The West is fighting Russia as if it didn't have nuclear weapons

“The West is fighting Russia as if it didn't have nuclear weapons” – Interview with Dmitri Trenin

[This interview posted on 4/4/2024 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://www.nachdenkseiten.de/?p=113348.]

Recently, the renowned Russian political scientist Dmitri Trenin wrote in an article that for the first time since 1945, the West has stopped fearing Russia. According to the former head of the Carnegie Institute in Moscow, an anxiety deficit can be fatal and must therefore be overcome before it is too late. After the dissolution of the institute in 2022, Trenin, unlike several colleagues, remained in Russia. His views, which in several points show similarities to those of his colleague Sergei Karaganov, raise painful and distressing questions for Europeans: How does a Russian expert view the West's warmongering against Russia? How did we get here? What does this confrontation mean for Russia? How does he assess Hungary's position in this conflict? And why should the West be taught the meaning of fear? Éva Péli conducted the interview with Dmitri Trenin and translated it from Russian.

Éva Péli: You write in a recent article that a “powerful campaign to prepare for war with Russia” has unfolded in the EU. Why has this happened and what do you think are the reasons for it?

Dmitri Trenin: There are many reasons for the campaign to prepare for war with Russia. First of all, there is disappointment at the failure of the Ukrainian offensive in 2023, which was supposed to lead to Russia's defeat. Instead, there has been a turnaround in the war. The initiative has shifted to the Russian army. The prospect of a Russian military victory – and at the same time a geopolitical defeat for the West – became real. Meanwhile, Europeans became frightened by Donald Trump's potential move into the White House. Moreover, the position of the Republican Party in the US has already led Washington to curtail its support for Kiev.

Thus, against the backdrop of Russian successes on the battlefield and the gradual shift of US attention to Asia/China, Europe has started to worry more about the sustainability of the main Atlantic institutions – NATO and the EU. And then there are the European arms manufacturers. Naturally, they want to make money in preparation for a big war.

Furthermore, France wants to take advantage of the situation and assume the position of “commander of Europe” to fill the void created by the US. For its part, Germany has embarked on an arms build-up to strengthen its position in Europe. EU leaders are stoking war hysteria to assert themselves on an anti-Russian basis. “Global Britain” has restarted the eternal ‘Great Game’ against Russia. (Editor's note: ‘The Great Game’ refers to the historical conflict between the United Kingdom and Russia for supremacy in Central Asia. It lasted from the Napoleonic Wars until the Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1907).

Finally, a number of countries on the eastern flank of NATO and the EU, such as the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, Finland, Sweden and others, are trying to increase their importance within the framework of Western alliances and partnerships in order to obtain additional aid and support.

Is this a return to the confrontation of the Cold War era before 1989? If there are differences, what is new about them?

Unlike during the Cold War, the West's fear of the consequences of its actions has now diminished significantly. One example of this is Emmanuel Macron's statement about the possible deployment of NATO troops in Ukraine. The ideology of liberal globalism has defeated pragmatism and realism. This is dangerous for the world. In addition, liberalism is taking on totalitarian traits in many cases.

The quality of European elites in general and heads of state in particular (see Great Britain, France, Germany) is much lower than it was during the Cold War. The (false and dangerous) idea that Russia could be defeated in a conventional war has spread among Western elites.

You write about the “own reasons” of the Europeans for the confrontation with Russia. What are they?

There are many such reasons. Here are a few of them:

Disappointment at not having succeeded in turning post-Soviet Russia into an obedient object of European policy.
The ingrained attitude of European elites towards Russia as a barbaric country, an upstart and something “other”, hostile to “Europe”.
Old fears of a huge conservative empire that “towered over Europe”, later of a radical communist giant. The first fear is characteristic of the European left, the second of the European right. In both cases, size (“the size of Russia”) plays a role. In the past, they were called “barbarians at the gate”; today they are referred to as “jungles threatening the garden”. However, the meaning is the same.
The Great Game, which the British played against Russia and lost in the 20th century, is being resumed along all of Russia's borders, including Ukraine, the Caucasus, the Baltic states and Central Asia.
The arrogance of French culture and values. France's claim to the role of “European USA”.
Traditional German contempt for Slavs and Russians in particular. Added to this is a subliminal – if never acknowledged – desire for “moral revenge” for World War II.
Historical grievances among the Poles – because of the partition of Poland – and also among the Czechs because of 1968, among the Finns because of the 40 years of “Finlandization” during the Cold War. The Baltic nations have built their identity entirely on the idea that they are victims of “evil Russia”.

They believe that NATO is betting on a protracted war that could decisively weaken Russia. The Soviet Union suffered a similar fate in Afghanistan. How do you see these parallels?

