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Developing Action Capacity: A Path

by Anonymous
A guide to building capacity for powerful actions in small groups. Includes a source link to the No Trace Project, which hosts translations and pdf downloads of the guide.

Developing Action Capacity: A Path

“We are not special. Our skills are not overly technical or advanced, and our tools are simple to acquire. If you are reading this, you are capable of doing what we do.”

– APD Patrol Car Torched in Lakewood

While I agree with this sentiment, the reader is left with many questions about how to develop such a capacity for action, even if they are motivated. What exactly does it take to not get caught carrying out heavy actions like arson? This is especially important in the long run; not getting caught for a single arson is one thing, but being able to continue carrying out attacks in the face of heightened repressive attention is quite another.

For anyone who wants to carry out actions like this, but isn’t doing so yet, I’ve sketched an outline of the steps I think are necessary to sustain hard-hitting attacks on domination (limited to the topic of “operational” considerations, i.e., acquiring skills). This brief outline is intended to orient you and provide a “learning path” — each step has recommended reading that actually goes into the appropriate amount of depth on the subject. Use the Tails operating system to visit these links, which runs from a USB drive and leaves no trace on your computer. What I’ve written here is by no means definitive, and I hope to spark a dialogue about any operational aspects I may have neglected, as well as anything outside this scope that is important for sustaining and intensifying the capacity for action.

Deepening bonds

For anyone who doesn’t already have an action group, deciding who to act with is the first obstacle to overcome. I prefer to act in groups of two or three; it’s easier to maintain a high level of trust and agility with just a small handful of people. Most actions don’t require more than three participants, and when they do, action groups can collaborate. I prefer not to act alone because some aspects of actions are less risky when there are at least two people (for example, having a lookout).

In deciding who to act with, there is a tension between flexibility and consistency. Acting in several different configurations allows you to develop trust and experience with more people, which makes you more resilient in the face of arrests, burnout, or interpersonal splits. On the other hand, acting in a more consistent configuration can make it easier to develop a higher capacity for action in a shorter period of time.

Action groups only form because someone takes the initiative to propose them to a comrade with whom they want to deepen affinity and trust.

Affinity

Deciding who to approach in your network should be based on a sense of affinity between you, as this will determine what the action group decides to focus on. Affinity means sharing analysis, discovered through getting to know each other, that leads to prospects for action. It means knowing that you share goals and want to act in similar ways to pursue them.

The long-term exploration and deepening of affinity across a network, beyond a specific action group, opens up many more possibilities for the configuration of action groups to adapt over time, as well as for collaboration between them. I’ve chosen to use the term “action group” rather than “affinity group” to emphasize that affinity exists in many different constellations, each with its own potential.

Recommended reading:

Trust

Trust is contextual — you may trust someone to be a good friend, but that is different from trusting them with your freedom. Deciding who to approach in your network should be based on trust that they can live with the possible consequences of their actions without betraying their comrades, even if it means a long prison sentence. Trust is qualitative in a way that can’t be reduced to a simplistic formula. It’s based on an intimate knowledge that can only come from singular experiences within a relationship. However, there are established practices for deepening trust that are still worthwhile.

Recommended reading:

Laying the groundwork

Once there are two or three people who want to experiment with acting together, I recommend starting with actions that do not have particularly serious consequences if you get caught, such as breaking windows. This allows you to assess whether the configuration is a good fit, practice any skills that are new to anyone, establish operational approaches and a good “workflow” for the tasks involved, and develop an interpersonal dynamic that meets everyone’s needs, all in a relatively low-stakes environment. Progressively increasing the intensity of the action also gives you the opportunity to practice moving through fear so that decision-making, communication, and execution in high-stress situations can remain unimpeded.

Operational security

“Operational security” means the practices that allow you to get away with crimes. I recommend that your action group first discuss each of the highlighted resources at the No Trace Project before taking action, in an outdoor and device-free location. Many of these discussions are well suited for larger affinity constellations than your action group. This will take a considerable amount of time, but an in-depth discussion of these topics will provide a necessary foundation. Don’t make the mistake of assuming that everyone is already on the same page. These conversations will also be an opportunity to discuss how you will prepare for any repression that may result from your actions.

Action planning

With this foundation in place, you are now in a strong position to begin action planning. As you gain experience, organizing and executing actions will become much more natural. What was initially a lot to keep track of will eventually become second nature. This is another reason why it’s a good idea to start with actions that aren’t particularly risky.

Recommended reading:

  • How To Have A Fun Night To Forget: This will give you a quick overview of the steps involved in taking action.
  • Threat Library: This will give you a framework for planning the operational security measures for a specific action (for example, what surveillance detection measures you will take before going to a meeting).

Materializing your dreams

Before your action group engages in actions that will be more intensively investigated, it is especially important that you become competent in two operational security practices:

DNA minimization protocols

DNA minimization protocols are necessary to avoid leaving evidence at a crime scene. However, these precautions are not perfect, so the action should be conducted in such a way as to leave nothing behind that could have DNA traces on it. I recommend learning and practicing this skill long before you actually need to use it for high-risk actions.

