Dashed hopes at Jerusalem summit

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas have failed to move forward towards resolving crucial issues relating to an Israeli pullout from the occupied Gaza Strip and peacemaking.

Aljazeera’s correspondent in Jerusalem said Sharon had offered to transfer security control in Qalqaliya and Bethlehem within two weeks provided the Palestinian leadership controls the resistance factions.

In addition, Sharon offered to allow entry of 16,000 Palestinian workers and ease the movement of Palestinians at crossings.

But, talking after the two-hour meeting at Sharon's residence in Jerusalem, Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qureia said: It was a difficult meeting and it did not meet our expectations.

"There were no positive answers to the issues we raised," Qureia said, mentioning the reopening of Gaza's airport, further releases of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails and Jewish settlement expansion in the West Bank.

In a gesture to Abbas, Sharon offered to pull back Israeli forces from Bethlehem and Qalqilya in the West Bank within two weeks, but conditioned the move on a credible Palestinian plan to rein in anti-Israel fighters, the Israeli leader's spokesman said.

"We are still taking casualties," Sharon complained to Abbas. The remarks seemed to set the tone for the session, which lasted a little more than two hours.

Gaza withdrawal

The meeting was held a day after Palestinian fighters killed a Jewish settler in the West Bank and Israeli soldiers shot dead a Palestinian civilian in a restricted area in the Gaza Strip, incidents that further frayed a four-month-old ceasefire.

In a sign of impatience with Abbas over his refusal to meet Israeli demands to disarm Palestinian resistance fighters, Israeli forces detained dozens of Islamic Jihad members in the biggest West Bank raid since he and Sharon declared the truce at a February summit in Egypt.

The Jerusalem summit, the first between an Israeli prime minister and a Palestinian president in the holy city at the heart of the Middle East conflict, brought both men together before Israel's planned withdrawal from Gaza in mid-August.

Despite US pressure to coordinate the pullout, Sharon and Abbas gave no outward sign of cooperation. They did not appear together in public during the summit, nor hold a joint news conference afterwards.

The Israeli leader has been seeking stronger steps from Abbas to prevent Palestinian fighters from disrupting the pullout and filling a potential power vacuum afterwards.

Palestinian prisoners

"The disengagement plan will go according to plan and schedule under two possible scenarios, either coordinated with the Palestinians - they take the necessary steps - or unilaterally, and we will take all the necessary steps," Sharon spokesman Raanan Gissin told CNN after the meeting.

Abbas says he needs to show Palestinians clear Israeli commitments to relieve burdens of occupation, such as roadblocks and sealed borders, in return for efforts to ensure the pullout is not carried out under fire.

He also wants Israel to free more of the 8000 Palestinians in its jails, including long-serving inmates. The issue, raised at the summit, is highly emotive for Palestinians.

"We are willing to consider that but there is no way that this thing could pass in the Knesset or in the government or in the Israeli public when terrorism continues," Gissin said.

Israel has freed 900 prisoners since the truce was declared.

Islamic Jihad arrests

Washington is counting on Israel's evacuation of all 21 settlements in Gaza and four of 120 in the West Bank to kick-start a US-backed international road map peace plan.

Sharon, however, reaffirmed at talks in Jerusalem on Sunday with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that he will not enter into talks on Palestinian statehood until Abbas disarms and dismantles resistance groups.

Abbas, whose January election to succeed the late Yasser Arafat revived peace hopes, says he wants to co-opt fighters into Palestinian security forces and their groups into mainstream politics rather than risk confrontation and possible civil war.

Just hours before the summit, Israeli soldiers took 52 Islamic Jihad members into custody in the West Bank.

Islamic Jihad said attacks it has carried out against Israelis since the ceasefire were in response to recent Israeli raids in the West Bank against several of its men.
Aljazeera + Agencies

http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/6CF40041-8E60-4FA1-A889-360B49C6144A.htm

OCCUPIED JERUSALEM, June21 , 2005 (IslamOnline.net & News Agencies) – Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Premier Ariel Sharon met in West Jerusalem on Tuesday, June21 , against a backdrop of massive Israeli arrests of Islamic Jihad members and a hunger strike by thousands of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails.

Just hours before the unprecedented summit at Sharon’s private residence, Israeli occupation troops rounded up 52 Islamic Jihad activists in the West Bank in the biggest sweep since the two men declared a truce, Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported.

Lieutenant colonel Erez Weiner, head of Israeli military operations in the West Bank, told AFP that more arrests would follow.

Immediately after the arrests, an Islamic Jihad spokesman urged Abbas to cancel the summit, while Hamas warned that “a declaration of an end to calm could be made at any moment”.

Abbas managed to convince Palestinian resistance factions in March into agreeing to a “period of calm” conditional on Israel ending its aggressions against them after an agreement with Sharon in the Egyptian resort of Sharm El-Sheikh in February.

Since then, the quasi-truce has been put to the test several times in view of continued Israeli violations.

Last month Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz gave his army a free hand in dealing with what Israel terms “militants” – a reference to Palestinian resistance fighters.

Over the past three months, many Palestinians were killed and wounded by Israeli gunfire, drawing retaliatory mortar and rocket attacks from Hamas and Islamic Jihad fighters on Jewish settlements in the occupied territories.

Huger Strike

To bring their ordeal to the limelight, Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails went on hunger strike Tuesday.

The largest Palestinian detainees' rights group, the Prisoners Club, said practically all8 , 000Palestinian detainees were following the order to refuse food.

“This strike is intended to remind Abu Mazen (Abbas) of the prisoners' cause and ask him to insist on a clear timetable for their release,” said Issa Qaraqaeh, director of the Bethlehem-based Prisoners Club.

In pre-summit statements, Abbas vowed to give first and foremost priority to the prisoners issue, promising their relatives to try his best to release every Palestinian prisoner.

The issue is one of the most emotive in the Palestinian society.

Since the truce declaration, Israel has reluctantly released 900 prisoners, most of whom were about to complete their terms.

Abbas is pressing for the release of more detainees, including those with long terms.

Summit Agenda

The release of prisoners, the planned Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in mid-August and the implementation of the understandings reached in the Sharm El-Sheikh summit are high on the agenda of the Abbas-Sharon summit.

Chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat said Abbas would press Sharon for further Israeli troop pullbacks from West Bank cities.

Israel has already pull out from Ramallah and Jericho, turning over security control to the Palestinian Authority.

Abbas aides said he would seek Sharon's agreement for a free passage corridor between Gaza and the West Bank and an end to Israeli settlement expansion.

Sharon told US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on Sunday, June19 , that he would not enter into talks on permanent peace deal with the Palestinians until Abbas disarmed and dismantled “militant” groups.

Abbas frequently said that he would not be dragged into a confrontation with the resistance factions, stressing that the Palestinians can settle their own differences through dialogue.

Low Expectations

Critics and analysts expected little, if not nothing, from the Abbas-Sharon meeting.

“Without help, without cooperation from the Israeli side, without the Israeli side treating him as a partner, as a neighbor, I do not think (Abbas) can do anything,” Palestinian National Security Adviser Jibril Rajoub said.

Israeli commentator Akiva Eldar, writing in the daily Haaretz, said Sharon's response to Abbas's requests would be as terse as a cellular telephone text message.

"Most prominent will be a combination of two letters, 'N' and 'O'."

No joint news conference was scheduled, another sign of low expectations.

Hamas also questioned the significance of the summit.

“The meeting ... will do nothing to change the realities on the ground, for the agenda of the Zionist entity is limited to implementing its retreat from Gaza and mobilizing the efforts of all parties to this end, including the Palestinians," the movement said in a statement.

Hamas further criticized Abbas for accepting Sharon’s invitation to hold the summit in Jerusalem.

“This is a dangerous precedent which could lead to recognition of the Zionist allegations proclaiming Jerusalem as their capital.”

http://islamonline.org/English/News/2005-06/21/article06.shtml

"OCCUPIED JERUSALEM,'

It'll be great once the Nazi arabs leave Jerusalem, it's time to end the OCCUPATION of Jewish land by the expansionist, racist, apatheid religiously intolerant moslem arabs

"OCCUPATION of Jewish land by the expansionist, racist, apatheid religiously intolerant moslem arabs"

Obviously this is at some level not a real argument and mainly just a childish response in the form of "no your the occupier", but I wouldnt be too surprised in some antiPalestinian types really do see Palestinians as invaders.

Here is one of the most detailed rebuttals Ive seen of the myth of Palestinians either moving to the region in the past 100 or so years or being remnants on an invasion 1000 years ago (although since the US was stolen over the past 400 years from Natiev Americans you would think that arguments over kicking peopel off land becasue of events 1000 years ago wouldnt matter to most peopel anyways):

---

It is still a matter of some debate to what extent Arabs replaced previous populations in the Middle East, and to what extent those populations merely adopted the Arabic language. However, the prevailing view of historians is that most of the population remained the same; the significant number of loanwords from earlier languages (Aramaic in the Fertile Crescent, Coptic in Egypt, Berber in the Maghreb), the retention of earlier cultural customs (especially well-documented for Egypt among the fellahin, but notably including sizable Christian communities throughout the area), and the relatively small population of Arabia all point to a continuity with the earlier population. The medieval North African sociologist Ibn Khaldun strongly argued for continuity, considering the Arabization of these populations to be a result of their imitating their rulers. Interestingly, in his time, the word "Arab" referred only to Bedouin and their direct descendants, and was not applied to city dwellers and farmers even if they had come to speak Arabic.

The Palestinian Bedouin, however, are much more securely known to be Arab by ancestry as well as by culture; their distinctively conservative dialects and pronunciation of qaaf as gaaf group them with other Bedouin across the Arab world and confirm their separate history. Their arrival in the Negev predates Islam by a considerable period; specifically Arabic onomastic elements began to appear in Edomite inscriptions starting in the 6th century BC, and are nearly universal in the inscriptions of the Nabataeans, who arrived there in the 4th-3rd centuries BC[3] (http://www.nabateans.org/israel.htm). A few Bedouin are found as far north as Galilee; however, these seem to be much later arrivals (although Sargon II settled Arabs in Samaria as early as 720 BC.)

As genetic techniques have advanced, it has become possible to look directly into the question of the ancestry of the Palestinians. In recent years, many genetic surveys have suggested that Jews and Palestinians (and in some cases other Levantines) are genetically closer to each other than either is to the Arabs of Arabia or to Europeans [4] (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=12743242) [5] (http://foundationstone.com.au/HtmlSupport/WebPage/semiticGenetics.html) [6] (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=8838913) [7] (http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F50C15F83F5D0C778DDDAC0894DA404482). (this collection (http://www.khazaria.com/genetics/abstracts.html) contains more links to genetic studies of Jewish and middle eastern populations.) These studies look at the prevalence of specific inherited genetic differences (polymorphism) among populations, which then allow the relatedness of these populations to be determined, and their ancestry to be traced back (see population genetics). These differences can be the cause of genetic disease or be completely neutral (see Single nucleotide polymorphism) ; they can be inherited maternally (mitochondrial DNA), paternally (Y chromosome), or as a mixture from both parents ; the results obtained may vary from polymorphism to polymorphism. One study [8] (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=11935342)on congenital deafness identified an allele only found in Palestinian and Ashkenazi communities, suggesting a common origin ; an investigation [9] (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=12820706) of a Y-chromosome polymorphism found Lebanese, Palestinian, and Sephardic populations to be particularly closely related ; a third study [10], looking at Human leukocyte antigen differences among a broad range of populations, found Palestinians to be particularly closely related to Ashkenazi and non-Ashkenazi Jews, as well as Middle-Eastern and Mediterranean populations. (The latter study by Antonio Arnaiz-Villena has been the subject of intense controversy, it was retracted by the journal and removed from its website, leading to further controversy; the main accusations made were that the authors used their scientific findings to justify making one-sided political proclamations in the paper; that the retraction followed lobbyist pressure because the results contradicted certain political beliefs; some suggested that the broad scientific interpretation was based on too narrow data [11] (http://www.nature.com/cgi-taf/Dynapage.taf?file=/nature/journal/v415/n6868/full/415115b_fs.html), whereas others support the scientific content as valid - for more information on the controversy : [12] (http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/326/7401/1262), [13] (http://observer.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,605798,00.html), [14] (http://www.forward.com/issues/2001/01.11.30/news7.html), [15] (http://www.tufts.edu/~skrimsky/PDF/nature_genetics.PDF).) If this close relatedness is true, it would confirm both Jews' and Palestinians' historical claims, suggesting a common Northwest Semitic ancestry. However, the results are complex, much work remains to be carried out, and partial results can be interpreted to suit diverse political agendas.

http://encyclopedia.laborlawtalk.com/Palestinian
---

One would think thata study showing jews adn Palestinians are more closely related than other groups would be welcomed, but instead the papers showing the relationship have been under attack:

Genetics paper erased from journal over political content

ERICA KLARREICH

A paper about the genetic origins of Palestinians has found itself at the centre of a political storm. In a highly unusual move, the journal Human Immunology has deleted the paper from its September issue after receiving a wealth of complaints over what some saw as inappropriate political comments about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

The paper examines genetic variability in the HLA complex — a highly diverse complex of immune-system genes — in a sample of Palestinians (A. Arnaiz-Villena et al. Hum. Immunol. 62, 889–900; 2001). But controversially, it also includes a historical introduction calling Jews living in the Gaza strip "colonists" and describing some Palestinians as living in concentration camps. The paper's publication sparked a "cascade" of angry letters complaining that such comments had no place in a scientific journal, says the journal's editor-in-chief, Nicole Suciu-Foca of Columbia University in New York.

The paper "purports to be a scientific treatise" but "offers opinion on geopolitical issues that cannot be substantiated by the data presented", wrote Dolly Tyan, then president of the American Society for Histocompatibility and Immunogenetics (ASHI), which runs the journal, in a letter to members on 3 October. "ASHI is offended and embarrassed by its inclusion within the journal."

The publisher of Human Immunology, Elsevier Science, has removed all electronic versions of the article and has sent a letter to individual subscribers and librarians advising them to ignore the article "or, preferably, to physically remove the relevant pages".

http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v414/n6862/full/414382a0_fs.html

Now some are claiming the study was bad science:
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v415/n6868/full/415115b_fs.html

But
"It is still a matter of some debate to what extent Arabs replaced previous populations in the Middle East, and to what extent those populations merely adopted the Arabic language. However, the prevailing view of historians is that most of the population remained the same; the significant number of loanwords from earlier languages (Aramaic in the Fertile Crescent, Coptic in Egypt, Berber in the Maghreb), the retention of earlier cultural customs (especially well-documented for Egypt among the fellahin, but notably including sizable Christian communities throughout the area), and the relatively small population of Arabia all point to a continuity with the earlier population. The medieval North African sociologist Ibn Khaldun strongly argued for continuity, considering the Arabization of these populations to be a result of their imitating their rulers."
http://psychcentral.com/psypsych/Palestinian

Since historians and linguists have already concluded that the evidence shows that Palestinians have most of their roots in Palestine before it became Muslim and there has been little controversy over genetic studies that show most E European Jews did come from the Middle East, its strange that a study showing that Jews and Palestinians are two very closely related populations is so controversial. I'm guessing the problem is one of Israelis not wanting to admit that any Palestinians forced out of what is now Israel were actually descendents of Jews who converted to Islam but its really hard to believe that people can place such a high value on land claims from 1000+ years ago and very little value on land claims from 60 years ago.

It's Jebusite land. The city was two thousand years old before Jews even showed up on the scene.

"This city has known many wars and various periods of occupation. According to Jewish tradition it was founded by Abraham's forefathers Shem and Eber. In Genesis it was ruled by Melchizedek, regarded in Jewish tradition as being a priest of God and identical to Shem. Later it was conquered by the Jebusites. After this it came under Jewish control. The Bible records that King David defeated the Jebusites in war and captured the city without destroying it. David then expanded the city to the south, and declared it the capital city of the united Kingdom of Israel."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jerusalem#Antiquity_.28Prehistory_-_6_CE.29

"According to the Hebrew Bible the Jebusites (Hebrew יבוסי Yəbhûsî, Yevusi, Y'vusi) were a Canaänite tribe who inhabited the region around Jerusalem in pre-biblical times (second millennium BC). Jerusalem was known as Jebus until King David conquered it, an event estimated to have occurred in 1004 BC. Though the haredim, the strictly Orthodox Jews, have their own chronology, which places the event later, the date was commemorated in an Israeli medal issued in 1996"
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jebusite

Of course you have empires like that of Sumer going back 2000 yeras beforet his time in the same general area so any talk of "we were here first" is pretty pointless.

The Jebusites dont get much press but Homer Simpson apparently worships someone name Jebus.

You didn't see any of the dramatic footage of the Israeli army's arrest yesterday of a 21-year old, female Palestinian homicide-bomber, strapped with 25 pounds of high-explosives, just moments before she was to commit mass-murder by detonating herself inside an Israeli hospital.

Utterly ignoring the extraordinary video of the homicide-bomber's arrest, both the BBC and CNN focused extensively on how much "damage" Israel's early morning arrest - for which there was no video - of 55 Fatah and Islamic Jihad terrorists, described by CNN as "Palestinian activists," would cause to today's scheduled "summit meeting" between Israeli Prime Minister Sharon and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.

That only one network would air incredible footage of the seizure of a ticking human-bomb, just moments before she tried to murder hospital patients, means this story was not simply ignored by the mainstream media - it was boycotted by the mainstream media. Since nearly every aspect of this remarkable story contradicts everything the mainstream media has been trying to tell us about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, they just opted for the easiest way to handle it - denying it ever happened.

Not covering it meant not having to show that Israel's planned unilateral withdrawal from Gaza next month will not decrease terror - it will increase terror. Had the Israeli army not been in Gaza yesterday, dozens of Israelis would have been killed and hundreds wounded at Beer Sheva's Soroka Medical Center.

