Peace for Ukraine

Peace for Ukraine
by Bernd Lucke, Reinhard Merkel, Dirk Meyer

[This article posted on 12/6/2024 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://www.telepolis.de/features/Frieden-fuer-die-Ukraine-10190516.html.]


New attempts to broker a ceasefire in Ukraine are on the increase. Selenskyj, Stoltenberg and Baerbock are putting forward options. But what does Russia have to gain from this?

Suddenly everyone is talking about a ceasefire. First President Selenskyj, who told Sky News that a ceasefire was possible if the non-Russian-occupied part of Ukraine were placed under NATO protection.

Then former NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg brought up a ceasefire and “temporary territorial cessions” by Ukraine. He was followed by Foreign Minister Baerbock, who promised German ground troops to secure a ceasefire.

Indeed, a ceasefire would be highly welcome. Death and lifelong war-related disabilities, which so far number at least in the six figures, would come to a (temporary) end. The risk of military escalation would be drastically reduced.

But we should not do the math without the host. What interest would Russia have in a ceasefire? Militarily, it currently has the initiative. Certainly Moscow does not want to give Ukraine a breathing space with the opportunity for military consolidation. Or to get NATO protection. Or to push German troops between the Russian and the Ukrainian.
Conditions for a ceasefire

There will only be a ceasefire if Russia receives something in return. Stoltenberg has recognized this. But are “provisional territorial concessions” of interest to Russia?

It already exercises de facto control over these areas. But “provisionally” means that the areas are not to be ceded de jure. Ukraine (and with it the West) would tolerate Russian administration, but would insist that it is contrary to international law.
Ongoing violation of international law

This would mean that international law would continue to be violated. Consequently, the West would have to maintain sanctions against Russia. So what would Russia gain from the ceasefire – apart from halting the Russian advance and Ukraine receiving reinforcements or protection from NATO?

Of course, Russia could also use the ceasefire to create facts on the ground. Since the transfer will not be carried out de jure, Russia would probably pursue a targeted russification of these areas in order to make their “temporary” transfer factually irreversible.
Settlement, forced relocation

Since the occupation of Crimea in 2014, there have been reports of Russian citizens settling and Ukrainian citizens being forcibly relocated.

Such measures would be a blatant violation of international humanitarian law and would likely lead to new conflicts between Russia and the West. The main reason for this is that a “temporary territorial cession” without international legal certification does not create legal certainty or a lasting peace settlement.



The West would also have to face accusations that it is “selling” the population in the eastern Ukrainian territories to Russia without rights through a “temporary” cession.

This would be diametrically opposed to the previous claim that the West was supporting a fight for democracy and the rule of law in Ukraine. If the Stoltenberg proposal were to remain in place, none of this would benefit the people in the Russian-occupied territories.

But there is a much better solution, better for both Ukraine and Russia. Not just a ceasefire, but a peace solution, in accordance with international law, safeguarding the security interests of both sides and recognizing the military realities that have emerged.

As reported by Telepolis, the Hamburg Peace Initiative we founded proposes making the Russian-occupied territories independent states through a referendum.

These states should be internally free, democratic and constitutional. Ukraine would thus have achieved the most important goal of all politics: the protection of human rights and the foundations of individual well-being for the entirety of Ukrainian citizens.

On the other hand, the new states should require Russia's consent for all military and security policy decisions, be militarily allied with Russia and allow Russia to station troops on their territory.

These would be states from which no danger would emanate for Russia. At the same time, they would be a cordon sanitaire against Ukraine and NATO. In this way, they would meet Russia's demand for security, as it itself understands it and wants to be respected.

Further provisions of our proposal regulate the protection of Ukraine by NATO, the protection of the liberal internal order in the new states, further security guarantees for Russia, the repatriation of abducted children, the repair of war damage, economic reconstruction and the lifting of all sanctions.

The advantages of this proposal are obvious. There would be peace, not just a (perhaps fragile) ceasefire.

The citizens in the Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories would not be disenfranchised, but would live in a constitutional state with a liberal-democratic basic order. Russia's security interests would be preserved and also recognized by NATO countries under international law.

Ukraine would receive NATO protection. The sanctions against Russia and the political ostracism of Russia would be lifted. All territorial disputes would be permanently and effectively settled under international law.

As important and right as an early ceasefire is, it can only be a first step. The “temporary” territorial ceding proposed by Stoltenberg would not bring peace. It could not solve the fundamental problems, would possibly create new ones, and would also disenfranchise 20 percent of Ukraine's population.

The proposal of the Hamburg Peace Initiative, on the other hand, could ensure the basis for a lasting peace: in accordance with international law, with a high degree of security stability and with satisfactory results for both parties to the conflict.