Recommended reading:

Surveillance detection

If there is no evidence left at crime scenes, and you have established practices that prevent targeted digital surveillance from providing leads, investigators will be forced to use physical surveillance to try to incriminate you. The main goal of physical surveillance is to surveil the suspect during an action (as they did for Jeff Luers), and if that doesn’t work, to surveil the suspect while they are preparing for an action (buying materials, doing reconnaissance, etc.), all the while mapping the suspect’s network to find more suspects.

Detecting physical surveillance is a skill that takes a lot of practice, so I recommend that you start learning it long before you actually need to use it for high-risk actions. If you are ever the target of an investigation, this is the only thing that will prevent the police from following you to an action or preparation for an action.

Recommended reading:

Action techniques

Of course, skills related to action techniques are also important. For example, there are many ways to start a fire. Some are better than others in terms of reliability and effectiveness, but your approach should always be adapted to the specific scenario (target, exit plan, expected response times, etc.). Whatever techniques you end up using, it’s important to stay open to innovation rather than limiting yourself to following a guide.

Action technique is also related to operational security: for example, if you decide that the incendiary device(s) need a delay, it’s critical to be very confident that the delay won’t fail, as this would leave evidence for investigators to take samples from. Thoroughly test its reliability under the same conditions, and build in redundancy by using multiple delays on each device. Depending on the circumstances and terrain, you may even want to make a plan for noticing if any fires don’t start, such as choosing an exit route that provides a line of sight and pausing along it until you see the light of the flames.

Recommended reading:

Connecting constellations

The next step in developing capacity for action requires going beyond one’s own group. This is where things get really interesting: coordination between autonomous groups allows them to accomplish far more than they could on their own, while their autonomy wards off hierarchy and centralization. Of course, conspiring with more people involves risk and must be balanced with the need for compartmentalization — the need-to-know principle can help here.

Affinity is the strongest foundation for a common project among these groups — while affinity within an action group is based on interpersonal experience, affinity between action groups is based more on affinity with the project than with each other. The long-term search for affinity beyond your action group is what makes this foundation possible. Informal organization can then grow between action groups, which is a model that has been experimented with since the ’70s. Informal organization is born and shaped by the pursuit of specific goals, such as preventing the construction of Cop City through diffuse sabotage. “It doesn’t have a name to defend or assert, only a project to bring about”.

This outline touches on what I think are the minimal steps necessary to develop a capacity for hard-hitting action, limited to the topic of acquiring skills. Much more is needed — learning other skills beyond this baseline, experimenting with informal organization while navigating its challenges, developing analyses to understand the changing terrain, studying the vulnerabilities of domination, and focusing on all the other aspects that contribute to sustaining and intensifying action.

§Developing Incisive Capacity: Making Actions Count
by Anonymous

A recent text outlining a path for developing action capacity concludes that “studying the vulnerabilities of domination” also needs attention. If a capacity for destruction is present, then the question naturally arises of how to aim it so that this destruction hits where it hurts. Let’s imagine what such an approach might entail by turning our gaze to a central pillar of global power and counterinsurgency: the U.S. “defense industry.”

Anarchists and other rebels based in the U.S. are well-placed to strike at its war machine—the ’60s saw a prolonged social upheaval driven primarily by this objective, and in the many years since, anarchists here have occasionally moved beyond opposing war to attacking it. The current genocide in Palestine has heightened social tensions against U.S. militarism, though the actions of anarchists in this moment have mostly had little impact on their targets and not contributed much to the popular imaginary of how militarism can be attacked. What could equip anarchists to carry out more significant strikes, to hone a quality of action that goes beyond the symbolic? To this end, the proposal put forward by “Fragments for an Insurgent Struggle Against Militarism and the World that Needs It” deserves discussion: to focus on well-conceived attacks that target vulnerabilities in the production and infrastructure of war.

Breaking the links in the chain

The production of war starts here: the U.S. is by far the world’s largest arms exporter. Of SIPRI’s “Top 100 Arms-Producing and Military Services Companies,” 42 are based in the U.S., accounting for 51% of total global revenues. Most visible are the factories that churn out arms, ammunition and other war equipment. Less visible are the supply chains that transform raw materials into the components the factories need (production stage supply chains) or transport the finished product into the hands of States (distribution stage supply chains). “Fragments for an Insurgent Struggle…” proposes to focus destructive attention on the upstream supplier bottlenecks inherent in high-tech production, an industry “dependent on numerous expensive and difficult-to-obtain resources,” rather than on the well-secured assembly plants:

Arson attacks on the vehicles of arms companies and their suppliers, as well as on the vehicles of the logistics companies that transported their war material, etc., as well as a perhaps even larger series of paint attacks on the headquarters of these companies offered, and still offer, a militant perspective of intervention in war production. And yet: it would be news to me that supplies to the war fronts ever came to a standstill in the process. The interruption of production was too minor, the sabotage of logistics too insignificant. Nothing that could not have been made up by an additional night shift. And the financial damage? Well, let’s say that the management of these companies make calculations in other dimensions.