Ignoring the story meant the networks didn't need to tell viewers that yesterday's homicide-bomber was not dispatched by terrorists of Islamic Jihad or Hamas, groups opposed to President Abbas, but was in fact working for the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigade, which is controlled by the political party Fatah, whose chairman is none other than President Abbas himself!

Ignoring the story meant not having to reveal that the would-be-murderer had been traveling regularly to Israel for years on a valid medical pass, which granted the woman free treatment for burns she received in a home cooking accident, and was thus ruthlessly exploited by depraved terrorists whose shameless capacity to cynically manipulate goodness, in their pursuit of murder and death, knows no bounds.

Granted, none of this prevented the ultra-left wing terrorist coddlers at the UN-supported "Physicians for Human Rights" to warn Israel against using what it called "the unfortunate incident" as an excuse to toughen restrictions on the issuance of medical passes. Terrorists target Israeli hospitals and UN support-groups respond by admonishing Israel.

Ignoring the story meant not having to cover comments the female-terrorist made in a rare army supervised press conference in which she revealed what her mission was and who sent her. "I believe in death," she said on Israeli TV. "All my life I have been preparing to be a martyr. Mother, please forgive me for failing in [my] mission." Sentiments not exactly consistent with the line long peddled by the liberal media, and more recently even by the Bush administration, that Israel is the obstacle to "peace."

"but was in fact working for the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigade, which is controlled by the political party Fatah"

Perhaps thats why they were caught and the bombing didnt happen. Abbas is working pretty closely with the Israelis right now and if anyone in Fatah knew about an attempted suicide bombing its likely that Fatah itself helped give the information to the Isralis that lead to this arrest.

Crazed Settlers trying to blow up the Temple Mount may be driven by hatred that was spread by the Likud Party but the arrest of someone who belongs to Likud atempting to attack the Temple Mount wouldnt reflect negatively on Likud and neither should a thwarted bombing reflect on Abbas (especially when its likely that Abbas helped thwart the bombing you bring up).

Facinating! Although alot of history passed through Israel thats not accounted for in these theories. It seems to me that alot of the people of the Middle East i.e. the Assyrians, Bablyonians etc ALL were of North Semitic ancestry. As we all recall, the Asyrian Empire did include that piece of real estate and did plant colonies there. One might just as likely argue that any North Semitic genes in the Palestinian population came from the Asyrians or Bablyonians as anyone else. As to Bablyonians, they were fond of wiping out entire populations and enslaving the survivors i.e. the Phillistines. Its wild, unsupported speculation to attempt to declare the Palestinians the heirs of the Canaanites. Thereafter, lets remember that the land of Israel went through the rule of a list of colonial occupiers, the Mongol massacres, various plagues, including the bubonic plague twice and finally corrupt mis-rule by the Turks including de-forestation and driving sharecroppers from the land. Its just not been a simple place.

As a Hebrew reader, I found it interesting to find that the famous Moabite Stela is quite readable, althoughnot 100% to a reader of Biblical Hebrew. My guessis that these people, Cananite were quite closely related to the Hebrews, but with a different religion. Perhaps they were among the Edomites ("Idumeans") that all converted to Judaism.

International Law
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


International Court of Justice - Summary of the Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004
Summary, International Court of Justice, July 10th, 2004

History of the proceedings (paras. 1-12)

The Court first recalls that on 10 December 2003 the Secretary-General of the United Nations officially communicated to the Court the decision taken by the General Assembly to submit the question set forth in its resolution ES-10/14, adopted on 8 December 2003 at its Tenth Emergency Special Session, for an advisory opinion. The question is the following:

"What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, as described in the report of the Secretary-General, considering the rules and principles of international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions?"

The Court then gives a short overview of the history of the proceedings.


Questions of jurisdiction (paras. 13-42)

At the outset of its reasoning the Court observes that, when seised of a request for an advisory opinion, it must first consider whether it has jurisdiction to give the opinion requested and whether, should the answer be in the affirmative, there is any reason why it should decline to exercise any such jurisdiction.

The Court first addresses the question whether it possesses jurisdiction to give the advisory opinion. It notes first that the competence of the Court in this regard is based on Article 65, paragraph 1, of its Statute, according to which the Court "may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request", and secondly that the General Assembly, which seeks the advisory opinion, is authorized to do so by Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter, which provides: "The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question." As it has done sometimes in the past, the Court then turns to the relationship between the question which is the subject of a request for an advisory opinion and the activities of the Assembly. It observes in this respect that Article 10 of the Charter has conferred upon the General Assembly a competence relating to "any questions or any matters" within the scope of the Charter, and that Article 11, paragraph 2, has specifically provided it with competence on "questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations..." and to make recommendations under certain conditions fixed by those Articles. It notes that the question of the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory was brought before the General Assembly by a number of Member States in the context of the Tenth Emergency Special Session of the Assembly, convened to deal with what the Assembly, in its resolution ES-10/2 of 25 April 1997, considered to constitute a threat to international peace and security.

After recalling the sequence of events that led to the adoption of resolution ES-10/14, the Court turns to the first question of jurisdiction raised in the present proceedings. Israel has alleged that, given the active engagement of the Security Council with the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question, the General Assembly acted ultra vires under the Charter, because its request for an advisory opinion was not in accordance with Article 12, paragraph 1, of the Charter, which provides that: "While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests." The Court first observes that a request for an advisory opinion is not a "recommendation" by the General Assembly "with regard to [a] dispute or situation", within the meaning of Article 12, but considers it appropriate to examine the significance of that Article, having regard to the practice of the United Nations. It notes that, under Article 24 of the Charter, the Security Council has "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" and that both the Security Council and the General Assembly initially interpreted and applied Article 12 to the effect that the Assembly could not make a recommendation on a question concerning the maintenance of international peace and security while the matter remained on the Council's agenda, but that this interpretation of Article 12 has evolved subsequently. The Court takes note of an interpretation of that text given by the United Nations Legal Counsel at the Twenty-third Session of the Assembly, and of an increasing tendency over time for the General Assembly and the Security Council to deal in parallel with the same matter concerning the maintenance of international peace and security. The Court considers that the accepted practice of the Assembly, as it has evolved, is consistent with Article 12, paragraph 1; it is accordingly of the view that the General Assembly, in adopting resolution ES-10/14, seeking an advisory opinion from the Court, did not contravene the provisions of Article 12, paragraph 1, of the Charter. The Court concludes that by submitting that request the General Assembly did not exceed its competence.

The Court recalls that it has however been contended before it that the request did not fulfil the essential conditions set by resolution 377 A (V), under which the Tenth Emergency Special Session was convened and has continued to act.


Resolution 377 A (V) provides that:

"if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures . . .". The Court proceeds to ascertain whether the conditions laid down by this resolution were fulfilled as regards the convening of the Tenth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, in particular at the time when the Assembly decided to request an advisory opinion from the Court.

In light of the sequence of events as described by it, the Court observes that, at the time when the Tenth Emergency Special Session was convened in 1997, the Council had been unable to take a decision on the case of certain Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, due to a negative vote of a permanent member; and that, as indicated in resolution ES-10/2, there existed a threat to international peace and security. The Court further notes that, on 20 October 2003, the Tenth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly was reconvened on the same basis as in 1997, after the rejection by the Security Council, on 14 October 2003, again as a result of the negative vote of a permanent member, of a draft resolution concerning the construction by Israel of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The Court considers that the Security Council again failed to act as contemplated in resolution 377 A (V). It does not appear to the Court that the situation in this regard changed between 20 October 2003 and 8 December 2003, since the Council neither discussed the construction of the wall nor adopted any resolution in that connection. Thus, the Court is of the view that, up to 8 December 2003, the Council had not reconsidered the negative vote of 14 October 2003. The Court concludes that, during that period, the Tenth Emergency Special Session was duly reconvened and could properly be seised of the matter now before the Court, under resolution 377 A (V).

The Court also emphasizes that, in the course of this Emergency Special Session, the General Assembly could adopt any resolution falling within the subject-matter for which the Session had been convened, and otherwise within its powers, including a resolution seeking the Court's opinion. It is irrelevant in that regard that no proposal had been made to the Security Council to request such an opinion.

Turning to alleged further procedural irregularities of the Tenth Emergency Special Session, the Court does not consider that the "rolling" character of that Session, namely the fact of it having been convened in April 1997 and reconvened 11 times since then, has any relevance with regard to the validity of the request by the General Assembly. In response to the contention by Israel that it was improper to reconvene the Tenth Emergency Special Session at a time when the regular Session of the General Assembly was in progress, the Court observes that, while it may not have been originally contemplated that it would be appropriate for the General Assembly to hold simultaneous emergency and regular sessions, no rule of the Organization has been identified which would be thereby violated, so as to render invalid the resolution adopting the present request for an advisory opinion. Finally, the Tenth Emergency Special Session appears to have been convened in accordance with Rule 9 (b) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, and the relevant meetings have been convened in pursuance of the applicable rules.

The Court turns to a further issue related to jurisdiction namely the contention that the request for an advisory opinion by the General Assembly does not raise a "legal question" within the meaning of Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter and Article 65, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court.

As regards the alleged lack of clarity of the terms of the General Assembly's request and its effect on the "legal nature" of the question referred to the Court, the Court observes that this question is directed to the legal consequences arising from a given factual situation considering the rules and principles of international law, including the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 (hereinafter the "Fourth Geneva Convention") and relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. In the view of the Court, it is indeed a question of a legal character. The Court further points out that lack of clarity in the drafting of a question does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction. Rather, such uncertainty will require clarification in interpretation, and such necessary clarifications of interpretation have frequently been given by the Court. Therefore, the Court will, as it has done often in the past, "identify the existing principles and rules, interpret them and apply them..., thus offering a reply to the question posed based on law" (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 234, para. 13). The Court points out that, in the present instance, if the General Assembly requests the Court to state the "legal consequences" arising from the construction of the wall, the use of these terms necessarily encompasses an assessment of whether that construction is or is not in breach of certain rules and principles of international law.

The Court does not consider that what is contended to be the abstract nature of the question posed to it raises an issue of jurisdiction. Even when the matter was raised as an issue of propriety rather than one of jurisdiction, in the case concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Court took the clear position that to contend that it should not deal with a question couched in abstract terms is "a mere affirmation devoid of any justification" and that "the Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question, abstract or otherwise" (I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 236, para. 15).

The Court finds that it furthermore cannot accept the view, which has also been advanced, that it has no jurisdiction because of the "political" character of the question posed. As is clear from its long-standing jurisprudence on this point, the Court considers that the fact that a legal question also has political aspects, "does not suffice to deprive it of its character as a 'legal question' and to 'deprive the Court of a competence expressly conferred on it by its Statute', and the Court cannot refuse to admit the legal character of a question which invites it to discharge an essentially judicial task" (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 234, para. 13).

The Court accordingly concludes that it has jurisdiction to give the advisory opinion requested by resolution ES-10/14 of the General Assembly.


Discretionary power of the Court to exercise its jurisdiction (paras. 43-65)

The Court notes that it has been contended, however, that the Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction because of the presence of specific aspects of the General Assembly's request that would render the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction improper and inconsistent with the Court's judicial function.

The Court first recalls that Article 65, paragraph 1, of its Statute, which provides that "The Court may give an advisory opinion..." (emphasis added), should be interpreted to mean that the Court retains a discretionary power to decline to give an advisory opinion even if the conditions of jurisdiction are met. It is mindful however of the fact that its answer to a request for an advisory opinion "represents its participation in the activities of the Organization, and, in principle, should not be refused". From this it follows that, given its responsibilities as the "principal judicial organ of the United Nations" (Article 92 of the Charter), the Court should in principle not decline to give an advisory opinion, and only "compelling reasons" should lead the Court to do so.

The first argument presented to the Court in this regard is to the effect that it should not exercise its jurisdiction in the present case because the request concerns a contentious matter between Israel and Palestine, in respect of which Israel has not consented to the exercise of that jurisdiction. According to this view, the subject-matter of the question posed by the General Assembly "is an integral part of the wider Israeli-Palestinian dispute concerning questions of terrorism, security, borders, settlements, Jerusalem and other related matters". The Court observes in this respect that the lack of consent to the Court's contentious jurisdiction by interested States has no bearing on the Court's jurisdiction to give an advisory opinion, but recalls its jurisprudence to the effect that the lack of consent of an interested State might render the giving of an advisory opinion incompatible with the Court's judicial character, e.g. if to give a reply would have the effect of circumventing the principle that a State is not obliged to submit its disputes to judicial settlement without its consent.

As regards the request for an advisory opinion now before it, the Court acknowledges that Israel and Palestine have expressed radically divergent views on the legal consequences of Israel's construction of the wall, on which the Court has been asked to pronounce in the context of the opinion it would give. However, as the Court has itself noted before, "Differences of views . . . on legal issues have existed in practically every advisory proceeding." Furthermore, the Court does not consider that the subject-matter of the General Assembly's request can be regarded as only a bilateral matter between Israel and Palestine. Given the powers and responsibilities of the United Nations in questions relating to international peace and security, it is the Court's view that the construction of the wall must be deemed to be directly of concern to the United Nations in general and the General Assembly in particular. The responsibility of the United Nations in this matter also has its origin in the Mandate and the Partition Resolution concerning Palestine. This responsibility has been described by the General Assembly as "a permanent responsibility towards the question of Palestine until the question is resolved in all its aspects in a satisfactory manner in accordance with international legitimacy" (General Assembly resolution 57/107 of 3 December 2002). The object of the request before the Court is to obtain from the Court an opinion which the General Assembly deems of assistance to it for the proper exercise of its functions. The opinion is requested on a question which is of particularly acute concern to the United Nations, and one which is located in a much broader frame of reference than a bilateral dispute. In the circumstances, the Court does not consider that to give an opinion would have the effect of circumventing the principle of consent to judicial settlement, and the Court accordingly cannot, in the exercise of its discretion, decline to give an opinion on that ground.

The Court then turns to another argument raised in support of the view that it should decline to exercise its jurisdiction: that an advisory opinion from the Court on the legality of the wall and the legal consequences of its construction could impede a political, negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. More particularly, it has been contended that such an opinion could undermine the scheme of the "Roadmap", which requires Israel and Palestine to comply with certain obligations in various phases referred to therein. The Court observes that it is conscious that the "Roadmap", which was endorsed by Security Council resolution 1515 (2003), constitutes a negotiating framework for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but that it is not clear what influence its opinion might have on those negotiations: participants in the present proceedings have expressed differing views in this regard. The Court finds that it cannot regard this factor as a compelling reason to decline to exercise its jurisdiction.

It was also put to the Court by certain participants that the question of the construction of the wall was only one aspect of the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict which could not be properly addressed in the present proceedings. The Court does not however consider this a reason for it to decline to reply to the question asked: it is aware, and would take into account, that the question of the wall is part of a greater whole. At the same time, the question which the General Assembly has chosen to ask of the Court is confined to the legal consequences of the construction of the wall, and that the Court would only examine other issues to the extent that they might be necessary to its consideration of the question put to it.

The further argument has been raised that the Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction because it does not have at its disposal the requisite facts and evidence to enable it to reach its conclusions. According to Israel, if the Court decided to give the requested opinion, it would be forced to speculate about essential facts and make assumptions about arguments of law. The Court points out that in the present instance, it has at its disposal the report of the Secretary-General, as well as a voluminous dossier submitted by him to the Court, comprising not only detailed information on the route of the wall but also on its humanitarian and socio-economic impact on the Palestinian population. The dossier includes several reports based on on-site visits by special rapporteurs and competent organs of the United Nations. Moreover, numerous other participants have submitted to the Court written statements which contain information relevant to a response to the question put by the General Assembly. The Court notes in particular that Israel's Written Statement, although limited to issues of jurisdiction and propriety, contained observations on other matters, including Israel's concerns in terms of security, and was accompanied by corresponding annexes; and that many other documents issued by the Israeli Government on those matters are in the public domain.

The Court therefore finds that it has before it sufficient information and evidence to enable it to give the advisory opinion requested by the General Assembly. Moreover, the circumstance that others may evaluate and interpret these facts in a subjective or political manner can be no argument for a court of law to abdicate its judicial task. There is therefore in the present case no lack of information such as to constitute a compelling reason for the Court to decline to give the requested opinion.

Another argument that has been advanced is that the Court should decline to give the requested opinion on the legal consequences of the construction of the wall because such opinion would lack any useful purpose: the General Assembly would not need an opinion of the Court because it has already declared the construction of the wall to be illegal and has already determined the legal consequences by demanding that Israel stop and reverse its construction and further, because the General Assembly has never made it clear how it intended to use the opinion. The Court observes that, as is clear from its jurisprudence, advisory opinions have the purpose of furnishing to the requesting organs the elements of law necessary for them in their action. It recalls what it stated in its Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: "it is not for the Court itself to purport to decide whether or not an advisory opinion is needed by the Assembly for the performance of its functions. The General Assembly has the right to decide for itself on the usefulness of an opinion in the light of its own needs." It thus follows that the Court cannot decline to answer the question posed based on the ground that its opinion would lack any useful purpose. The Court cannot substitute its assessment of the usefulness of the opinion requested for that of the organ that seeks such opinion, namely the General Assembly. Furthermore, and in any event, the Court considers that the General Assembly has not yet determined all the possible consequences of its own resolution. The Court's task would be to determine in a comprehensive manner the legal consequences of the construction of the wall, while the General Assembly ? and the Security Council ? may then draw conclusions from the Court's findings.

Lastly, another argument advanced by Israel with regard to the propriety of its giving an advisory opinion in the present proceedings is that Palestine, given its responsibility for acts of violence against Israel and its population which the wall is aimed at addressing, cannot seek from the Court a remedy for a situation resulting from its own wrongdoing. Therefore, Israel concludes, good faith and the principle of "clean hands" provide a compelling reason that should lead the Court to refuse the General Assembly's request. The Court does not consider this argument to be pertinent. It emphasizes, as earlier, that it was the General Assembly which requested the advisory opinion, and that the opinion is to be given to the General Assembly, and not to an individual State or entity.


