Rereading the victory discourses of liberalism

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311886.2024.2350159#abstract
[This article is available on the Internet, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311886.2024.2350159#d1e149.]


Çiçek, A. C. (2024). Rereading the victory discourses of liberalism—’the end of ideology’ and ‘the end of history’ (finalization theories)—alongside the 2008 financial crisis. Cogent Social Sciences, 10(1). https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2024.2350159


Below are the first two pages of the 14 page article discussing `the end of ideology' and `the end of history' (financialization theories) - alongside the 2008 financial crisis


Abstract

The discourse of ‘the end of ideology’ put forward by Bell in 1960 was centered on the notion that an ideological consensus had been reached, especially in developed countries, and that ideologies were no longer necessary given that economic growth had replaced political growth as the predominant subject of debate. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of real socialism in parallel to the breakup of the USSR, the discourse that liberalism constitutes the dominant and only paradigm rose dramatically in prominence alongside the neoliberal policies implemented following the economic crisis in the 1970s. Undoubtedly, one of the most important works in this trend was the ‘end of history’ thesis put forward by Fukuyama in the 1990s. This study is rooted in the need to reconsider these ‘finalization’ theses founded on liberalism’s supposed lack of alternatives in the aftermath of the 2007–2008 global financial crisis. Offering a critique of historical economic-political liberalism, it aims to demonstrate the failure of these ending theses, both of which are still accepted and promoted by defenders of neoliberalism. This study employs historical and hermeneutic qualitative research methods. Its most important finding is that neoliberalism cannot be both a political and an economic ‘end’.

Introduction

The end of history certainly does not refer to the cessation of time or historiography. Rather, from a political perspective, it refers to the finalization of human development at a certain level of social, political and economic maturity. At such an end, it is supposedly unnecessary to pursue an alternative to the status quo, as the current system is optimal. Proponents of this view argue that human development and progress have largely been completed and that large-scale political change, transformation and revolution are outdated notions. In the twentieth century, the most important of such finalizing discourses were the ‘end of ideology’ and the ‘end of history’.

The ‘end of ideology’ discourse put forward during the Cold War—in the aftermath of the Second World War—was based on the notion that the system in place in the US-centered Western Bloc was the most ideal among all existing systems, meaning it was no longer necessary to discuss ideology. Rooted in the fact that the West was ‘prosperous’, proponents argued that the greatest possible ideal had been reached and that vicious ideological debates should be left aside. However, even today, the existence and determination of ideologies are important, even if not absolute. Although their importance and determining functions are different, ideologies are a part of the human equation across every geographical region in the world, regardless of whether they are called developed, undeveloped, underdeveloped or developing. As Örs (Citation2009, pp. 39–42) points out, ideologies that provide a sense of inner harmony, comfort and coherence—that help individuals to make sense of a complex world and give them an ‘identity’—will continue to exist in developed countries for as long as human beings’ problems with nature, political power and other people are perpetuated, through changes in human qualities (e.g. feminism, environmentalism, localism). In non-Western countries, the determining position of ideologies is obvious.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the USSR came another discourse of finalization: ‘the end of history’. According to this ‘end’, following liberal democracy’s victory in the predominant ideological conflict, the current system—which boasted the most internal consistency—would continue moving forward without any alternative. Such unobstructed advancement was a given, as development and progress had reached their final point in liberal democracy. As Zizek (Citation2009, p. 10) points out, Fukuyama’s discourse on the ‘end of history’ has been rendered irrelevant by two major US-centered events, one political and the other economic: On 11 September 2001, the twin towers were brought down, breaking the veneer of the liberal democratic political utopia, and the 2008 financial crisis brought about its economic collapse.