A protracted war is not in Russia's interest. The West's combined resources are greater than Russia's. Therefore, Russia could end up in a situation where it must either use nuclear weapons in accordance with its military doctrine or surrender with dire consequences for the country. Putin once said: “Why do we need peace when Russia will no longer exist?” I personally take that seriously. So Russia must win the war that is literally existential for the country. But a Russian victory in Ukraine will not be a starting point for a further advance to the west. Those who claim this have no evidence and are just scaring people. For the USSR, Afghanistan was a war on the periphery. However, Ukraine is not only a strategically central war for Russia, but also a civil war taking place within the same society.

You warn that Russia faces defeat if it does not achieve its goals in Ukraine. What are they?

If Russia does not achieve its stated goals in Ukraine, it will be more than a disappointment for many in Russia. There will be many questions about the reasons for the failure and about who will be held accountable for the senseless sacrifices. It will be a serious blow to the reputation of the country's leadership. The growing discontent from below could be accompanied by a staggering at the top. External forces will continue to influence the situation and try to bring about chaos in the Russian Federation and a so-called regime change in the country. Such a prospect is a strong incentive for Russia to strive for and achieve a convincing victory in Ukraine.

You also write that for the first time since 1945, the leaders of (Western) Europe no longer fear Russian nuclear weapons. For a long time, observers such as former GDR secret service chief Werner Großmann said, “If Russia didn't have nuclear weapons, there would be war again.” Why is that no longer the case?

In the West, astonishingly including Europe, the fear of nuclear weapons has almost completely disappeared in recent decades. It is assumed that there are no targets and no victims that would justify the use of nuclear weapons – and therefore conventional weapons can be used without restriction. The US has concluded that Russia would rather capitulate than launch a nuclear strike. This unleashes NATO countries and brushes aside all “red lines”. The West is fighting Russia as if it had no nuclear weapons. The US is apparently not going to launch a nuclear strike against Russia, launch a massive invasion and occupy Russian territory. But its strategy is aimed at inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia in Ukraine, after which chaos could break out in Russia itself.

All these calculations are extremely dangerous. There is no way Russia will lose, let alone surrender. It is quite capable of winning. However, the constant escalation of the war by NATO countries increases the likelihood that Moscow will abandon the restraint it has shown from the outset and will strike targets in the territories of the most active NATO countries involved in the war.

Some think that the West is in decline and therefore very angry. The French sociologist Emmanuel Todd says that the West has taken a “bizarrely aggressive path”. By contrast, you warn that the potential of the West, including Europe, is still very great. How do you justify this?

I see no contradiction between the crisis phenomena in the countries of the West and the decline of its influence in the world on the one hand, and the increasing aggressiveness of Western politics on the other. On the contrary, the West is acting tough, aggressively and increasingly riskily in a difficult situation. In terms of capabilities, Western countries still have a great deal of power. Global finances and logistics, information resources and military power are largely controlled by the US and its allies. The opponent should never be underestimated.

The combination of great potential, a pronounced sense of threat and a particular aggressiveness is therefore a dangerous cocktail. In the face of such an opponent, Russia must find ways to mobilize its own resources as effectively as possible and to successfully cooperate with partner countries.

What do you think is the reason for Europe and the West as a whole to present a united front against Russia as never before?

The anti-Russian unity of Western countries is a success of the US strategy. Starting from the mid-2000s, immediately after the US aggression against Iraq, Washington began to “cleanse” the European elites of “dissidents” who opposed US policy. As a result, the successors of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and President Jaques Chirac became much more pro-American politicians.

Later, as a result of the special operations of the United States and its allies, the persons pursuing an independent course were neutralized: Dominique Strauss-Kahn in France, Vice-Chancellor Heinz-Christian Strache in Austria and Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini in Italy. Pro-US media in European countries, especially in the UK, Germany and France, created a situation in which any attempt at an objective approach to Russia by the so-called Russia or Putin supporters was seen as a departure from liberal ideology and de facto as a betrayal of ideals and values. From around 2006, the outright demonization of Russia and Putin personally began. Those who did not submit to this brainwashing were excluded from “decent society”. 20 years later, the US has achieved the result it was striving for.

Budapest seems to repeatedly go against the anti-Russian course of the EU and NATO. They see Hungarian politics as purely tactical and focused on its own interests. How do you justify this?

Hungary is a member of NATO and the EU. Hungarians have their own memories of historical relations with Russia. Budapest's position on Russia is by no means pro-Russian. The Hungarian leadership, with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán at the helm, is acting on the basis of Hungary's national interests. It is fundamentally opposed to the pressure of liberal globalists from the United States and Europe. Such a confrontation requires a great deal of courage. At the same time, Orbán is a shrewd politician and a pragmatic statesman. He understands the limits to which the resistance of a small country against powerful external forces can bear fruit and where invisible “red lines” are drawn for Budapest. On this basis, Prime Minister Orbán is able to “get the most” out of the situation for his country.