In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to give an opinion on the question put to it by the General Assembly and that there is no compelling reason for it to use its discretionary power not to give that opinion.


Scope of the question before the Court (paras. 66-69)

The Court then proceeds to address the question put to it by General Assembly resolution ES-10/14 (see above). The Court explains that it has chosen to use the term "wall" employed by the General Assembly, because the other terms used ? "fence" or "barrier" ? are no more accurate if understood in the physical sense. It further notes that the request of the General Assembly concerns the legal consequences of the wall being built "in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem", and considers that it is not called upon to examine the legal consequences arising from the construction of those parts of the wall which are on the territory of Israel itself.


Historical background (paras. 70-78)

In order to indicate the legal consequences of the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Court has first to determine whether or not the construction of that wall breaches international law. To this end, it first makes a brief historical analysis of the status of the territory concerned since the time that Palestine, having been part of the Ottoman Empire, was, at the end of the First World War, the subject of a class "A" mandate entrusted by the League of Nations to Great Britain. In the course of this analysis, the Court mentions the hostilities of 1948-1949, and the armistice demarcation line between Israeli and Arab forces fixed by a general armistice agreement of 3 April 1949 between Israel and Jordan, referred to as the "Green Line". At the close of its analysis, the Court notes that the territories situated between the Green Line and the former eastern boundary of Palestine under the Mandate were occupied by Israel in 1967 during the armed conflict between Israel and Jordan. Under customary international law, the Court observes, these were therefore occupied territories in which Israel had the status of occupying Power. Subsequent events in these territories have done nothing to alter this situation. The Court concludes that all these territories (including East Jerusalem) remain occupied territories and that Israel has continued to have the status of occupying Power.


Description of the wall (paras. 79-85)

The Court goes on to describe, on the basis of the information available to it in a report by the United Nations Secretary-General and the Written Statement presented to the Court by the Secretary-General, the works already constructed or in course of construction in that territory. Relevant rules and principles of international law (paras. 86-113)

It then turns to the determination of the rules and principles of international law which are relevant in assessing the legality of the measures taken by Israel. It observes that such rules and principles can be found in the United Nations Charter and certain other treaties, in customary international law and in the relevant resolutions adopted pursuant to the Charter by the General Assembly and the Security Council. It is aware, however, that doubts have been expressed by Israel as to the applicability in the Occupied Palestinian Territory of certain rules of international humanitarian law and human rights instruments.


United Nations Charter and General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) (paras. 87-88)

The Court first recalls Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter, which provides that:

"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations," and General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), entitled "Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States" (hereinafter "resolution 2625 (XXV)"), in which the Assembly emphasized that "No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal." As stated in the Court's Judgment in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), the principles as to the use of force incorporated in the Charter reflect customary international law (see I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 98-101, paras. 187-190); the same is true, it observes, of its corollary entailing the illegality of territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force.

As to the principle of self-determination of peoples, the Court points out that it has been enshrined in the United Nations Charter and reaffirmed by the General Assembly in resolution 2625 (XXV) cited above, pursuant to which "Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to [in that resolution] ... of their right to self-determination." Article 1 common to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reaffirms the right of all peoples to self-determination, and lays upon the States parties the obligation to promote the realization of that right and to respect it, in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. The Court recalls its previous case law, which emphasized that current developments in "international law in regard to non-self-governing territories, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, made the principle of self-determination applicable to all [such territories]", and that the right of peoples to self-determination is today a right erga omnes.


International humanitarian law (paras. 89-101)

As regards international humanitarian law, the Court first recalls that Israel is not a party to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, to which the Hague Regulations are annexed. It considers, however, that the provisions of the Hague Regulations have become part of customary law, as is in fact recognized by all the participants in the proceedings before the Court. The Court also observes that, pursuant to Article 154 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, that Convention is supplementary to Sections II and III of the Hague Regulations. Section III of those Regulations, which concerns "Military authority over the territory of the hostile State", is particularly pertinent in the present case.

Secondly, with regard to the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Court takes note that differing views have been expressed by the participants in these proceedings. Israel, contrary to the great majority of the participants, disputes the applicability de jure of the Convention to the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The Court recalls that the Fourth Geneva Convention was ratified by Israel on 6 July 1951 and that Israel is a party to that Convention; that Jordan has also been a party thereto since 29 May 1951; and that neither of the two States has made any reservation that would be pertinent to the present proceedings. The Court observes that the Israeli authorities have indicated on a number of occasions that in fact they generally apply the humanitarian provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention within the occupied territories. However, according to Israel's position, that Convention is not applicable de jure within those territories because, under Article 2, paragraph 2, it applies only in the case of occupation of territories falling under the sovereignty of a High Contracting Party involved in an armed conflict. Israel explains that the territories occupied by Israel subsequent to the 1967 conflict had not previously fallen under Jordanian sovereignty.

The Court notes that, according to the first paragraph of Article 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, when two conditions are fulfilled, namely that there exists an armed conflict (whether or not a state of war has been recognized), and that the conflict has arisen between two contracting parties, then the Convention applies, in particular, in any territory occupied in the course of the conflict by one of the contracting parties. The object of the second paragraph of Article 2, which refers to "occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party", is not to restrict the scope of application of the Convention, as defined by the first paragraph, by excluding therefrom territories not falling under the sovereignty of one of the contracting parties, but simply to making it clear that, even if occupation effected during the conflict met no armed resistance, the Convention is still applicable.

This interpretation reflects the intention of the drafters of the Fourth Geneva Convention to protect civilians who find themselves, in whatever way, in the hands of the occupying Power, regardless of the status of the occupied territories, and is confirmed by the Convention's travaux préparatoires. The States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, at their Conference on 15 July 1999, approved that interpretation, which has also been adopted by the ICRC, the General Assembly and the Security Council. The Court finally makes mention of a judgment of the Supreme Court of Israel dated 30 May 2004, to a similar effect.

In view of the foregoing, the Court considers that the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable in the Palestinian territories which before the 1967 conflict lay to the east of the Green Line and which, during that conflict, were occupied by Israel, there being no need for any enquiry into the precise prior status of those territories.


Human rights law (paras. 102-113)

The participants in the proceedings before the Court also disagree whether the international human rights conventions to which Israel is party apply within the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Annex I to the report of the Secretary-General states:

"4. Israel denies that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both of which it has signed, are applicable to the occupied Palestinian territory. It asserts that humanitarian law is the protection granted in a conflict situation such as the one in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, whereas human rights treaties were intended for the protection of citizens from their own Government in times of peace."

On 3 October 1991 Israel ratified both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 19 December 1966 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of the same date, as well as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989.

On the question of the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, the Court first recalls its finding, in a previous case, that the protection of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not cease in time of war (I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 240, para. 25). More generally, it considers that the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It notes that there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law. In order to answer the question put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, international humanitarian law.

It remains to be determined whether the two international Covenants and the Convention on the Rights of the Child are applicable only on the territories of the States parties thereto or whether they are also applicable outside those territories and, if so, in what circumstances. After examination of the provision of the two international Covenants, in the light of the relevant travaux préparatoires and of the position of Israel in communications to the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Court concludes that those instruments are applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory. In the case of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Israel is also under an obligation not to raise any obstacle to the exercise of such rights in those fields where competence has been transferred to Palestinian authorities. The Court further concludes that the Convention on the Rights of the Child is also applicable within the Occupied Palestinian Territory.


Violation of relevant rules (paras. 114-142)

The Court next proceeds to ascertain whether the construction of the wall has violated the rules and principles of international law found relevant to reply to the question posed by the General Assembly.


Impact on right of Palestinian people to self-determination (paras. 115-122)

It notes in this regard the contentions of Palestine and other participants that the construction of the wall is "an attempt to annex the territory contrary to international law" and "a violation of the legal principle prohibiting the acquisition of territory by the use of force" and that "the de facto annexation of land interferes with the territorial sovereignty and consequently with the right of the Palestinians to self-determination". It notes also that Israel, for its part, has argued that the wall's sole purpose is to enable it effectively to combat terrorist attacks launched from the West Bank, and that Israel has repeatedly stated that the Barrier is a temporary measure.

The Court recalls that both the General Assembly and the Security Council have referred, with regard to Palestine, to the customary rule of "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war". As regards the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination, the Court observes that the existence of a "Palestinian people" is no longer in issue, and has been recognized by Israel, along with that people's "legitimate rights". The Court considers that those rights include the right to self-determination, as the General Assembly has moreover recognized on a number of occasions.

The Court notes that the route of the wall as fixed by the Israeli Government includes within the "Closed Area" (i.e. the part of the West Bank lying between the Green Line and the wall) some 80 per cent of the settlers living in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and has been traced in such a way as to include within that area the great majority of the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (including East Jerusalem). The information provided to the Court shows that, since 1977, Israel has conducted a policy and developed practices involving the establishment of settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, contrary to the terms of Article 49, paragraph 6, of the Fourth Geneva Convention which provides: "The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies." The Security Council has taken the view that such policy and practices "have no legal validity" and constitute a "flagrant violation" of the Convention. The Court concludes that the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (including East Jerusalem) have been established in breach of international law.

Whilst taking note of the assurance given by Israel that the construction of the wall does not amount to annexation and that the wall is of a temporary nature, the Court nevertheless considers that the construction of the wall and its associated régime create a "fait accompli" on the ground that could well become permanent, in which case, and notwithstanding the formal characterization of the wall by Israel, it would be tantamount to de facto annexation.

The Court considers moreover that the route chosen for the wall gives expression in loco to the illegal measures taken by Israel with regard to Jerusalem and the settlements, as deplored by the Security Council. There is also a risk of further alterations to the demographic composition of the Occupied Palestinian Territory resulting from the construction of the wall inasmuch as it is contributing to the departure of Palestinian populations from certain areas. That construction, along with measures taken previously, thus severely impedes the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination, and is therefore a breach of Israel's obligation to respect that right.


Relevant international humanitarian law and human rights instruments (paras. 123-137)

The construction of the wall also raises a number of issues in relation to the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law and of human rights instruments.

The Court first enumerates and quotes a number of such provisions applicable in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including articles of the 1907 Hague Regulations, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. In this connection it also refers to obligations relating to guarantees of access to the Christian, Jewish and Islamic Holy Places.

From the information submitted to the Court, particularly the report of the Secretary-General, it appears that the construction of the wall has led to the destruction or requisition of properties under conditions which contravene the requirements of Articles 46 and 52 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 and of Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

That construction, the establishment of a closed area between the Green Line and the wall itself, and the creation of enclaves, have moreover imposed substantial restrictions on the freedom of movement of the inhabitants of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (with the exception of Israeli citizens and those assimilated thereto). There have also been serious repercussions for agricultural production, and increasing difficulties for the population concerned regarding access to health services, educational establishments and primary sources of water.

In the view of the Court, the construction of the wall would also deprive a significant number of Palestinians of the "freedom to choose [their] residence". In addition, since a significant number of Palestinians have already been compelled by the construction of the wall and its associated régime to depart from certain areas, a process that will continue as more of the wall is built, that construction, coupled with the establishment of the Israeli settlements mentioned above, is tending to alter the demographic composition of the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

In sum, the Court is of the opinion that the construction of the wall and its associated régime impede the liberty of movement of the inhabitants of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (with the exception of Israeli citizens and those assimilated thereto) as guaranteed under Article 12, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. They also impede the exercise by the persons concerned of the right to work, to health, to education and to an adequate standard of living as proclaimed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Lastly, the construction of the wall and its associated régime, by contributing to the demographic changes mentioned, contravene Article 49, paragraph 6, of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the pertinent Security Council resolutions cited earlier.

The Court then examines certain provisions of the applicable international humanitarian law enabling account to be taken in certain circumstances of military exigencies, which may in its view be invoked in occupied territories even after the general close of the military operations that led to their occupation; it points out, however, that only Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention contains a relevant provision of this kind, and finds that, on the material before it, the Court is not convinced that the destructions carried out contrary to the prohibition in that Article were "rendered absolutely necessary by military operations" so as to fall within the exception.

Similarly, the Court examines provisions in some human rights conventions permitting derogation from, or qualifying, the rights guaranteed by those conventions, but finds, on the basis of the information available to it, that the conditions laid down by such provisions are not met in the present instance.

In sum, the Court finds that, from the material available to it, it is not convinced that the specific course Israel has chosen for the wall was necessary to attain its security objectives. The wall, along the route chosen, and its associated régime gravely infringe a number of rights of Palestinians residing in the territory occupied by Israel, and the infringements resulting from that route cannot be justified by military exigencies or by the requirements of national security or public order. The construction of such a wall accordingly constitutes breaches by Israel of various of its obligations under the applicable international humanitarian law and human rights instruments.


Self-defence and state of necessity (paras. 138-141)

The Court recalls that Annex I to the report of the Secretary-General states, however, that, according to Israel: "the construction of the Barrier is consistent with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, its inherent right to self-defence and Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001)".

Article 51 of the Charter, the Court notes, recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against another State. However, Israel does not claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State. The Court also notes that Israel exercises control in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and that, as Israel itself states, the threat which it regards as justifying the construction of the wall originates within, and not outside, that territory. The situation is thus different from that contemplated by Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001), and therefore Israel could not in any event invoke those resolutions in support of its claim to be exercising a right of self-defence. Consequently, the Court concludes that Article 51 of the Charter has no relevance in this case.

The Court considers further whether Israel could rely on a state of necessity which would preclude the wrongfulness of the construction of the wall. In this regard, citing its decision in the case concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), it observes that the state of necessity is a ground recognized by customary international law that "can only be invoked under certain strictly defined conditions which must be cumulatively satisfied" (I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 40, para. 51), one of those conditions being that the act at issue be the only way for the State to guard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril. In the light of the material before it, the Court is not convinced that the construction of the wall along the route chosen was the only means to safeguard the interests of Israel against the peril which it has invoked as justification for that construction. While Israel has the right, and indeed the duty to respond to the numerous and deadly acts of violence directed against its civilian population, in order to protect the life of its citizens, the measures taken are bound to remain in conformity with applicable international law. Israel cannot rely on a right of self-defence or on a state of necessity in order to preclude the wrongfulness of the construction of the wall. The Court accordingly finds that the construction of the wall, and its associated régime, are contrary to international law.


Legal consequences of the violations (paras. 143-160)

The Court then examines the consequences of the violations by Israel of its international obligations. After recalling the contentions in that respect of various participants in the proceedings, the Court observes that the responsibility of Israel is engaged under international law. It then proceeds to examine the legal consequences by distinguishing between, on the one hand, those arising for Israel and, on the other, those arising for other States and, where appropriate, for the United Nations.


Legal consequences of those violations for Israel (paras.
149-154)

The Court notes that Israel is first obliged to comply with the international obligations it has breached by the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Consequently, Israel is bound to comply with its obligation to respect the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and its obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Furthermore, it must ensure freedom of access to the Holy Places that came under its control following the 1967 War.

The Court observes that Israel also has an obligation to put an end to the violation of its international obligations flowing from the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Israel accordingly has the obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall being built by it in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem. In the view of the Court, cessation of Israel's violations of its international obligations entails in practice the dismantling forthwith of those parts of that structure situated within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem. All legislative and regulatory acts adopted with a view to its construction, and to the establishment of its associated régime, must forthwith be repealed or rendered ineffective, except where of continuing relevance to Israel's obligation of reparation.

The Court finds further that Israel has the obligation to make reparation for the damage caused to all the natural or legal persons concerned. The Court recalls the established jurisprudence that "The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act... is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed." Israel is accordingly under an obligation to return the land, orchards, olive groves and other immovable property seized from any natural or legal person for purposes of construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In the event that such restitution should prove to be materially impossible, Israel has an obligation to compensate the persons in question for the damage suffered. The Court considers that Israel also has an obligation to compensate, in accordance with the applicable rules of international law, all natural or legal persons having suffered any form of material damage as a result of the wall's construction.


Legal consequences for other States (paras. 154-159)

The Court points out that the obligations violated by Israel include certain obligations erga omnes. As the Court indicated in the Barcelona Traction case, such obligations are by their very nature "the concern of all States" and, "In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection." (Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 32, para. 33.) The obligations erga omnes violated by Israel are the obligation to respect the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, and certain of its obligations under international humanitarian law. As regards self-determination, the Court recalls its findings in the East Timor case, and General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV). It recalls that a great many rules of humanitarian law "constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law" (I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 257, para. 79), and observes that they incorporate obligations which are essentially of an erga omnes character. It also notes the obligation of States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention to "ensure respect" for its provisions.

Given the character and the importance of the rights and obligations involved, the Court is of the view that all States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem. They are also under an obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction. It is also for all States, while respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to see to it that any impediment, resulting from the construction of the wall, to the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination is brought to an end. In addition, all the States parties to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 are under an obligation, while respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention.


The United Nations (para. 160)

Finally, the Court is of the view that the United Nations, and especially the General Assembly and the Security Council, should consider what further action is required to bring to an end the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and the associated régime, taking due account of the present Advisory Opinion.


The Court considers that its conclusion that the construction of the wall by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is contrary to international law must be placed in a more general context. Since 1947, the year when General Assembly resolution 181 (II) was adopted and the Mandate for Palestine was terminated, there has been a succession of armed conflicts, acts of indiscriminate violence and repressive measures on the former mandated territory. The Court would emphasize that both Israel and Palestine are under an obligation scrupulously to observe the rules of international humanitarian law, one of the paramount purposes of which is to protect civilian life. Illegal actions and unilateral decisions have been taken on all sides, whereas, in the Court's view, this tragic situation can be brought to an end only through implementation in good faith of all relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). The "Roadmap" approved by Security Council resolution 1515 (2003) represents the most recent of efforts to initiate negotiations to this end. The Court considers that it has a duty to draw the attention of the General Assembly, to which the present Opinion is addressed, to the need for these efforts to be encouraged with a view to achieving as soon as possible, on the basis of international law, a negotiated solution to the outstanding problems and the establishment of a Palestinian State, existing side by side with Israel and its other neighbours, with peace and security for all in the region.


