures of Washington's Arab allies following the war against Lebanon in 2006, rediscovered diplomacy and invested some real effort into reviving the Palestinian- Israeli negotiating strategy, it was too late. Too little time was left for it to achieve sufficient inroads to generate qualitative shifts, and the regional parties had, in all events, lost faith in the ability of the American diplomacy to deliver.
More
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/902/op2.htm
Many colleagues, notably Hassan Nafaa and Gamil Matar, have discussed at length, on the pages of Al-Hayat, the causes of the failure of US Middle East policy, placing particular emphasis on two major phenomena: the extremely costly occupation of Iraq and its enormous strategic reverberations, as epitomised in the rise of Iran's regional influence and the expanding scope of its operations; and, secondly, the decline in Washington's ability to promote a two-pronged agenda consisting of a security component (the war against terrorism) and an ideological component (a coalition of moderates versus an axis of evil) and which, in its extreme simplicity, does not intersect with the intricate realities of the region and, hence, fails to contribute to the creation of a realistic departure point for a drive to control the various crises in the region that would simultaneously serve to protect US interests. While I thoroughly concur with this analysis, I would like to raise three additional factors that explain the failure of Washington's Middle East policy.
Firstly, the Bush administration marginalised a key instrument that the US had always depended on in the exercise of its role and implementation of its policy in the Middle East: diplomacy, with both its incentive and punitive dimensions. Instead, this administration threw all its weight behind confrontationist and containment strategies, and their combative instruments, notably the military machine, arms pacts and security/intelligence activities. By the time the Bush administration, yielding to the pressures of Washington's Arab allies following the war against Lebanon in 2006, rediscovered diplomacy and invested some real effort into reviving the Palestinian- Israeli negotiating strategy, it was too late. Too little time was left for it to achieve sufficient inroads to generate qualitative shifts, and the regional parties had, in all events, lost faith in the ability of the American diplomacy to deliver.
More
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/902/op2.htm
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Bill Richardson, the governor of New Mexico, a former US presidential candidate and a current key figure in the campaign backing Barack Obama, the Democratic candidate for this year's presidential elections, was in Cairo this week in an advanced attempt to promote Obama as a US president with a will to fortify good relations with the region, including Egypt, which he described as a country with a pivotal role for the stability of the Middle East.
On Monday, Richardson met President Hosni Mubarak, Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul-Gheit and Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa for talks on the potential of improving relations between Washington and Cairo and the rest of the Arab world should Obama enter the White House this year. Officials say Richardson was not short on criticism of US foreign policy on the Middle East during the past eight years of the George Bush administration and that he appreciated Egyptian and other Arab concerns over the situation in Iraq and the fate of the Arab- Israeli struggle. They added, however, that Richardson shared no clear or concrete proposals to remedy the harm done during the Bush years. Richardson was just there to acknowledge the mistakes and to promise the determination to engage in a concerted effort to rectify the situation, particularly in relation to what he qualified as a too-little-too-late intervention by the Bush administration to settle the Palestinian-Israeli problem.
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http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/902/eg1.htm
The Syrian regime depends on three major institutions to stay in power: the Baath Party, the army and the security and intelligence apparatus.
The Baath Party is the sole decision- maker in the country, at least according to the constitution. In real life, however, the party's National Command (NC, qiyada qotriya ) is little more than a rubberstamp committee. The NC approves without much debate the nomination of ministers, parliamentary members, governors and other top officials. It has never been known to oppose the president or make up its mind on public matters, whether political, economic, or cultural. In brief, the NC is a tool rather than a true associate in power. Its main role is bureaucratic and it doesn't venture much into decision-making.
More
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/902/re5.htm