The 2008 financial crisis led to debates over the inevitability of state intervention, with Keynesian paradigms gaining popularity and attempts being made to overcome the crisis with expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. Thus, the ideas that the liberal democratic system would represent the endpoint of human development, which started with the ‘end of ideology’ and took on flesh and bones with the ‘end of history’, have been increasingly questioned following inevitabilities from the system’s crisis-producing structure at regular intervals. It can be said that neoliberalism, which exhibits several key differences from classical liberalism and exists in various forms, is in a ‘continuity relationship’ with classical liberalism due to the paradigm from which it originates, the theoreticians and practitioners of the ideology, its dominant position and its overarching mission to maintain the capitalist system. This is also true for liberal democracy and neoliberal democracy. Of course, neoliberalism is often a term used by its critics. The term is not used by its practitioners or adherents. Sometimes it appears as a worldview, sometimes as a political discourse, sometimes as a set of public policies (Castree et al., Citation2013, p. 339). In this study, neoliberalism is treated as a critical concept as well as an ideology that cannot be ‘the last’.

Within the continuity relationship between the two established finalizing discourses, the ‘end of history’ discourse is more decisive. As it is closer to the present, this study focuses on the ‘end of history’, though it does not neglect the ‘end of ideology’. Of course, neither of these discourses was limited to the time in which it was put forward. Both of them—but especially the former—are defended by modern neoliberal circles. Fukuyama, the man behind the original thesis, has also argued on multiple occasions that his thesis cannot be falsified. This is why the neoliberal system is seen by some circles as a literal ‘end’. This study details these finalizing theses before elaborating on why liberal democracy cannot represent the ‘end’ of human political or economic development.

Trying to construct ‘victory’ through finalization

Although the idea that liberal democracy has triumphed without an alternative from an eschatological (apocalyptic) perspective was clearly put forward by Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man in 1989, it is clear that the ‘end of ideology’ thesis put forward by Daniel Bell in the mid-twentieth century paved the way for this perspective. Thus, it is noteworthy that the discourse on the end of ideology emphasizes that liberalism is gradually becoming the world’s dominant paradigm in the world.

Undoubtedly, the eschatological (apocalyptic) understanding of history does not stem from Bell. Hegel (1977, pp. 56–57, 507) spoke of a logical end to history once human consciousness reaches absolute consciousness about itself through a dialectical process. Associating this logical end with a strong Prussia (alongside the American and French Revolutions), Hegel argued that history ends with the present moment and emphasized that the future is a closed book (Colingwood, Citation1996, p. 157). Marx is another thinker who approached the historical process with an emphasis on progress and finality. According to Marx, history progresses through class conflict; class struggle represented the primary driver of the historical progression from slave society to feudal society and, from there, to capitalist society. In the communist society that will follow the capitalist society, Marx thought that the disappearance of relations based on exploitation would put an end to the historical search for a new and better order (Sarı, Citation2010, p. 65). Neither Marx nor Hegel believed that progress would continue indefinitely. They both felt that development would come to an end once a form of society that suits humanity’s deepest aspirations is reached. In other words, both Hegel and Marx agreed that, in such a scenario, there would be no further progress in the development of fundamental principles and institutions, as the great social problems would have already been solved (Fukuyama, Citation1993, pp. 10–11).

In the 19th century, finalization discourse, which generally persisted within the context of the philosophy of history, exhibited development based on the liberal paradigm, especially in the aftermath of the Second World War. Stating that he was inspired by different sources, Bell (Citation2012, p. 12) put forward the end of ideology thesis in the ‘spirit’ of the Cold War. Indeed, just before Bell, Albert Camus (Citation2018, p. 42) had argued that the current era—most notably characterized by the dropping of the atomic bomb—had marked the ‘end of ideologies’. Bell was also influenced by Arthur Koestler’s (Citation1949, p. 31) assessment that the raising of Nazi flags at the airfield in honor of Hitler’s Foreign Minister Ribbentrop’s visit to Moscow and the playing of Horst Wessel Lied, the National Anthem of Nazi Germany, by the Red Army band marked the ‘End of Adventure’. The ‘absurdity’ of mixing politics and ideology, which Raymond Aron (Citation1979, p. 7) discussed in his France-centered work The Opium of the Intellectuals, also influenced Bell’s ideas...