The full text of the final paragraph (para. 163) reads as
follows:
"For these reasons,

THE COURT,

(1) Unanimously,

Finds that it has jurisdiction to give the advisory opinion requested;

(2) By fourteen votes to one,

Decides to comply with the request for an advisory opinion;

IN FAVOUR: President Shi; Vice-President Ranjeva; Judges Guillaume, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Elaraby, Owada, Simma, Tomka;

AGAINST: Judge Buergenthal;

(3) Replies in the following manner to the question put by the General Assembly:

A. By fourteen votes to one,

The construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated régime, are contrary to international law;

IN FAVOUR: President Shi; Vice-President Ranjeva; Judges Guillaume, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Elaraby, Owada, Simma, Tomka;

AGAINST: Judge Buergenthal;

B. By fourteen votes to one,

Israel is under an obligation to terminate its breaches of international law; it is under an obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall being built in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, to dismantle forthwith the structure therein situated, and to repeal or render ineffective forthwith all legislative and regulatory acts relating thereto, in accordance with paragraph 151 of this Opinion;

IN FAVOUR: President Shi; Vice-President Ranjeva; Judges Guillaume, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Elaraby, Owada, Simma, Tomka;

AGAINST: Judge Buergenthal;

C. By fourteen votes to one,

Israel is under an obligation to make reparation for all damage caused by the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem;

IN FAVOUR: President Shi; Vice-President Ranjeva; Judges Guillaume, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Elaraby, Owada, Simma, Tomka;

AGAINST: Judge Buergenthal;

D. By thirteen votes to two,

All States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction; all States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 have in addition the obligation, while respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention;

IN FAVOUR: President Shi; Vice-President Ranjeva; Judges Guillaume, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Elaraby, Owada, Simma, Tomka;

AGAINST: Judges Kooijmans, Buergenthal;

E. By fourteen votes to one,

The United Nations, and especially the General Assembly and the Security Council, should consider what further action is required to bring to an end the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and the associated régime, taking due account of the present Advisory Opinion.

IN FAVOUR: President Shi; Vice-President Ranjeva; Judges Guillaume, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Elaraby, Owada, Simma, Tomka;

AGAINST: Judge Buergenthal."


Annex to Summary 2004/2

Separate opinion of Judge Koroma

In his separate opinion Judge Koroma stated that although he concurred with the Court's ruling that the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated régime are contrary to international law, he thought the following points worth stressing.

In his view, the construction of the wall has involved the annexation of parts of the occupied territory and the dispossession of some of the Palestinians of their land, contrary to international law (in particular, the principle of the non-acquisition of territory by force), human rights law and international humanitarian law, according to which the rights of an occupying Power in an occupied territory and over the inhabitants are of a limited nature; such rights do not amount to sovereign rights which would entitle the occupier to bring about changes in the status of that territory such as the construction of the wall. In other words, it is a violation of the existing law for an occupying Power unilaterally by its action to bring about changes in the status of a territory under its military occupation.

On the issue of jurisdiction, Judge Koroma stated that while it is understandable for a diversity of legal views to exist on the question submitted to the Court, he is of the opinion that the objection that the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the issues raised in the question is not sustainable when seen in the light of the United Nations Charter, the Statute of the Court and its jurisprudence; also not sustainable, in his view, is the objection based on judicial propriety ? a matter which the Court considered extensively in terms of the fair administration of justice. In the judge's view, not only is the question presented to the Court an eminently legal one susceptible of a legal response but no compelling evidence was adduced to persuade the Court to deny itself its advisory competence.

Equally worth stressing were the Court's finding regarding the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people including the establishment of a State of their own as envisaged in resolution 181 (II) and the finding that the construction of the wall would be an impediment to the realization of that right.

He also emphasized the authoritative character of the findings of the Court, some of which are based on the principles of jus cogens and are of an erga omnes character.

Also of importance is the call upon the parties to the conflict to respect the principles of humanitarian law, in particular the Fourth Geneva Convention, in the ongoing hostilities.

Finally, the judge stated that, the Court having made its findings, it was now up to the General Assembly to utilize those findings in such a way as to bring about a just and peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a conflict which has not only lasted for too long but has been the cause of enormous suffering to those directly involved and has poisoned international relations in general.


Separate opinion of Judge Higgins

Judge Higgins, who voted with the Court on each of the paragraphs in the dispositif, expounds in her separate opinion on some of the problems faced by the Court in deciding whether it should exercise its discretion to decline to respond to the question put to it. In her view, a condition elaborated by the Court in the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion is not met ? namely, that where two States are in dispute, an opinion should not be requested by the General Assembly "in order that it may later, on the basis of the Court's opinion, exercise its powers and functions for the peaceful settlement of that dispute or controversy" (I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 26, para. 39). Participants in this case made clear that the intention was precisely to use any opinion to bring pressure to bear.

Judge Higgins further opines that it is in principle undesirable for a question to be put to the Court, while precluding it from looking at the context in which the problem has arisen. She specifies what the Court should have done, both to ensure that the Opinion was balanced and evenhanded, and to make use of the possibilities afforded by an advisory opinion to remind both Palestine and Israel of their responsibilities under international law.

Judge Higgins further explains that, while she agrees that Articles 46 and 52 of the Hague Regulations and Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention have been violated by the building of the wall within the Occupied Territory, she does not fully share all the reasoning of the Court in arriving at this conclusion. In particular, she doubts the wall constitutes a "serious impediment" to the exercise of Palestinian right to self-determination, seeing the real impediment as lying elsewhere. While she agrees that Israel may not exclude wrongfulness by invoking the right of self-defence, her reasons are different from those of the Court, whose views on self-defence as expressed in paragraph 139 of this Opinion she does not share.

As to the legal consequences of the Court's findings, Judge Higgins notes that while she has voted in favour, inter alia, of subparagraph (3) (D), she does not believe that the obligations incumbent on United Nations Members stem from or rely on the legal concept of obligations erga omnes. Separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans

Judge Kooijmans starts by summarily explaining why he voted against operative subparagraph (3) (D). He then sketches the background and context of the Genera

This historical crap doesn't matter.

ANti-israel people and antisemites want to keep bringing history up because they want to spread the idea that the current state of Israel has no "right" to even exist, which is an insane suggestion.

It's year 2005 now.

Israel is a country. It exists.

Jerusalem was a territory that Israel has won, and Israelis don't plan on giving any inch of Jerusalem away, ESPECIALLY to people who hate jews and want to destroy israel (a huge portion of palestinians).

It is absurd to keep having these conversations.

"Its wild, unsupported speculation to attempt to declare the Palestinians the heirs of the Canaanites."

Its much more likely that both modern Jews and Palestinians have almost equal roots in all of the groups that lived in the area before 2000BC.

While Judaism in now a ethnicity and and a religion I'm not clear what one would call it back then (since the modern Torah may not have been compiled until the 7th century BC) . It wasnt the modern religion and when it rapidly expanded as a kingdom one would assume that ancient Israel either ruled over a mainly nonJewish population or converted many of the pre-existing peoples. Monotheism may go back as far as 2000BC to some guy named Abraham but with nothing written down until Moses (~1300BC) leading a slave revolut by a people who were not all monotheistic even the Biblical account doesnt make it very clear as to when a well defined group being Jewish camne into being until the first strong kindoms appeared several hundred years after that (I guess technically the slaves in Egypt were supposed to be descendents of Abraham but since he was just some guy from Ur its hard to see how anyone in Egypt would really know that their familly traced itself back to him and its not clear that there was even a culture among the Egyptian slaves that could be described as Jewish beyond being a Semitic people who had been captured by the Egyptians since the Torah wasnt yet in existance)

There are elements of the Christian/Jewish/Muslim myths that look a lot like what one sees in the pre-existing Chaldean mythology (Greek myths also plagarize from Chaldean mythology) Even the idea of one god is unlcear in terms of its orginal meaning since "you shall worship no other god before me" means something quite different from "you should worship no other god aside from me" which means something different from saying "there is only one god" (which means something quite different from "there are 3 gods but really one and he was his own father but not in a trashy way"). If you look at the ancient world there are quite a few religions that would have gods demanding "worship no other god before me" and perhaps some even demanding that no other gods be worshiped. By the time of Maimonides one has "Not to entertain thoughts of other gods besides Him" as a commandment but that still has a sound of a polytheiestic worldview with one god having a special status.
If you look at
http://www.mechon-mamre.org/p/pt/pt0223.htm#33
(which is one of those calls to genocide one find in all religions)
one sees "They shall not dwell in thy land--lest they make thee sin against Me, for thou wilt serve their gods" which definintely sounds like an admission that there are other gods but they were evil and not to be worshiped. Chaldean mythology doesnt have too many gods who liked humans so demanding allegence to one of them rather than all of them seems like a natural step.

Sorry about rambling and Im not really making a point, but just theorizing that Judaism and monotheism were not as major a split from pre-existing beliefs as people like to pretend and that with limited literacy at any point in the ancient world it's impossible to take some modern group and claim they were some ancient group since the boundaries of who was or wasnt a member of those groups wasnt that well defined. Palestinians, Jews, and others probably do have most of their ancestry in the various Semitic groups one reads about in the Torah and in history classes but even in terms of actual beliefs, would a modern Jew have more or less in common with a Jew before the text of the Torah was finalized than with a Muslim, or follower of other religions that follow the same or similar creation myths.

Maybe we all went wrong when we abandoned Enki, Nammu, Anu, Ki, Enlil, Sin, Utu and of course Inanna ( http://www.sacred-texts.com/ane/stc/index.htm ). After Enlil, Anu and the rest of the council of deities, decided that Man would suffer total annihilation in a flood, it was only because Enki covertly rescued the human man Ziusudra by instructing him to build some kind of an ark for his family that we are here today. But who remembers Enki anymore? Even the Babylonians credited Marduk for what Enki did. Before he saved humanity Enki also created us (or at least the first human named Adamu) by mixing the life essence of animals with the life essence of The Elders. We owe him a lot but somehow we have lost our way. According to Sumerian legend Ziusudra should actually still be around today living in Dilmun which apparently is an Island that is part of Bahrain. If someone just went and talked to him Im sure this who Israeli-Palestinian thing could be resolved since he was around long before everyone else and Abraham probably still believed in him when he left Ur (since the demand to not worhip the council of deities didnt include a demand to not belive in the mythology of Ur when it was not directly tied to Gods )

An Open Letter to the Palestinians from an Agnostic

Speaking Truth to the Powerless:
Open Letter to the People Commonly Called "Palestinians".
Greetings to any Palestinian who may be reading this.
My name is David White.
I am a citizen of New Zealand, a small, Western, nominally Christian country in the South Pacific Ocean. I am not Jewish, or Christian, I guess I'm vaguely agnostic.
Writing this letter is a good way for me to discuss the horrible mess in the
Middle East, spell out as many relevant points as possible concerning the state of the Palestinian people, and to see what can be made of them I don't speak Arabic, so I can only communicate with English-speaking Palestinians.
There aren't many here in NZ, though, and I haven't yet met any. I don't know how many will ever see these words, but here's hoping someone does.
I have a post-graduate university education, and I suppose I could be called an intellectual. Unfortunately, many such people have supported abhorrent ideologies such as Nazism, and continue to support Communism, so I refuse to describe myself in this way. I don't want to be considered as just another "trendy leftie" academic, as we would say in NZ. So, unlike many university-educated types, I am anti-totalitarian, pro-peace up to a point, pro-democracy, pro-capitalism (except the capitalists running Enron), and skeptical about the "cult of victimhood." I'm quite safe here in New Zealand, and no one I know has been killed by a Palestinian.
My perspective of Palestinians is something like this - you're Arabs (of course), mostly Muslim, but with a Christian minority. Many of you live outside Gaza/West Bank, mostly in Jordan and other Muslim countries, with some groups living in Western countries as well. You feel that you have been wronged by Israel and are fighting to destroy them.
As for my perspective on Israel, I see them like this. They are a mainly Jewish, small, free-market democracy with a large Arab minority surrounded by hostile Arab dictatorships. They have an ancestral claim to Israel, their state was created as a refuge from persecution, they have a right to exist, and, having survived a holocaust in Europe, they should not have to sit still and wait for another one in the Middle East.
A Down Under Overview.
Over the last few months, the conflict in the disputed territories of Gaza and the West Bank has turned into a war between the Palestinian people and Israel. (I will not apologize for using the term "disputed", as I believe it reflects a rather complicated situation more accurately than "occupied").
Your interpretation, as far as I can tell, seems to be something like this: You have no state of your own, and you are fighting a war against those you call "Zionist oppressors" and "colonial imperialists", in order to create a Palestinian state.
Accusations of massacre and human rights violations by the Israeli Army are being tossed around like confetti. Your leader, Yasser Arafat, vows to "martyr" himself rather than "surrender", and that bungling and incompetent organization, the United Nations (again, no apologies for venting personal opinions), is trying to do what it is constitutionally incapable of doing, i.e. "saving future generations from the scourge of war".
The Israelis see things differently, of course. For them, it's a simple battle for survival. They offered you a state, and you attacked them instead. They have occupied Palestinian towns, have fought it out with various armed groups, and desperate attempts are being made by the US, other Arab countries and the UN to break the so-called "cycle of violence". As a result, the Palestinian situation at the moment generally, can be explained by putting it into New Zealand idiom.
Put bluntly, the Palestinian people are buggered. Munted. Stuffed. Rooted.
(American equivalent=screwed. British equivalent: done over). It's like this: Yasser Arafat turned down the Israeli offer of a Palestinian homeland in Gaza and the West Bank. You want, or Arafat claims that you want, a Palestine "from the river to the sea" in other words, "all or nothing".
There is one insuperable obstacle to this- Israel. No matter how eloquent your arguments or numerous your martyrs, no matter how many European diplomats are angered by, or UN resolutions are passed against, Israel, the Israelis are not going to pack up and leave. The only way you will get the Palestinian State you want is to destroy Israel.
This is what you have been trying to do since 1948, and the current "intifada" launched in 2000 is your latest effort. However, the Israelis are not standing there and letting you kill them. They are fighting back, and if they have to choose between their own survival and yours, guess which choice they'll make.
A Vast Wringing of Hands, A Great Fluttering of Diplomats.
That has been the overall response to the disaster you have created for yourselves. You, the Palestinian Arabs, are obviously hoping for some kind of international intervention to save you. As we in New Zealand would say, "Get Real!".
The European Union and the UN have demonstrated on numerous occasions in the past their incompetence and total incapacity to take any sort of firm action without American leadership. Ask your Muslim brothers of Bosnia-Herzegovina, about how effective the EU and the UN were in protecting them without American intervention. In spite of the impression that American diplomatic efforts have created, the US will not take sides against Israel, and will eventually abandon its futile attempts at evenhandedness. If they do join forces militarily with Israel in their war against terrorism, your fighters will be snuffed out like candle flames.
As for your "beloved Arab brothers" in the Middle East, they make a great deal of noise about your "liberation struggle", and have sent money and arms, but have not sent a single tank to save you. Their diplomatic proposals are ones that could have been offered at any time, and are aimed at benefiting them, not Palestinians. The Egyptians themselves will not declare war on Israel unless they receive $100 billion to cover their costs.
Do you really believe that the rest of your Arab Muslim brothers think you are worth that much? Do you really believe they will put your interests ahead of their own? Although your friends and Arabs in Europe are passing sanctions and burning synagogues in your support, not a single EU warship has sailed to your aid, and not a single NATO aircraft has dropped a single bomb on your "Zionist oppressors".
I have noted that large numbers of people, including university-educated intellectuals support the Palestinian cause. Don't be misled by this. No matter how many western intellectuals, news media and international organizations may support the Palestinian struggle, none of this matters because America stands by Israel.
The Unbearable Burden of Life
How did you get into such a mess? As you yourselves would say and have indeed said on many occasions, it isn't your fault. It's always the "Great Satan" America, and it's "Lesser Satan", Israel, that you blame for all your woes. Everything that you do, such as your "martyrdom operations", are described as the products of your "rage" at being "dispossessed of your land", and of your "helplessness" in the face of "Zionist" might.
There are only 300 million Arabs against over 5 million Jews! How unfair! How unjust, that so many can do so little against so few!
A number of Western commentators have put Arab failures down to numerous cultural factors, not the least being Islam. Your religious beliefs in martyrdom and jihad, coupled with a total inability to accept any blame for your own predicament, have combined to do you great and lasting damage.
Look closely at why Western countries such as Israel have succeeded, and Muslim countries have not. Western countries are free-market democracies. Muslim countries (other than Turkey) aren't. Surely that should tell you something.
Why I Stand With Israel
As I said, I do not, and I will not, support the Palestinian cause. Why not? I have a number of reasons, and here they are:
1. You have made it clear beyond any shadow of doubt that you intend to destroy Israel and kill or drive out its Jewish population. This is genocide, pure and simple. You justify this by saying that Israel has committed many crimes against your people, and that you seek "justice". I say this in response - NOTHING WHATSOEVER is an acceptable justification for genocide. Loss of land, humiliation at being militarily defeated? Others have suffered these and moved on to create new nations and opportunities for themselves.
Examples abound- the Germans thrown out of East Prussia in Europe, 1945, the Nationalist Chinese who fled to Taiwan in 1949, to name but two. Germans and Taiwanese have coped with military defeat and the loss of land. They haven't warred with their neighbors, nor have they launched terrorist attacks upon them. Both countries have more wealth than any Arab nation. Why can't Palestinians cope? Are Germans and Chinese better able to deal with adversity than Arabs?
2. You have accused the Israelis of "genocide" against you. Here's a question for you: Israel has atomic bombs and powerful military forces. If they really, truly wanted you all dead, they could easily do it. Why haven't they? If the Israelis went all-out, you would be, as we say in New Zealand, "dog tucker". Why did they spend so much time negotiating with your leaders? Because Israel wants peace and secure borders. You refuse to give them even that. You plan genocide and accuse Israel of the same crime. Prove it!
3. The use of terrorism. Killing people for being Jewish is despicable. Terrorist attacks on innocent civilians are also despicable. (At this point, I'd like to pause and get a question of nomenclature cleared up, regarding those Palestinians who kill themselves and others with explosives strapped to their bodies. You call them "martyrs". Western media sources and academics debate the precise term to use in describing them. Others, including the Israelis, call them terrorists.
I have a better, more appropriate term. I prefer to use the word "kamikazes". The original kamikazes appeared in 1944, in the war in the Pacific. They were Japanese Navy and Army pilots, organized into "Special Attack Units" with orders to crash their planes into American warships, in the hope of destroying them - "one plane, one ship". Their initial impact was similar to that of the Al-Quaeda attacks on New York and the Pentagon- shock and horror. (I noted that many Palestinians appeared on Western TV celebrating the September attacks). Note: The American response, in both cases, was not the one hoped for.
Once the shock had worn off, the US set out to destroy the kamikazes, and terrible destruction was rained down on Japan, ending only with 2 atomic bombs. You know what is happening right now in Afghanistan to the Al-Quaeda group).
1. Using children as suicide bombers. Anyone who teaches children to kill themselves in suicide attacks is not worth supporting under any circumstances. For you to do this to your children is an abomination. A commentator on a Web magazine said that if the Palestinians laid down their arms, they would get peace and land. If the Israelis laid down their arms, they would be killed. You know that is true, even if most of Europe doesn't. Your cause is evil, because it seeks destruction at any price. Genocide is not justice. Sacrificing your own children for the sake of your leader's personal ambitions is wicked.
That's why I cannot support you. That's why I stand with Israel.
Palestinian Past or Future?
The Second World War in Europe ended with Hitler's suicide. He was replaced by Admiral Doenitz who quickly made peace with the Allies. Japan's leader, Emperor Hirohito, decided on surrender rather than see his nation destroyed.
If Arafat chooses surrender, though, will the rest of the Palestinians go along with it? If he dies, will the war end? If the answer to both of these questions is No, then the Palestinian people are doomed. Do you really prefer death as a people?
Do you fully comprehend what you are doing? If you are indeed aware that the path you have embarked on leads to destruction and if you have freely chosen to walk in that direction, then as a people you are truly beyond hope.
Are Palestinians really going to be a "Kamikaze Nation"? Are you really going to give Israel no other option except your destruction? If they must choose, then as Israeli historian Martin Van Creveld said "better a terrible end than terror without end".
Do not think that kamikaze tactics can get you what you want. The Israelis can tell you all about Masada, if you ask them. Remember what happened to the Japanese at places like Okinawa and Iwo Jima. Palestinians deserve better than the current mess you are in now - but before you can be given anything, you must offer a sincere peace, you must stop teaching your children to hate, you must stop believing that "victimhood" justifies everything and - above all other things - GIVE UP ISRAEL! Accept that you will never go there again except perhaps as workers or tourists. Accept that Jews are human beings. Accept the verdict of 1948 and learn to live with it.
Invest in banks, not bombs. Build computer chips, not Kalishnikovs. Teach science and mathematics, not hate. Look to the future, not the past. Stop blaming Americans and Jews for all your problems, and take responsibility for your own actions. Read those parts in the Quran about living with the "peoples of the Book".
Golda Meir, the former Israeli Prime minister, is quoted as saying "there will be peace in the Middle East only when the Arabs love their children more than they hate Israel ". Every time I see pictures of Palestinian children waving guns and wearing dummy explosives, then I can only say she is right. The alternative to peace is not victory but death.
Think about it - before it's too late.
From an Infidel to Those Who Submit, and are living in the Holy Land - May God grant you steadfastness in the face of things that cannot be changed, the capacity to cope with those that can be changed, and the wisdom and the ability to tell the difference.
David White
Auckland, New Zealand