What opportunities do you see for Russia in connection with the West's anti-Russian stance?

The anti-Russian attitude of the collective West does not in itself create opportunities for Russia. It creates problems. At the same time, the need to stand up to the West is mobilizing Russia from within. It is forcing Russians to rely on their wits and their own labor, and to move away from the attitude that if a country has oil and gas, everything else can be bought abroad. The break with the West confronted Russia with fundamental questions in the areas of economics, politics, ideology and values. The answer to these questions was the thesis of an independent Russian civilization, which is gradually taking shape. This is a change of colossal proportions. Not only the attitudes of the last 35 years, beginning with Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika, but also the attitudes of the last 300 years, beginning with Peter the Great, are being revised.

If these efforts are fruitful, Russia will finally transform itself from a peripheral province in the Western world system into one of the centers of a new world structure, in which Chinese, Indian, Islamic, African and other civilizations, including Western and Russian ones, will coexist and interact on an equal footing.

Despite the growing confrontation, you believe that war between the West and Russia can be avoided. At the same time, however, you see the danger of a “catastrophic head-on collision”. What do you mean by that?

There is nothing completely inevitable in history, except that every human being is mortal (sometimes, as Mikhail Bulgakov warned, suddenly). The opposing forces have the opportunity to stop, to negotiate. In a specific situation between Russia and the West, it should be clear what is at stake for each side. For the US, it is about its prestige, its global ambitions and relations with its allies. For Russia, it is about the very existence of the state. Let me remind you of Putin's words from an earlier interview with US television: “Why do we need peace if Russia will no longer exist?” I personally take that seriously.

You are calling for the West's spiral of escalation to be broken, among other things, by transforming the West's propagandized fear of a Russian victory into a real one, to intimidate the other side – by threatening to use nuclear weapons, by resuming nuclear weapons testing. This sounds similar to Sergei Karaganov's June 2023 proposal to use preventive nuclear strikes against Western targets to show the West its limits. Have you come closer to him or are there significant differences?

In the early fall of 2022, I spoke on Fyodor Lukyanov's television program International Review (Международное обозрение) about the fear factor as the most important component of mutual deterrence in the nuclear age. Since then, not only have I not changed my position, but I have increasingly warned that the current fear deficit in the US and especially in Europe could lead the world into disaster. The West's escalation steps have brought us much closer to the abyss in the last two years. The situation is very dangerous. You can compare my publications of the last one and a half or two years with the articles of my colleague and friend Sergei Karaganov and draw the appropriate conclusions.

Why do you think there is only peace between the great powers when there is enough fear of each other? Is fear a good basis for peace?

I don't think fear is a “good” basis for peace. However, the history of international relations, especially over the last 80 years, shows that unless the great powers are in a stable alliance or partnership with each other, they are forced to base their security on the ability to either prevent a potential opponent from winning or to destroy them, even at the cost of their own destruction. There is, of course, a third way: surrender, followed by submission or self-dissolution. For Russia, this way is unacceptable. Fear is therefore a poor basis, but the alternative to balance through fear means either general annihilation or the self-liquidation of one of the rivals.

One more question about Russia: President Vladimir Putin is clearly warning the West about the consequences of the confrontational course and also says that Russia does not want to attack NATO. He also rejects Karaganov's proposal. For many in the West, Putin still represents reason on the global stage. What happens when he steps down?

President Putin will remain at the helm of Russia for at least another six years after his election victory in 2024. The problem of succession in power is one of the most difficult and potentially dangerous in the Russian political system. Neither Lenin, Stalin nor other Soviet rulers were able to solve this problem. The only exception is Boris Yeltsin, who handed over the country's fate to Putin.

I am sure that Putin is concerned with the problem of succession. I think he is working on it, but he is unlikely to present the country and the world with a successor before he is ready to hand over power himself. Putin has just raised an even bigger problem: the formation of a new elite, a service elite, to replace the money elite of the post-Soviet era, which is focused on its own selfish interests. In my opinion, the transformation processes currently taking place in Russia are helping to improve the quality of the country's top leadership compared to 25 or 35 years ago.

Cover picture: Dmitri Trenin signs the guest book of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General John Craddock, during a reception at his residence, Chateau Gendebien, near Mons, Belgium, on the evening of June 15, 2009 – photo source: Staff Sgt. James Hennessey, public domain.

More on the topic:

Interview with security expert Karaganov: US would sacrifice Europe without hesitation

Voices from Ukraine: Selenskyj still believes in revenge

The death of a US blogger in a Ukrainian prison and the double standard

Germany – servant and victim of the USA