a quick search will see multiple zionists copying and pasting this garbage on the net
try this:
Frequently Asked Questions about the Apartheid Wall
FAQ, PENGON, October 4th, 2003

Frequently Asked Questions about the Apartheid Wall

1) How long is the Wall?

In total the Wall will run over 650 km (400 miles) inside the West Bank.


2) Where is the Wall being built?

The Wall is being built deep within the West Bank as it zigzags throughout 10 out of the 11 West Bank districts. The Wall, on this path, de facto annexes nearly 50% of the West Bank and completely destroys all continuity of life in the region.

The Wall begins at the northern most point in the West Bank and runs through the western districts of the West Bank to the north of Jerusalem; the Wall is not being built on or near the 1967 Green Line and at points reaches 16 km (some 10 miles) deep right into the heart of the West Bank in order to annex major Israeli Jewish-only settlements (more details in Question 9). After cutting through neighborhoods and villages in East Jerusalem, the Wall picks up by Bethlehem and continues south to Hebron. In eastern West Bank, a second wall begins again in the northern West Bank and, running somewhat parallel to the first wall de facto annexes the Jordan Valley, extends south to Jerusalem where it connects with the first Wall, and thereafter stretches through the southern West Bank.

More detailed information is provided in the section Maps.


3) What does the Wall look like?

The Wall takes on a variety of forms; around Qalqiliya the Wall is pure concrete eight meters (25 feet) high and fortified with armed watchtowers and in other areas it may be part concrete/part fence or a series of razor wire and/or electric fencing all of which includes a 70-100 meter (approximately 230-330 feet) “buffer zone” with trenches, roads, razor wire, cameras, and trace paths for footprints. In Bethlehem and Jerusalem, the Wall is made up of a combination of these edifices.

Regardless of the Wall’s structural differences, the implications are the same for Palestinians-- the inability to travel for employment, medical care, and education atop of the theft of land and resources by and for Israel (more details in Question 6).

Refer to the Photos section for downloadable images of the Wall and communities.


4) How much of the Wall has been completed and when is it scheduled to be completed?

The Israeli government began building the Wall in June 2002 in the northern West Bank districts of Jenin, Tulkarem, and Qalqiliya; at the end of July 2003, Israel announced the “completion” of this section, the so-called “first phase”, which stretches some 145 km (90 miles). However, the Israeli government continues to raze land, destroy shops, homes, and infrastructure in these areas as well as pave way for the “buffer zone”. Simultaneously, destruction for and building of the Wall has been taking place in northern Jerusalem by Qalandiya and Kafr Aqab, in the neighborhood Abu Dis in eastern Jerusalem, and around Bethlehem, Beit Sahur, and Beit Jala. The latest announcements of the Israeli government predict the completion of the Wall by 2005.

The Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign Fact Sheet: The Wall’s “First Phase” provides more details for the “completed” sections of the Wall.


5) Is the Wall temporary?

At the cost of 12 million NIS or 2.8 million USD per km, the Wall is not a “temporary” measure but the continuation of Israel’s theft of Palestinian land and iron grip of Palestinian resources. The Wall, through its path which is marked by land annexation and destruction, is clearly a “tool” for the Israeli government in maximizing the confiscation of Palestinian land for future settlement expansion. In one case, in the village Nazlat ‘Isa, located between the Wall and the Green Line, the Wall brought the complete destruction of the entire village market including over 200 shops and five homes (with 16 additional homes having been given demolition orders), completely destroying the livelihood for all residents. The devastating reality which the Wall imposes is meant to ensure that Palestinians will be forcibly expelled from areas Israel looks to annex and “demographically contained” in other areas by creating permanent “facts on the ground” for the continued colonization of Palestine.


6) How is the Wall affecting Palestinian communities?

The Wall is devastating every aspect of Palestinian life—already tens of communities have experienced the loss of land, water, and resources which provide their sustenance as well as the destruction of community and personal property. Palestinian villages and towns near the Wall have become isolated ghettos where movement in and out is limited, if not impossible, thus severing travel for work, health, education, and visits to friends and family. For instance, in the 18 communities surrounded into an enclave in the Tulkarem district the inability to travel due to the Wall and Israeli military “closures” has brought the unemployment rate up from 18% in 2000 to an estimated 78% in the spring of 2003. In Qalqiliya, where the Wall hermitically seals the city with one Israeli military controlled checkpoint, nearly 10% of the 42,000 residents have been forced to leave their homes due to the city’s imprisonment, closure of the market, and inability to find work.

The Wall is intended to deny any prospects for survival in communities, and therefore is not only the negation of Palestinian national aspirations and right to self-determination, but also a tool in the creeping “transfer” of the population and the realization of the Zionist/Israeli expansionist plans as addressed in Question 13.

Community Voices offers personal testimonies and community case studies from those affected by the Wall. Additionally, The Wall in Palestine: Facts, Testimonies, Analysis, and Call to Action details the Wall’s implications on life in Palestine and coming impacts.


7) Are there gates where Palestinians can cross over the Wall and access their lands?

The notion of “access” gates where the Israeli military will “permit” Palestinians to travel to their land demonstrates the Wall’s institutionalization and follows the Israeli “permit” system which began during the 1993 Oslo Process whereby the Israeli government has been consolidating absolute control over every aspect of life in Palestine through dictating all aspects of movement.

The Israeli government’s rhetoric of “gates” and movement has amounted to the complete denial of the basic right to freedom of movement for Palestinians. The reality of “access” gates on the ground is the severe humiliation of Palestinians by the Israeli military and private “security” guards including beatings, being “denied” passage or being told that the land is “not theirs” and that they are “entering Israel”. Furthermore, in most cases the Israeli military only “allows” residents (who have Israeli approved permits and paperwork) to cross for a limited number of times per day and between highly restrictive hours. Additionally, communities are not told in advance when the gates will be opened and thus endure grueling waits, often for the military not to arrive or to arrive and deny access.


8) What is the Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign demanding?

The Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign is calling for:
1) the immediate cessation of the building of the Wall,
2) the dismantling of all parts of the Wall and its related zones already built,
3) the return of lands confiscated for the path of the Wall, and
4) the compensation of damages and lost income due to the destruction of land and property (this compensation is in addition to, not instead of, restitution of land).

For more information read About the Campaign.


9) How is the Wall related to the Israeli settlement policy?

The Wall is the continuation of the Zionist/Israeli expansionist agenda of stealing Palestinian land and forcibly expelling residents—the Wall’s path equates to the de facto annexation of nearly 50% of the West Bank and almost all of the Israeli settlements.

Around Jerusalem the Wall is completing the Zionist/Israeli project of “Greater Jerusalem”, formally endorsed by the Knesset in 1997, which aims at “judaizing” and annexing East Jerusalem into a Jewish metropolitan area. As explained in Question 2, the Wall closes Jerusalem off to the north and south of the West Bank, but remains “open” to the east for the still expanding settlement Ma’ale Adumim. Upon the Wall’s completion, this will amount to the confiscation of 90% of the land in the Jerusalem district.

The path of the Wall has been openly dictated by intentions to include settlements within the Israeli government and society. In March 2003, the Yesha Council of settlers worked with the Israeli government to extend the Wall’s path further into the West Bank south of Qalqiliya in order to bring the settlements of Ariel, Immanuel, and Qedumim into the Israeli “controlled area”. One week later, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon announced the building of the Wall in the Jordan Valley in order to “separate” the string of settlements in this region from the rest of the West Bank. Thus, the Wall will de facto annex 98% of the settler population.


10) Would it be acceptable if the Wall was built on the 1967 Green Line?

It is entirely unacceptable to build the Wall on the 1967 Green Line—there is a fundamental injustice in caging in an entire population. While the 1967 Green Line is advocated by the UN and many others to be the “international border” between Israel and the West Bank, the fact is that, following the 1948 war and the Zionist proclamation of the State of Israel, communities were forcibly and artificially divided into east/west by this “border”. However, the residents continue to share social services, markets, and familiar ties. To advocate that the Wall could be built on the 1967 Green Line is to legitimize the forcible separation of these communities.


11) What is the Wall’s status under international law?

The Wall, as well as the Occupation itself, comprises a wide range of violations to international law. A major violation of the Apartheid Wall is the unilateral demarcation of a new border in the West Bank that amounts to effective annexation of occupied land (United Nations Charter, art. 2.4).

Furthermore, destruction for and building of the Wall has amounted to numerous more violations of the IV Geneva Convention (IV GC) including the destruction of land and/or property (art. 53) and collective punishment (art. 33).

The Wall also breaches the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966) and the International Covenant on Economical, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966), both of which Israel has signed. The rights violated include: freedom of movement (ICCPR, art. 12), property (ICCPR, art. 1,), health (ICESCR, art.12 and IV GC, art. 32), education (ICESCR, art.13, and IV GC, art. 50), work (ICESCR, art. 6), and food (ICESCR, art. 11).

Under Article 1 of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1979) the Wall constitutes a “Crime against Humanity”. It divides populations on the basis of race and ethnicity and discrimination against residents in the West Bank to benefit illegal Israeli settlers and thus complies with the definition of “apartheid”.

These are only a few of the articles in international conventions and declarations which the Wall infringes upon. The chapter The Wall Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law in The Wall in Palestine: Facts, Testimonies, Analysis, and Call to Action provides more analysis and examples of the Wall under international law.


12) What is the relationship between the Wall and the “Road Map”?

Though some perceive the Wall to contradict the “Road Map”, in fact they are perfectly complementary and share aims that correlate with the Israeli government’s agenda. In the autumn of 2002 Israeli Prime Minister Sharon advocated a “Palestinian State” with borders that “overlap with territories A and B [which Israel determined during the Oslo process], except for essential security zones”. This would leave some 50% of the West Bank for part of a “Palestinian State” that is being created by the Wall through the formation of Palestinian ghettos.

Although Israel has flagrantly violated international law since 1948, the Wall “relieves” the government of the mounting “burden” (such as international pressure, economic resources) of maintaining the Occupation— Israeli logic reasons that the Wall enables control over strategic land and resources with the least expense of resources to “deal with” the Palestinian population as they will be “demographically contained” into areas which are currently deemed of less interest. In this context, the “Road Map” and the Wall are synonymous as they call for a “final settlement” which will be in the interest of the Israeli state.

The US-pushed “Road Map” calls for “Permanent Status Agreements” in 2005 in regard to boarders, Jerusalem, settlements, and refugees. The Wall, which is also set to be finished in 2005, enables the Israel government to unilaterally define the limits of such “agreements” by:
• Creating a de facto “border” between the West Bank and Israel,
• Completing the Israeli/Zionist project of “Greater Jerusalem” (as discussed in Question 9) to entirely annex the capital of historic Palestine,
• Annexing nearly all of the settlements in the West Bank into the “Israeli controlled” area “outside” the Wall,
• Forcibly expelling residents near the Wall from their land and home, thus becoming refugees, some for the second or third time, and continuing the racist Zionist slogan/policy of “a land without people”.


13) Why does the Israeli government and the Israeli public support the building of the Wall?

The Israeli government favors the Apartheid Wall because it furthers its agenda, policies, and actions of expelling the indigenous Palestinians for the colonization of land and “resettlement” of Jewish communities in “Greater Israel”. This is a clear goal of the Israeli government with the Wall, as the Wall carves away massive amounts of land in the West Bank, creating the largest single annexation of land since the 1967 Occupation; when completed, the Wall will leave less than 12% of historic Palestine for the indigenous population. Through building the Wall the Israeli government is pressing on with the forced expulsion of Palestinians from their land; the Wall attacks all aspects of Palestinian life—the loss of land and water, demolition of markets and homes, restriction to movement, education and medical care—thus making subsistence and survival difficult if not impossible and maximizing for Israel the sought after results summarized best in the Zionist adage of “more land, fewer people”. The Wall “demographically contains” those Palestinians which “remain” into ghettos in the West Bank (as also in the Gaza Strip), which serves and propagates Israel’s façade of “security” for colonization of Palestinian land.

The majority of the Israeli public has supported the Wall, following the pretext of “security”. The idea of unilateral separation appeals greatly to those in their society who do not want to admit or take responsibility for their government’s racist actions. In a poll conducted in June 2002 by Ma’ariv found that 69% of the Israeli public supported the Wall, at a time when the majority of the settlers still opposed it. The Israeli settlers in the West Bank have since begun to be in favor of the Wall, as it became evident that the majority of their settlements would be included in the “Israeli side” of the Wall.

More information is given in Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign Fact Sheet: The Apartheid Wall.


14) What is the US position on the Wall?

The US Administration has particular interest in supporting Israel and its expansionist agenda-- US support for the Wall does not veer from this fundamental position. US support for the Israeli state is rooted in the US military industry and the “use” of Israel as an “ally” in strategic regional interests in the Middle East. Funding Israel militarily serves the US military industry/economy as Israel spends the majority of aid on weapons, including fighter jets, tanks, and bulldozers, from US manufacturers which are then used against the entire Palestinian population. US support for Israel also ensures it as a military stronghold in the Middle East which furthers US interests of territorial control, oil resources, and more over the last two years in the US proclaimed “war on terrorism”. To achieve its colonial agenda, US interest lies in backing Israel’s plans rather than take a position “against” the Wall.

In July 2003, US Administration officials, including G. Bush and Collin Powell, paid feeble rhetoric to calling the Wall a “problem” or noting that it would impede the “peace process”. There was rumor that, as part of US law which prohibits aid to countries which engage in violations to international law, the US Administration might withhold a dollar of US loans for every dollar spent on the Wall. However, this has amounted to no action and the façade quickly faded after Israeli Prime Minister asserted that the “Wall would continue to be built” despite any “pressure”. In September 2003 US Congress approved the $9 billion in loans with no mention of the Wall; the US position thus remains unabated in supporting Israel’s racist Wall project along with the entire Occupation.


15. What is the position of Europe on the Wall?

The European Union has repeatedly issued statements ranging from “deep concerns about” the Wall to “calls for” the halting of the confiscation of Palestinian land and the construction of the Wall. However, the words are hollow in front of the continuous support the EU gives Israel, even if this implies breaching its own laws.
Surprising as it may seem, Europe - occupying rank number one for Israel's imports and rank number two for its exports - has as much economic muscle in the region as the United States.

If it were not for support from the US and EU, Israel would not be able to bear the enormous expenses of the Wall as well as the Occupation. The EU countries have continued to export weapons to Israel even during the last three years, have been unwilling to reinstall an embargo on arms exports to Israel that was in affect until 1994, as it continues to grant Israel privileged access to the European market through the European-Israeli Association Agreement that began in 2000. Though this treaty is explicitly conditioned to respect human rights by all partners and excludes settlement products from preferential treatment as they are not produced on what is considered Israeli territory, Israel refuses to make any distinction between the products possible, falsifying certificates and not responding to the EU’s requests on this issue.

The European Union accepts these violations of its own laws for the sake of “good relations” with Israel. Every euro to the Israeli occupation economy is a euro in support of Israel’s agenda and policies of theft, dispossession and expulsion of the Palestinian people, now embodied in a dramatic way by Israel’s Apartheid Wall.

"You have made it clear beyond any shadow of doubt that you intend to destroy Israel...You call them "martyrs"....You have accused the Israelis of "genocide" against you...you...you...you"

Who does "you" refer too, all Palestinians? Abbas? the PLO?
Isnt it just as bad to blame all Palestinians for the statements of a few people as it would be in the other direction.

In terms of the "you intend to destroy Israel" part what exactly does that mean. I dont exactly see any group trying to destory Israel during the last few decades. The number of Israelis killed by Palestinians over the past five years is probably lower than the number of murders during that same time period ina major US city. Im sure you can find someone online demanding Israel not to exist but that should be taken as no more or less of a threat than someone demanding Canada or Italy not exist; crazy unrealistic threats are hardly things to fear.

Countries come and go.

Where is Rhodesia today? Where's the Soviet Union today? Where's the Third Reich? Where's Czechoslovakia? Where's Yugoslavia? Where's Languedoc? Where's Bavaria? Where's Bengal? Where's New Granada? Where's Hawai'i? Where's the Republic of Texas? Where's Tibet? Where's the United Arab Republic? Where is Katanga? Where is Transvaal? Where is Ubangi-Shari? Where’s Sikkim? Where’s Manchukuo? Where’s Nejd? Where’s Little Armenia? Where’s Khiva? Where’s Magadha? Where’s Edessa? Where’s Malaya? Where’s Sarawak? Where’s Courland? Where’s Livonia? Where’s Aragon? Where’s Selisia? Where’s Wallachia? Where’s the DDR? Where's the CSA?

Countries come and go. Israel's days are numbered. Get used to it.

What you are really suggesting is the dismantling of the State of Israel and replacing it with the Arab state of Palestine. This would be soon followed by either/both the expulsion/slaughter of millions of Jews by their Palestinian neighbors. With your proposed scenario of an existential war, naturally Israel will be compelled and justified in responding forcefully.

> replacing it with the Arab state of Palestine

This a straw man. How typically Zionist a comeback. Zionists *love* straw men. I said no such thing. What I have said repeatedly is that justice will only be served by a single, secular, egalitarian society in which it doesn't matter who your mother was or what name, if any, you use for deity.


>this would be soon followed by either/both the expulsion/slaughter of millions of Jews by their Palestinian neighbors.

The Arabs of Palestine say the same thing about the Zionists. The only difference is that the Zionists have actually seized the land by force and run out three quarters of a million Arabs. Even today they are squeezing more and more land from the West Bank with their infernal wall. It is the Zionists who are the aggressors. The Arabs are their victims.


>Proud Jew

Is it not as racist to call oneself a "Proud Jew" as it is to call oneself a "Proud Gentile"? If not, let's hear why.

You've established your clear bias, unshakable by truth,facts or logic. Yes, we have all heard your message before, sometimes from David Duke or Father Coughlin, sometimes from Goebbels or Henry Ford. Now that its been made public that you are simply uncomfortable with Jews being Jews, you maybe disregarded as yet another in a long chain of hate. Yes,we've heard it before.

What I am uncomfortable with is Jews being like Nazis. I'm uncomfortable with anyone being like Nazis.

Proud Jew said it best:

"What you are really suggesting is the dismantling of the State of Israel and replacing it with the Arab state of Palestine. This would be soon followed by either/both the expulsion/slaughter of millions of Jews by their Palestinian neighbors. With your proposed scenario of an existential war, naturally Israel will be compelled and justified in responding forcefully."

Or you can call me Critical Thinker, fff, gehrig, james black,sefared, ect.

Even those Palestinans calling for a binational state seem to be calling for one where the constitution would gurante rights to all religions (and perhaps possibly work the way Lebanon does but in a more fair fashion).
Onre oen state solution is probably not practica, but those calling for it (at least those Palestinians like Said who have called for it) are not demanding the destruction of Israel.

Who is suggesting it?

The people who run about 100 indymedia sites, the people behind tons of "peace" movements, the leftist professors in colleges around the world, neo-nazis, white supremecists, islamists, and a handful of insane morons who claim to be jewish

Iev had "leftist professors" who liked Israel, "leftists professors" who hated Israel but mostly "leftist professors" who didnt really care either way about Israel.

In terms of well known "leftist professors" who talk abouit the Middle East Chomsky, Juan Cole, and most other people I can think of have never called for the destruction of Israel. Im guessing in the case of Cole and Chomsky they are pragmatically supportive of a two state solution, but I could be wrong. Edward Said's statements about a one state solution were as follows:

Q: Your vision of inclusion and the one-state solution actually follows one of the old streams of Zionism.

Said: As many Palestinians have, I've read the history of debates within the Zionist settlers' movement. There were people of a fairly important caliber, like Martin Buber, like Judah Magnes, who was the first president of Hebrew University, like Hannah Arendt, who realized that there was going to be a clash if the aggressive settlement policies and the ignoring of the Arabs pressed ahead. David Ben-Gurion actually said, "There's no case in history where a people simply gives up and allows another people to take their territory over."

So they knew that there would be a conflict, especially Magnes, who really was an idealist. He was a man way ahead of his time, and a remarkable spirit also. He said, "Let's try to think in terms quite morally and profoundly about the Arabs. Let's think in terms of their presence, not their absence."

That spirit is to be found in the work of the new Israeli historians, who have gone back over the national narrative of Israel and reexamined the myth of Israel's independence and discovered how much of it was based on the denial, or the effacement, or the willful avoidance of the Arabs. All that Israel has been able to do for the last fifty years is not, of course, to get security for itself. There is no security of that sort. But it has been maintaining a kind of holding operation by which the Arabs are simply kept out. Over time that can't work because of demographics and the fact that people don't give up if they're beaten down. They hold on even more resolutely and more stubbornly.

More
http://www.progressive.org/interview9904.htm

A more complete paper by Said is at:
http://www.one-state.org/articles/1999/said1.htm

After the Jews in Poland had been concentrated into the Warsaw Ghetto, a handful of brave Jews (many proud Zionists by the way)fought back valiantly against the Nazi Werhmacht in an attempt to forestall the trip to the death camps. No negotiations,no peace talks, no "land for peace"deals. Quite different than the Palestinians fighting against city busses and discos in an attempt to ethnically cleanse Jews from Arab lands. It is quite revealing that there exists this strange need to equate Jews with Nazis. We find it in Arab sites, Indy sites and David Duke. We know what you are and we have seen it before.

The Zionists have done to Palestine what the Nazis did to Poland.

This site is confusing. It seems like half the posting are by this one guy ranting against Israel. Whats up with this?

"It seems like half the posting are by this one guy"

He claims to hates this site and tells everyone to post on his website but he still spends all day posting over here.

The "person" (if you want to call it that) is nicknamed Nessie.

And basically, 100% of topics involving israel or the palestinians on indybay.org get completely ruined because of nessie's idiotic, over the top rantings about how israel should be destroyed.

And when nessie calls in sick, JA or wendy campbell fill in.

That's why it's almost impossible to have real discussions here, because it's basically 2-3 obsessed, insanely over the top anti-israel LUNATICS who push the discuss to such an idiotic extreme that the rest of us wind up having to respond to it.

because they are immediately spammed by the Zionist propaganda mill with their racist bullsh*t. As soon as the editors here come to their senses and ban Zionist propaganda, you'll be seeing a whole lot less of "nessie." But as long as a website that purports to represent the Bay Area continues to portray the Bay Area activist community as soft on racism, it is the moral duty of every Bay Area activist who doesn't want the world to think ill of of the Bay Area activist community to make it abundantly clear that while Indybay is soft on racism, the Bay Area activist community is not.

It seems like just the opposite. If a posting pops up that isn't rabidly anti- Zionist, that poster gets spammed, squashed, bad mouthed and called names like "Nazi". Like theres only one official, approved set of thoughts or something.

Methodist Church Divestment Campaign Continues to Strengthen
Worldwide Activism, The Grassroots Palestinian Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign, June 19th, 2005

Calls within the United Methodist Church (UMC) to divest from Apartheid Israel in support of the Palestinian struggle for justice and freedom are growing by the day. In the latest move, the Virginia Conference of the UMC this week passed a resolution to consider divestment from companies profiting from or facilitating the seizure of Palestinian land or the destruction of Palestinian homes.

The move by the Virginia Conference – which represents more than 340,000 United Methodists in Virginia and has 1,207 congregations throughout the state – comes just days after the UMC in New England passed a resolution directly urging churches to divest from companies complicit in the Occupation.

This week’s motion was proposed by the Virginia chapter of the Methodist Federation for Social Action (MFSA), an advocacy group that unites activists within the UMC to take action on issues of justice, peace and liberation around the world. In presenting the resolution, Hunter Mabry, a spokesman for MFSA, drew attention to the workings of multinational companies in supporting or facilitating the Occupation. He noted that many products of such companies are “used in destroying Palestinian homes and seizing Palestinian land for Israeli resettlement.”

Passing the resolution, the Conference noted that the UMC has implemented financial boycotts in the past as a means of challenging apartheid in South Africa.

The resolution calls for the national pension and social justice boards of the United Methodist Church in Virginia to begin to identify any “multinational corporation profiting from the use of its products in the illegal destruction of Palestinian homes and properties.” Supporters expect that the resolution will pave the way for churches in Virginia to implement full divestment against Apartheid Israel.

Occupation and Settlement: The Myth and Reality
By David Meir-Levi

One of the most prominent and contentious issues in the media coverage and Arab propaganda regarding the Israel-Arab conflict is that of Jewish “occupation” of Arab lands and the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (hereafter WBGS). Unfortunately, these issues have been clouded with misleading rhetoric and propagandistic mantras by both sides. To properly understand the role of the Israeli presence and settlements in the WBGS, it is necessary to review their history within the broader historical context of the Arab-Israel war, which has been proceeding without interruption since 1948.

Historical Introduction
Early Zionism

The conflict between Israel and the Arab world began well before the 1948 war. Zionist pioneers from middle of the 19th century onward began their work of rebuilding a Jewish homeland in what was then the Ottoman or Turkish Empire by their purchase of land from the Turkish Crown and from Arab landowners (Effendi). There was no invasion, no conquest, no theft of Arab land and certainly not of Palestinians who were subjects of Turkish rule. Unarmed and with no military, the Jews bought so much land that in 1892 a group of Effendi sent a letter to the Turkish Sultan, requesting that he make it illegal for his subjects to sell land to Jews. Their successors did the same thing, via a telegram, in 1915.

No one complained of theft because there was none. No Arabs were driven from their homes. In fact, as a demographic study published by Columbia University demonstrates[1], the Arab population of the area grew tremendously during this period in part because of the economic development that the Jews helped to generate. Thus, between 1514 AD and c. 1850, the Arab population of this region of the Turkish empire was more or less static at about 340,000. It suddenly began to increase c. 1855, and by 1947 it stood at c. 1,300,000 -- almost quadrupling in less than 100 years. The exact causes of this increase are beyond the scope of this essay, but the causal correlation between this independently documented phenomenon and the Zionist endeavor is beyond rational argument.

Far from driving out any Arabs, stealing their land or ruining their economy, the work of the Jewish pioneers in the 19th and early 20th centuries actually enabled the population to quadruple, the economy to enter the modern era, and the society to slough off the shackles of serfdom that typified the Effendi-Fellah (land-owner/serf) relationship of the Ottoman era. An Arab working in a Jewish factory or farming community could earn in a month what his father earned in a year eking out a living as a subsistence-level farmer using medieval technology. Arab infant mortality plummeted and longevity increased as the Jews shared their modern medical technology with their Arab neighbors.

Much of the land that the Zionists purchased was desert and swamp, uninhabited and deemed uninhabitable by the Arabs. Modern agrarian techniques and the blood and sweat of thousands of idealistic Jews reclaimed that land and turned it into prime real estate with flourishing farms and rapidly growing communities sporting modern technology and a healthy market economy. As a result, Arab migrants poured into the region from surrounding states, with hundreds of thousands seeking a better life and greater economic opportunity. Based on the above, it is fair to suggest that a significant plurality, if not a majority, of Arabs living in Israel today owe their very existence to the Zionist endeavor.

Validation of this history, a history quite at variance with the standard Arab revisionism, comes from a surprising source. Sheikh Yousuf al-Qaradhawi, international Arab terrorist and lieutenant to Osama bin Laden, in a televised speech in May, 2005 (cf. MEMRI, http://www.memritv.org/search.asp?ACT=S9&P1=645), chided his followers with the following words: "Unfortunately, we (Arabs) do not excel in either military or civil industries. We import everything from needles to missiles…How come the Zionist gang has managed to be superior to us, despite being so few? It has become superior through knowledge, through technology, and through strength. It has become superior to us through work. We had the desert before our eyes but we didn't do anything with it. When they took over, they turned it into a green oasis. How can a nation that does not work progress? How can it grow?”[2]

It was precisely this success of the Zionist endeavor that raised the ire and fear of Arab leadership. Zionist progress, technology, economy, and the Jews’ willingness to share this technology with their Arab neighbors radically threatened the medieval strangle-hold of the Effendi over the fellahin (peasantry). As part of the Turkish (Ottoman) Empire, the Arabs of what is today called Israel did not wish to risk civil disobedience. Turkish methods of insuring tranquility under the Sultan were rather draconian. Not so with the British. So, after World War I when the British and the French dismantled the Ottoman empire (Sykes-Picot treaty, 1916), and Britain took over the governance of British Mandatory Palestine (today’s State of Israel and Kingdom of Jordan), Arab leadership found itself with a much freer hand. Stoking religious hatred, and fanning the flames of fellah resentment with lies about the Jews’ intent to destroy Islam, representatives of the leading Effendi families led by the Hajj Amin el-Husseini began an Islamic jihad involving a series of pogroms against the Jews.
Peel Partition Plan

1919, 1921, 1922, 1929, and 1936 saw Arab violence against Jews expanding in scope and growing in brutality, with the British doing almost nothing to curtail it and sometimes abetting it. Lord Earl Peel led a commission of inquiry in 1936, with the goal of finding a solution to the seemingly endless violence. His suggestion was partition. Let the Jews have their state on the c. 15% of lands that they have purchased and redeemed. Let the Arabs have theirs on the remaining 85%.

In 1922 Britain had given all of Palestine east of the Jordan river to the emir Abdullah, which became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, a kingdom with a majority Palestinian population which, by law, permitted no Jew to enter. When offered their own state in 1937 on c. 85% of British Mandatory Palestine west of the Jordan river the Arab leadership chose war and terrorism. This was the “Great Arab Revolt” of 1937-1939. With World War II in the offing, Britain lost no time in brutally crushing the Arab revolt.

Meanwhile, the pioneering Zionist endeavor continued, with the purchase of more crown land from the British. It is important to note that according to international law, what had been crown land under the Ottoman Empire was now legally crown land under the British Mandate. The disposition of that land through legal purchases was well within the rights of the British and conformed to the parameters of international law. When the West emerged from World War II, Zionist organizations owned about 28% of what is today Israel, and private Arab land ownership or British crown land accounted for the rest.

With the end of the war, Arab leadership again promoted violence and terrorism against Jewish settlements and against the British. The majority of Jewish leaders preached restraint and practiced the exploration of political solutions via the newly formed United Nations. A minority practiced terrorism against the British and violent reprisals against the Arabs.
UN Partition Plan

Sick of the violence and facing political crises growing out of economic problems following World War II, the British decided to place “the Palestine Question” into the hands of the United Nations. Several UN exploratory missions (UNESCOP being the latest) in 1947 reached Lord Peel’s conclusion of a decade earlier. On November 29, 1947 the UN decided to declare two states: the state of Palestine for the Arabs on c. 45% of the land, and the state of Israel for the Jews on c. 55%. The UN Partition Plan (UN Resolution # 181) created unwieldy boundaries between the two nascent states, based upon the land ownership and population densities of the two groups, plus the assignment of the Negev (the southern desert, crown land largely unpopulated and believed to be worthless) to the Jews. This desert constituted 60% of the Jewish portion.

It is important to note, at this juncture, that the Arab states were members of the UN. Their membership entailed their willingness to abide by majority decisions of the newly formed world governing body. But they did not.

In high-handed defiance of the UN partition plan, they launched a war of aggression which, by their own public rhetoric, was to be a war of annihilation. Their intent was not the correction of some border dispute or the reclamation of some turf lost in an earlier battle. Their vociferously ballyhooed intention was the destruction of the newly created State of Israel, and the genocide of its 605,000 Jews.

Much to their chagrin, they lost. And in losing, they lost much of the territory which the UN had designated for the state of Palestine. However, the remainder of what was to have been Palestine (the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) never became the State of Palestine. Rather, Egypt maintained illegal occupation of the Gaza Strip, and Jordan illegally annexed the West Bank, both in high-handed defiance of international law and UN resolutions 181 and 194. There was no Arab or Palestinian protest over this.

To add to the Arabs’ chagrin, they were faced in 1949 with an Israeli offer of peace. In exchange for a formal peace treaty, Israel would return much of the land conquered in the war and allow the repatriation of some substantive portion of the Arab refugees created by the war (Rhodes Armistice talks, February – July, 1949). Had the Arab nations been willing to accept the UN partition plan, or had they been willing to accept the Israeli peace offer, not only would there have been a State of Palestine since 1949, but there would never have been an Arab refugee problem. But the Arab response was NO PEACE. The refugees will return to their homes only when they can fly the flag of Palestine over the corpses of the Jews. Better our Palestinian brethren should rot in squalid refugee camps than that we should acknowledge a non-Arab state in our midst. As in 1937, Arab leadership rejected the possibility of a Palestinian state in favor of continued aggression against Israel. It was not the creation of the State of Israel that caused the refugee and other subsequent problems; it was the war of annihilation waged by the Arab states that snuffed out the second opportunity for the creation of a Palestinian state.
Pre-67 Terrorism Against Israel

From 1949 to 1956, Egypt waged a terror war against Israel, launching c. 9,000 attacks from terrorist cells set up in the refugee camps of the Gaza Strip. The 1956 “Sinai campaign” ended Egypt’s terror war, even though President Eisenhower forced Prime Minister Ben Gurion to return the Sinai to Egypt without a peace treaty. But the terror continued on other fronts. In 1964, Yasir Arafat began a 50-year campaign of terror the openly avowed goal of which was the destruction of Israel and the genocide of its Jews. (Arafat did not even mention the annexation of the West Bank by Jordan or the illegal occupation of Gaza by Egypt.) Sponsored first by Kuwait, and later by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, and Iran, Arafat declared unending war against Israel until all of “Palestine” would be liberated, redeemed in “fire and blood”.

It is important to note that from 1949 to 1967 there were no Jewish settlements in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. The “Palestine” that Arafat sought to “redeem” was the State of Israel within its 1949 “green line” borders. It is instructive to read the original 1964 version of the PLO Covenant: Article 24. “This Organization (the PLO) does not exercise any regional sovereignty over the West Bank in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in the Gaza Strip or the Himmah area”. Since the PLO’s original Covenant explicitly recognized Judea, Samaria, the eastern portion of Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip as belonging to other Arab states, the only "homeland" it sought to "liberate" in 1964 was the State of Israel. However, in response to the Six Day War, in which five Arab states attacked Israel and as a result of which Israel militarily occupied the West Bank, the PLO revised its Covenant on July 17, 1968 to remove the operative language of Article 24, thereby newly asserting a "Palestinian" claim of sovereignty to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

It is also instructive to note that the Jordanian occupation of the West Bank and Egyptian control of the Gaza Strip were typified by brutal totalitarian repression. In the words of Arafat himself, the Egyptians (in 1948) herded Palestinians into refugee camps, kept them behind barbed wire, sent in spies to murder the Palestinian leaders, and executed those who tried to flee.[3] Nor were there any Palestinian protests of any self-determination they had been denied.
Belated Palestinian Nationalism

The reason why there was no agitation among Palestinians for their own national identity prior to 1967 is perfectly clear. The concept of Palestine as a nation and Palestinians as a separate people did not exist among the Arabs of the Turkish provinces that became British Mandatory Palestine after World War I. Despite the contorted, forced, and contrived narratives of Rashid Khalidi, Baruch Kimmerling and others, their own analyses acknowledge that there was never any state called Palestine, no country inhabited by “Palestinians”, and no concept of a separate political or cultural or linguistic entity representing a defined group that could be identified by such an appellation.

In fact, the opposite is the case. Arab respondents to the UN’s UNESCOP 1947 inquiries argued that there never was, nor should there ever be, a Palestine. The area under discussion was historically part of southern Syria; and for centuries had been known as “balad esh-sham” (the country of Damascus). In fact, at that time, the term “Palestinian” was applied to the Jews living in Mandatory Palestine. The Arabs of the region were known as “Arabs”.

In a March 31, 1977 interview with the Amsterdam-based newspaper Dagblad de Verdieping Trouw, PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhse’in said: “The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct 'Palestinian people' to oppose Zionism. For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan.”

Even today, Syrian 5th Grade social studies textbooks show “Greater Syria” as Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel. There is no nation called Palestine. The concept of “Palestinians” as Arabs living for millennia in “historic Palestine” is a fiction created for the political and military purposes described by Mr. Muhse’in. This belated frenzy of Palestinian agitation for national self-determination is simply the faux mantle of respectability behind which genocidal Arab terrorism can be perpetrated against Israel with impunity. After the Holocaust, the West cannot look kindly upon genocidal terrorism; but it can embrace warmly and enthusiastically the deep and heartfelt yearnings of an oppressed people struggling to be free. Hence, Arafat’s terrorist propagandists needed to invent the lies of Palestinian National Identity and Israeli oppression.
The Six-Day War

Contrary to current Arab propaganda, but congruent with all news accounts contemporary to the events, Israel was the victim of Arab genocidal aggression in the 6-Day War. On May 15, 1967 Egypt demanded that the UN peace-keeping forces, in place since the Sinai Campaign, evacuate at once. UN Secretary General U-Thant, for reasons never fully clarified, complied at once. Then Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran and moved two tank battalions and 150,000 troops right up to Israel’s western border. A military pact with Syria and Jordan, and illegal invasion of Israel’s air space for surveillance over-flights of the Israeli atomic reactor in Dimona, rounded out the threats. These were five casus belli: actions defined in international law as so threatening to a sovereign state that each one creates a legitimate cause for defensive military response. Had Israel retaliated with lethal force after any one of these five, its military action would have been completely legal per international law, as legitimate defensive response to existential threats from an aggressor.


However, Israel did not retaliate. It first tried political negotiations. Its complaints to the UN went unanswered. Its reminders to President Johnson that the United States had guaranteed in 1957 to intervene if the Straits of Tiran were ever closed, or if Egypt ever re-militarized the Sinai, fell on deaf ears. Mr. Johnson was too heavily involved in the Vietnam war to consider American military action elsewhere, even though President Eisenhower, when he forced PM Ben Gurion to retreat from the Sinai after the phenomenally successful Sinai Campaign in 1956, had promised America’s eternal vigilance that Israel would not again face a military threat from Egypt.


After three weeks of watching the Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian forces grow in size and strength on its borders, Israel tried one last diplomatic action. Via the UN commander of the peace-keeping forces in Jerusalem, Colonel Od Bul (a Norwegian), Israel’s government sent a written message to King Hussein of Jordan: if you do not invade Israel, Israel will not invade the West Bank. King Hussein superciliously tossed the note back to Colonel Bul and walked away.


On Monday, June 5, 1967, after receiving military intelligence that Egypt was within hours of launching an invasion via the Gaza Strip, Israel launched its defensive pre-emptive strike, an air attack that destroyed the air forces of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria while they were still on the ground. With the control of the skies firmly in Israel’s hand, its armor and infantry put Egyptian forces to flight, reaching the Suez Canal within two days.


Despite Israel’s warning, King Hussein of Jordan began an artillery bombardment of Jerusalem and other Israeli cities along the Green Line. After more than a day of bombardment, with scores of Israelis dead, hundreds wounded, and millions of dollars of damages, Israel sent a second message to the Hashemite king: if you stop the bombardment now, we will consider it your politically necessary ‘salvo of honor’; and we will not retaliate. This message was sent via the Romanian embassy, from its West Jerusalem (Israeli) ambassador to its East Jerusalem (Jordanian) ambassador. Hussein ignored the warning and launched an infantry invasion of Jewish Jerusalem. It was only then that Israel responded with its invasion of the West Bank.


After almost a week of Syria’s constant artillery bombardment of Israeli towns and villages in the Galilee, Israel conquered the Golan Heights, destroyed the Syrian artillery, and drove the Syrian army back to within 40 kilometers of Damascus.

Israel did not invade Egypt, although its forces could have advanced almost unopposed to Cairo. It did not cross the Jordan river although the Jordan Legion was in disarray, with some troops having tossed their boots and rifles to more easily swim to the east bank. Nor did it continue its advance from the Golan Heights to Damascus, which it could have easily done in the wake of a terrified and decimated Syrian army. Israel stopped its advance on all three fronts after it had achieved its military objectives: the destruction of the armies that threatened its existence, and the establishment of defensible borders.
International Law and Israeli Sovereignty

Even one of the most critical of Israel’s historians, Professor Avi Schlaim acknowledges that Israel was the victim of Arab aggression in the six-day war. This is an important point with regard to the issue of Israeli settlements in and sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza Strip. International law is very clear. Had it been the aggressor, Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip would have been illegal, as would all future expansion of Israeli population into these territories.

However, as the victim of aggression, Israel’s legal position is exactly the opposite. (See infra, Part II, for details.) Suffice it for this introduction that the legal disposition of territories conquered in a defensive war can be determined only by a peace treaty between the belligerents. Absent such a peace treaty, the continued sovereignty and economic activities of the victim of aggression over its newly won territories is completely legal as long as such activity does not unfavorably prejudice the indigenous inhabitants. For the beneficial results of Israel’s sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza Strip, see below, Parts II and III.


Moreover, immediately after the war, Israel offered to return conquered territory in exchange for peace. The Arab nations rejected this offer. Israel could legally have annexed the newly won territories, but chose not to because it expected that eventually the aggressor nations would come to their senses and want their land back, and Israel would return some of these territories to their former occupiers in exchange for peace. Israel did this with Egypt, returning all of Sinai at the Camp David I accords in 1979. Anwar es-Sadat refused to accept the Gaza Strip back, preferring that its Palestinians remain under Israeli sovereignty. When Jordan agreed to a peace treaty in 1994, King Hussein specifically excluded the West Bank from consideration, because by then 96% of Palestinians in the area were under the rule of the Palestinian Authority, and Hussein conceded that he had no legal claim to the area or its Arab population.


In sum, Israel is the only known country in all of history and across the entire world to come into existence via legal and beneficial land development (as opposed to the almost universal method of conquest). Israel’s victory in the 1948 war and in the 6-day war, in which it was the victim of genocidal aggression, and the refusal of Arab nations to join it in peace negotiations, give Israel the legal right to maintain its sovereignty over its newly won territories, and to develop those territories in any manner that is not prejudicial to the well-being of the indigenous civilians. Had Arab leadership been amenable to peace with Israel, there could have been a Palestinian state in 1937, and again in 1947, and again in 1949; and there would never have been an Arab refugee problem. Had Arab leadership in 1967 been amenable to peace with Israel, there would never have been a continued Israeli sovereignty over the disputed territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.



With this historical framework in place, one can understand the real issues behind the controversy over Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the legal status of the settlements.

Part I: SETTLEMENT TYPES

There are five types of settlements:

A. Agrarian settlements for military purposes manned mostly by soldiers.

B. Settlements of Jews returning to sites occupied by Jews prior to 1948 (Hebron, Gush Etzion, Jewish Quarter).


C. Expanding suburbs of Israeli cities on or near the “Green Line”.

D. Missionary Settlements unrelated to the previous three types.


E. Patently illegal rogue settlements.
Settlements for Military Purposes

Agrarian settlements manned by IDF soldiers were established soon after the war along what the IDF felt were crucial corridors of defense, especially along the Jordan river, near the “Green Line”, in the Golan Heights, and near Gaza. Because Egypt, Syria and Jordan remained belligerent states for decades after the war, and because the PLO was actively trying to develop bases for terrorism in the newly conquered territories, and because Israel had previously been invaded across these territories, these settlements were intended primarily to serve a strategic military defensive purpose.



The Alon plan, developed by General Yigal Alon shortly after the war, envisioned a series of these military-agrarian settlements (referred to as “nahal” in Hebrew) protecting strategic areas along the Jordan river (it is important to recall that the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan was in a de iure state of war with Israel until 1994) and across parts of the West Bank where surveillance and the potential for rapid military deployment were deemed essential for security purposes.

In several cases, where Palestinian farmers utilized the Israeli court system to lodge complaints that the army was unnecessarily taking land without proper military purpose, the Israeli High Court of Justice decided in favor of the plaintiffs. The army site at Beth El (near Ramallah) is the best-known case, and probably one of the few cases in all of world history where the legal system of the victorious country decided in favor of the defeated, contrary to the security-related demands of the army. The IDF was forced to move its base about ten kilometers further west, to accommodate the land claims of the local Palestinians.
Settlements of Jews Returning To Their Pre-1948 Homes

Settlement of civilian Israelis in the West Bank began shortly after the 6-day war, with a small group of Orthodox Jews setting up a few households in the former Jewish section of Hebron, followed by larger re-settling of Jews in the rapidly reconstructed Jewish Quarter of East Jerusalem. Jews had lived in Hebron almost continuously since the days of Joshua (3100 years), and were expelled only during the horrific Arab pogroms of 1929 in which hundreds were slaughtered. Jewish habitation in Jerusalem had a similar millennia-long history, with the 1948 war and the massacre of about half of the population of the Jewish Quarter terminating Jewish presence there.


Later, Jews resettled the villages of the Kfar Etzion area (aka Gush Etzion) southwest of Bethlehem. Since this area had been extensively settled and developed in the early part of the 20th century by Zionist pioneers, and most of the Jews of these villages were massacred by Arab irregulars during the 1948 war, the return of Israelis to these sites created additional Type B settlements.
Expanding Suburbs

Unoccupied areas around Jerusalem and to the east of Kfar Saba and Netania (near Tel Aviv) and to the northeast of Petah Tiqvah were used as sites for major building projects that created low cost housing for the expanding populations of the Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv areas. In most cases, the land utilized for these projects was Jordanian ‘Crown Land,’ land to which no individual could lay claim of private ownership. In the absence of Jordan’s willingness to enter into peace negotiations after the war, Israel’s expropriation of these unoccupied areas was legal in as much as Israel’s sovereignty, having been created via defensive actions against an aggressor nation (Jordan), was legal.

In cases where West Bank Arabs legally owned land that Israel wanted for these expansion projects, Israel bought the land at fair market prices. Land sale to Israel was fairly active throughout the decades after the Six-day war. So much so that when the Palestinian Authority was established in 1994, Chairman Arafat declared that sale of land to Jews was punishable by death; as a result, Palestinian families who had benefited from these sales were suddenly in mortal danger and some were forced to flee the West Bank.


The rapid growth in Jerusalem’s Jewish population after the war presented the Israeli government with both a problem and a solution of considerable political valence. Areas of dense Jewish settlement were developed in order to accommodate this growth, and these settlements were used to surround Jerusalem, such that the 1948-67 phenomenon of a “Jerusalem Corridor” (where Jerusalem was surrounded on 3.5 sides by hostile Arab towns and villages with access to other Israeli areas restricted to only one narrow road) would not be re-created in the context of a future peace agreement with the Arabs. The outlying areas (French Hill, Ammunition Hill, Gilo, Ma’aleh Adumim, Har Homah, inter alia) were turned into hi-rise suburbs that expanded the city’s perimeter and accommodated the burgeoning population. Of these, only Gilo was built on privately owned land. A Christian family in Beit Jalla sold the hill-top site to the municipality of Jerusalem in 1974.
Missionary Settlements

Over time, religious and right wing political pressure supported the creation of settlements elsewhere in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Under Prime Ministers Begin and Rabin, these settlements proliferated. Often they were founded near ancient Jewish holy sites, such as Joseph’s Tomb near Nablus (Biblical Shehem).


Arab spokespersons claim that these settlements, some of which were built well inside the West Bank or Gaza Strip areas, stole land from Arab farmers. Israel claims that most land used for these developments was unoccupied and un-owned, thus qualifying as ‘Crown Land’, upon which Israel had full legal right to build and develop. Where privately owned land was needed for settlement expansion, Israel claims to have purchased that land from its legal owners at fair market values.


There was considerable debate in the Israeli government and society at large as to whether allowing these settlements to be developed was good in the context of Israel’s long-term goal of achieving peace with the Arab world in general and the Palestinians in particular. Ultimately, the government felt that creating “uvdot bashetah” (facts in the field - settlements that were there, literally in concrete, with buildings, populations, agrarian and industrial activities, connected by efficient infra-structure to the pre-1967 Israeli areas) would be of assistance in future negotiations, as these settlements would be bargaining chips in a future negotiations.
Rogue Settlements
These settlements were set up by break-away settlement occupants, often contrary to IDF and/or government instructions, sometimes on privately owned Palestinian land. Palestinian complaints about such illegal land grabs have been adjudicated in the Israeli court system with decisions not infrequently in favor of the Palestinians. These settlements, whether on illegally taken land or not, are considered illegal by many in Israel. Some have been forcibly dismantled. This is a very emotional issue in Israel, with orthodox Jews demanding that all Jews be allowed to settle anywhere in the Promised Land (especially anywhere in the region where Abraham lived: i.e., the West Bank from Shechem/Nablus to Hebron). Anti-settlement sentiment among Israelis (especially the non-religious) is spurred in large part by these sites; and it is almost exclusively this type of settlement on the West Bank that Prime Minister Sharon has agreed to dismantle even before peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority.
PART II: LEGAL OR ILLEGAL?

Anti-settlement spokespersons (Arab, Israeli and other) have repeatedly branded the settlements as illegal in accordance with the 4th Geneva Convention and international law. However, even a superficial review of the relevant elements of international law demonstrates that this interpretation of the Geneva Convention is a typical example of Arab Orwellian “doublespeak.” It is precisely international law, the Geneva Convention, and relevant UN resolutions that define these settlements as legal.


A. According to the Fourth Geneva Convention, the prohibition of exiling conquered populations and settling populations from the conqueror’s territory into conquered territories pertains to territory conquered in an offensive war. These sections of the Convention were written to deter future actions like those of the Nazis in Eastern Europe during WWII. Since Israel acquired sovereignty over the WBGS in a defensive war, it is highly questionable whether these prohibitions apply. The fact that the belligerent opponent (Jordan) remained at war (until 1994) meant that the conquered population was de facto and de jure a potentially hostile population. Moreover, Israel never exiled any Arabs from anywhere in the WBGS (except in 1992 when it deported c. 400 terrorists to south Lebanon in an attempt to stop terror activities). Rather, because of Israel’s policies of ‘open bridges’ across the Jordan (despite the fact that Jordan was still in a state of declared war with Israel), Arabs migrated into Israel in vast numbers, and the Arab population of the West Bank tripled, from about 650,000 in 1967 to more than 2,000,000 in 1994, with a commensurate increase in Arab settlements (some estimates suggest that as many as 260 new Arab villages or expansions of existing sites occurred during this time).


It is obvious, therefore, that Israeli settlement activity not only did nothing to infringe upon the well-being of the indigenous population; rather, that activity actually created the beneficial economic environment into which hundreds of thousands of Arabs could integrate.


B. Regarding territory conquered in a defensive action, the Charter of the League of Nations (the same one which gave Britain the right to establish a Mandatory Government over Palestine and which declared that British Mandatory Palestine was to be the homeland of the Jewish people) indicates that the disposition of such territory will be part of the peace treaty between the warring parties. In the absence of such a treaty, the disposition of these territories remains in dispute. Such territories should be referred to as “disputed territories”, not “occupied territories”. Their continued occupation by the defensive party is legal. Since the wars in 1948 and 1967 were defensive wars, Israel’s occupation of territories beyond the l947 partition boundaries and 1949 armistice boundaries is completely legal. The Charter of the United Nations accepts, and with no authority to change it, the Charter of the League of Nations. So the League of Nations Charter is still international law, and offers a congruent and rational balance to the 4th Geneva Convention (i.e., the Charter describes the rights of a nation occupying territory in a defensive action, and the Convention describes the limitations placed upon a nation occupying territory in an offensive action). Both are valid under international law.


C. It is also legal for the defensive party maintaining occupation in the absence of a peace treaty to take necessary measures to maintain security. Thus the Nahal settlements for military purposes are legal according to international law.


D. International law is also clear that populations that had been dispossessed from their ancestral homes by an offensive action have the right to re-settle their homes when a successful defensive action re-captures the land from which they were driven out. Thus the return of Jews to Hebron, Gush Etzion, and the Jewish Quarter is legal under international law.


E. UN Resolution 242 (11.22.1967) makes it clear that the purpose of the resolution is to create a just and lasting peace, with guarantees for the territorial inviolability, mutually recognized borders, and political independence of EVERY state in the area. According to Eugene Rostow, one of the drafters of 242, the plain meaning of the resolution is that Israel’s administration of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is completely legal until a just and lasting peace is achieved. Such administration, in the absence of a peace treaty, and in the face of continued hostility from Arab nations and terrorist groups, can include the development of unoccupied segments for housing a growing population. Such activity is not the same as transporting population to the territory for resettlement. So the third type of settlement is also legal.

The status of the Missionary Settlements is more complex. Nothing in the Geneva Convention prohibits voluntary development of the disputed territories. What is prohibited is forced deportations and organized displacement of the original populace by a forced settlement of the conquering population. So, to the degree that the Missionary Settlements are a function of voluntary Israeli settling in areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip without the sequestering of Palestinian land and the removal of Palestinian population, they are legal. Moreover, since the West Bank and Gaza were never legally part of any sovereign nation (they were part of British Mandatory Palestine until November 29, 1947) were intended by the UN to be part of a Palestinian State, and were over-run and illegally occupied by Jordan and Egypt in the 1948 war, in stark and defiant violation of the UN partition plan, UN resolutions 181 and 194, and international law), Israel’s occupation of these territories after the Six-Day War does not violate the legal claims of any nation.


However, since some privately owned Palestinian land was taken by government fiat, and it could be argued that either by complicity or by design the Israeli government sponsored these settlements (thus making it more of a government plan rather than a voluntary settlement), it seems fair to say that Missionary Settlements, although legal per the Fourth Geneva Convention and relevant UN resolutions, may be in a gray area morally.


The Rogue Settlements are palpably illegal. Even Israeli government officials have referred to them as “rogue” settlements, IDF forces have dismantled some, and PM Sharon has targeted some for a similar fate.

Part III: THE IMPACT OF SETTLEMENTS ON THE ARAB POPULATION

The impact of Israeli settlements that are not Rogue Settlements has been almost exactly the opposite of what the Arab propaganda claims.

It is important to note that from 1967 to 1992 – that is until the West Bank was turned over to the Palestinian Authority -- the population and economy of the West Bank grew substantially. The standard of living of the Palestinians, as well as the average per capita income, increased almost exponentially. This was in part due to the Israeli “Marshall Plan”, which expanded the infra-structure, modernized roads and the supplies of water, electricity, and sewerage, and made 20th century medical care available. Telephone and radio technology was up-graded to 20th century levels. Economic progress was also due in part to the integration of the Palestinian workforce into the Israeli economy by the employment of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in a wide variety of Israeli business and agricultural endeavors. The growth of tourism throughout the West Bank was a further boost to the area’s economy. The population of the WBGS more than tripled from 1967 to 1994, with a total Arab WBGS of c. 950,000 in 1967 growing to more than 3,000,000 by 1994. Seven universities, some sponsored in part by Jewish donors and the Israeli government, came into being where only three teacher training institutions had existed before.


Rather than displacing Palestinians, the Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank stimulated substantial growth and improvement. It has been noted that when an Israeli settlement of any of the first 4 types was erected, areas around it that were hitherto uninhabited became foci for Palestinian shops selling agricultural goods and cottage industry wares to the Israelis. Later, Palestinian houses followed the shops (1).

Moreover, during the decades after 1967, there were no road-blocks or lock-downs or curfews (except on rare occasions when the Israeli military or central intelligence agencies learned of the presence of terrorists in a specific village or town). WBGS Arabs shopped in Tel Aviv, and Jews shopped in east Jerusalem and Ramallah.

It is only since 1994, when 96% of Palestinians living in Israel came under the autonomous and independent control of the PNA (Palestinian National Authority, aka PA) that the economy of the WBGS has been crippled and the lives of the Palestinians wrecked by the PNA despotic and terrorist rule. The West Bank’s GDP in 2003 was about one-tenth of what it was in 1992. Only because of Arafat’s terror war was Israel forced to implement now infamous and wildly exaggerated harsh measures to stop terror attacks and protect civilian lives.


It is also important to note that the so-called “apartheid roads” did not exist prior to Arafat’s 1994 ascent to power, nor are they apartheid. During the decades from 1967 on, Israelis and Arabs used the same roads, many of which ran as main streets through the towns and villages of the West Bank, bringing in millions of tourist dollars to hitherto impoverished small-town Arab merchants. Only after Arafat began his terror war, and Israelis driving through Arab towns found themselves in mortal danger, did Israel build the “Israelis only” (not “Jews only”) roads. Rather than take punitive measures against Arab offenders who murdered or injured Israeli motorists (Jewish, Christian, and Moslem), the government decided instead to create this by-pass system so that Israelis could reach WBGS destinations without exposing themselves to terrorist attacks.


In sum, until Arafat began his terror war, the growth of Israeli population in the WBGS, and the expansion of Israeli villages and towns in those territories, was highly beneficial economically for the WBGS Arab populations, did not entail significant loss of Arab privately owned land, offered legal recourse to the rare cases of unfair expropriation, and was accompanied by a far, far greater growth of Arab population and settlements in the WBGS.
Part IV. THE ROLE OF SETTLEMENTS IN THE PEACE PROCESS

The role of the settlements in the context of the current conflict, and in the contentious issue of applying the “Road Map” to future peace negotiations, is perhaps the most complex and difficult issue to deal with, precisely because Arab propaganda has been so effective in establishing as axiomatic that the settlements are:


a.) illegal

b.) a symptom of Israel’s intent on conquest of Palestinian land and are thus inherently an obstacle to peace

c.) a harbinger of Israel’s permanent occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and hence make territorial compromise impossible


d.) signal Israel’s inherently obvious unwillingness to negotiate a fair peace.


Therefore, it will be most useful to look at these Arab contentions, and see how they correspond to historical reality.


a. Are the settlements illegal? We have just seen that except for the Rogue Settlements which the Israeli government does not condone, the settlements are legal under existing standards of international law.


b. Are the settlements an obstacle to peace? From 1949-1967 there were no settlements in the West Bank or Gaza Strip. Nor was there peace. Arab belligerence was unrelated to West Bank and Gaza settlements. The settlements to which the Arabs objected at that time were Tel Aviv, Haifa, Hadera, Afula, etc.

In June, 1967, immediately after the Six Day War, and before there were any Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israel proposed its dramatic peace initiative both at the UN and in sub rosa talks with Jordan. This initiative was rejected by all Arab states and the PLO at the Khartoum Conference in August-September, 1967. The obstacle to peace was the very existence of Israel, not settlements in the West Bank.

i. In 1979, as part of the accord with Egypt, Israeli settlements in Sinai were evacuated. In the context of a peace treaty, settlements are negotiable, can be, and were, dismantled.


ii. In 1979, as part of the accord with Egypt, Israel froze settlement expansion for three months, in order to encourage entry of Jordan into the Egypt-Israel peace process. Jordan refused. The freezing of settlements did not stimulate peaceful interaction. Arafat too (then engaged in creating a terrorist state in south Lebanon) was invited to join Egypt at the peace talks, and this settlement freeze was intended to encourage his participation. He refused. The existence of settlements in Sinai did not interfere with the Israel-Egypt peace accords; and the freeze on settlement activities did not encourage Jordan or the PLO to enter into peace accords.


iii. In 1994, Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel, while settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were growing in size and increasing in number. The existence and expansion of the settlements in no way impaired the peace process with Jordan.


c. Do the settlements make territorial compromise impossible? The accords discussed at Madrid, Wye, Oslo and Taba all include the acknowledgement that settlements (a few, some, many, probably not all) will be dismantled in the context of a peace agreement. Those accords were discussed while settlements were expanding. Settlements did not impede negotiation then.


i. Currently, c. 200,000 Jews live in a total of 144 communities scattered through the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 80% of these could be brought within Israel’s pre-67 borders with only a very minor re-arranging of “green line” boundaries.


ii. Part of Barak’s offer to Arafat in 2000 was the exchange of land such that the Palestinians would be compensated for the small number of settlements that would not be dismantled by the ceding of Israeli land within the pre-67 boundaries to the PNA. This offer included c. 95% of all settlements in the WBGS. Arafat rejected this offer, much to the surprise and chagrin of President Clinton.

iii. Does Israel’s violation of international accords by building the settlements show Israel’s unwillingness to negotiate a fair peace? Except for the Rogue Settlements, which Israel does not defend and will not support, there are no violations.

iv. the Camp David accords called for a 3-month moratorium on settlements. Menahim Begin kept this agreement (cf. supra, IV.b.iv)


v. the Oslo Accords say nothing about settlements. It was tacitly agreed informally that a moratorium on settlements would be one of 16 “confidence building” measures that Israel and the PNA would undertake. The provision about not changing the “status” of the territories refers to the agreement that neither side would unilaterally annex the areas (or declare them an independent state). In the presence of glaring, overt, and provocative violations of every one of the Oslo Accords by the PNA almost immediately after its signing, Netanyahu’s government felt itself under no obligation to maintain the tacit informal agreement. Since the PNA was not building confidence, why should Israel compromise its security and position for future negotiation?


vi. While Israel has built a total of 144 settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, more than 260 new Palestinian settlements have been constructed. These are concrete (excuse the pun) testimony to the flourishing of the West Bank’s economy and the growth of Palestinian population under Israeli control (1967-94), contrary to the Arab allegations that Israel has perpetrated genocide and crippled the economy of the West Bank. By what logic would anyone suggest that these Palestinian settlements are any less a threat to negotiations or a change of status of the territories than are the Israeli ones?


Bottom line: the settlements – except for the Rogue Settlements that Israel is ready to dismantle -- o are legal. Their growth and expansion have contributed substantively to the economic improvement of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. When there were no settlements in the WBGS, no territorial compromises or peace settlements were reached; and later territorial compromises and peace agreements have been reached despite the existence of settlements in the WBGS. Israel’s settlements violate no international accords.

Thus it is irrational to suggest that Israeli settlement in the WBGS prevent peace. Rather, it is the unwillingness of the PNA and Arab terrorist groups to negotiate, not the presence of settlements, that stalls the peace process and makes compromise impossible.
Part V: WHAT ABOUT UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL?

A. Part of the intent in creating “uvdot bashetakh” (facts in the field) was to create “bargaining chips” for future negotiations. They are one of the things that Israel will negotiate about. That is clearly what Netanyahu and Barak had in mind when they encouraged settlement expansion following Arafat’s violations of the Oslo Accords. There is no rational justification for a one-sided curtailment of population growth when the other side maintains a state of war despite the agreement to curtail violence.


B. The security needs that prompted the Alon Plan and Nahal settlements still exist, especially in light of the surge of terror activities sponsored openly by Hamas and at least 9 other terror groups operating in Israel; and in light of many terrorist factions and Arab states that refuse to consider any peace with Israel, that continue to perpetrate Jew-hatred in media and education, and continue to promulgate the goals of Hamas and other terror groups for the total destruction of Israel. The settlements and IDF presence in the major Arab population clusters of the West Bank reduce substantially the ability of terror groups to successfully launch their attacks. Unilateral withdrawal enhances the ability of the terror groups to wage terror war.


C. Any unilateral dismantling of settlements is likely to be interpreted by the PNA and terrorist leadership as a victory for terrorism. This, in fact, is exactly what has happened following PM Sharon’s decision to unilaterally dismantle Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip. Terrorist spokespersons vociferously rejoice in the apparent success of their terror activity, which they claim is the real motivator for Sharon’s decision; while other PNA spokespersons level the accusation that the unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip is just another Israeli deception. According to their logic, the unilateral withdrawal, instead of being a real concession to the Palestinian demand for national self-determination, is actually aimed at distracting the world and the Palestinian leadership so that Sharon can strengthen his hold on the West Bank and continue to expand Jewish settlement there. They argue that Sharon can now claim that Gilo, Jewish Hebron and the Gush Etzion areas are non-negotiable since Israel has given up so much in the Gaza Strip. In other words, Sharon’s unilateral gesture has backfired very badly precisely because it is not part of a negotiation process.

D. Netanyahu abandoned any thought of a settlement freeze after Oslo because the PNA made clear its intent to disregard Oslo and pursue a policy of unrelenting terror war. It is believed by some that part of his purpose in creating more settlements was to send Arafat a clear signal: ‘if you keep doing your anti-Oslo stuff, the area that you are likely to end up with as a Palestinian state is going to get smaller and smaller’. Sounds logical, especially since a military response may have been justified but would have caused world outrage. It didn’t work, even though a number of Palestinian intellectuals and political leaders (most notably, Elyas Freij, mayor of Bethlehem, quoted in the Washington Post in l991) publicly advocated negotiation because the growth of Israeli settlements in the West Bank made it clear that “time is on Israel’s side now”.


It did not work, probably, because Arafat never intended to negotiate. He always intended to perpetrate his long-dreamed final solution of the total destruction of Israel. In his 90-minute cell-phone speech to a Lebanese PLO radio station on 4.14.2002 (from his bedroom of the Muqat’a which Israel had surrounded and partially destroyed in Operation Defensive Shield) he outlined his strategy. With the help of other Arab states, with the success of Arab propaganda to gradually weaken Israel’s legitimacy in the eyes of the world such that UN forces could be deployed to assist the Palestinians and impede the Israelis in a future battle (4), and with Israel’s only foul-weather friend (USA) having moral and political difficulty providing assistance to what was now defined as a renegade or rogue nation, the terror armies and their allies could use the West Bank as a launching pad for the great final Jihad against Israel. Arafat’s intent as expressed in that speech has been corroborated by the Israeli destruction of major arms smuggling networks handling hundreds of tons of illegal (per Oslo) weaponry and munitions since 2001 (most recently the 50 tons of weapons on the Karine A and the scores of smuggling tunnels from Sinai to the Gaza Strip).

Bottom line: There is no rational justification for a one-sided settlement compromise when the other side maintains a state of war. Unilateral withdrawal enhances the ability of the terrorists to wage terror war. Sharon’s unilateral gesture backfired precisely because it was not part of a negotiation process. In light of the unrelenting and vociferously ballyhooed commitment of terror groups, and Abbas’ frequent public statements commending the terror groups, defining their casualties as martyrs, and vowing to never use force against them, it is irrational to suggest that further Israeli concessions will generate a Palestinian willingness to reciprocate. In fact, the opposite has happened. The failure of Camp David 2 was due in large part to Arafat’s strategy of pocketing Barak’s concessions, making no substantive concessions in return, and then demanding more from Barak.


CONCLUSION:

Most Israeli settlements in the WBGS are legal and violate no international laws or relevant UN resolutions. Most do not involve the theft of any Palestinian land. The settlement movement as part of Israel’s economic development of the WBGS after the Six Day War has provided enormous benefit to the Arabs of those areas and has enabled a tripling of Arab population and a skyrocketing West Bank economy, until the onset of Arafat’s rule. Settlements do not create stumbling blocks to peace or hindrances to peace negotiations. They can be, and have been, dismantled in the context of negotiations with an honest peace partner. Concessions about settlements should be made only in the context of negotiations, which can begin only after Palestinian leadership stops the violence, ends the terror war, and ends the hate speech and hate preach and hate teach that have permeated Palestinian society since 1994.

There is no issue relating to the Israeli settlements in the WBGS that could not be settled honorably to mutual satisfaction at the negotiating table between honest peace partners negotiating in good faith. The question of settlements is a matter for final status negotiations.


The simple fact is that no sovereign state would ever be expected to do otherwise.