It is by no means my intention to talk down these attempts at intervention, to discourage people from attacking even when the enemy seems overwhelming and one’s own room to maneuver seems too small in comparison, one’s own resistance too insignificant. None of this is a reason for me to refrain from attacking. Rather, I think it is worthwhile to reconsider established strategies from time to time and, if necessary, to revise them when it becomes apparent that one’s actions within them are largely ineffective or becoming predictable.

The world’s largest defense contractor, Lockheed Martin, saw its annual revenue drop by 8.9% between 2021 and 2022 due to supply chain constraints (in other words, it couldn’t produce $6 billion worth of weapons). Of the 41 other U.S. companies in the “Top 100,” 31 also saw their annual revenue decline for the same reason. By identifying the specific supply chain bottlenecks that are already severely hampering these leviathanic entities, it becomes possible to exacerbate shortages in a way that actually impacts weapons production.

Supply chains consist of “tiers” and look more like a network than a linear “chain.” First tier suppliers directly supply a company like Lockheed Martin, second tier suppliers supply the first tier, and so on. The average U.S. aerospace company relies on about 200 first-tier suppliers, and the second and third tiers involve more than 12,000 companies. Irreplaceable suppliers are called “sole-source,” and are often present at all tiers. As one engineer recently warned in the trade press, “Dassault has five thousand suppliers for its Rafale, and all it takes to block everything is for one to get stuck.”

In addition to supplying product components, supply chains must also provide specialized factory machinery. For example, the production of the machinery required for the microelectronics (semiconductors) used in virtually all military technology is a severe bottleneck causing shortages in this sector. In February 2022, the Department of Defense (DoD) released an action plan for “Securing Defense-Critical Supply Chains” which warns that “the high-tech company ASML (Netherlands) is currently the sole-source for extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography tools that are required to mass produce semiconductor die in technology nodes below 7nm1. Such consolidation increases sole-source risk in the global microelectronics supply chain.” ASML produces only about 40 machines per year (each taking 12-18 months and involving more than 1,000 first-tier suppliers). They have a $50 billion backlog and their closest competitors are a decade behind EUV technology.

All supply chains have bottlenecks, and most have “single points of failure,” it’s just a matter of locating them. The tools to gain this visibility are included in the field of “supply chain risk management”—our enemies are publishing much of this research. The same DoD action plan describes “persistent sub-tier2 supply chain vulnerabilities, from raw materials and chemical shortages to critical subcomponents produced by fragile suppliers.” It goes on to provide a high-level overview of supply chain issues for “areas in which critical vulnerabilities pose the most pressing threat”: missiles, batteries, castings, microelectronics, and critical minerals.

More recently, for the first time in its history, the DoD released a “National Defense Industrial Strategy” to provide a roadmap for “developing more resilient and innovative supply chains.” Their plans are not infallible—one advisor describes the document as lacking “a focus on long-term solutions to supply chain issues that have plagued the defense industry.” Equally interesting are the publications of RAND’s National Security Research Division, especially those of its National Security Supply Chain Institute.

The infrastructure of peace is the infrastructure of war

Logistics means the movement and storage of goods between different points in the supply chain (e.g., from manufacturing plants to assembly plants to distribution centers). Logistics works through infrastructure. Not all supply chain problems involve logistics—for example, a supplier’s factory burning down has nothing to do with whether the component can be moved efficiently, but rather whether it can be produced.

The angles of attack can be adapted to the context: a supply vulnerability depends on supplier bottlenecks, and a logistics vulnerability depends on infrastructure bottlenecks. For example, an arms factory may be located in a region with ample infrastructural redundancy that would make sabotaging logistics difficult, but perhaps it has a sole-source supplier. Conversely, the factory may have invested in building a supply chain with significant redundancy, but its product is shipped to market through ports with limited rail connections.

Regardless of supply and logistics flows (which, it must be emphasized, are generally fraught with severe bottlenecks), a factory needs to be connected to a functioning electrical grid in order to operate, and it often needs to be connected to the Internet via fiber optic cables. Energy and telecommunications vulnerabilities extend far beyond the well-secured perimeter of a factory, decentralized to such an extent that even a militarized police force would be incapable of protecting them.

To return to the proposal in “Fragments for an Insurgent Struggle…,” it suggests that an anti-militarist practice could sabotage “the entire logistical system in which these weapons are shipped, loaded, transported by rail or truck, rather than limiting itself to attacks on logistics companies,” as well as focusing on “the frequent freight rail connections of weapons companies’ production sites.”

The “dual-use” infrastructure that serves logistics quickly becomes the infrastructure of war when the State goes to war or has to turn against its own population in an insurgency scenario. The text “War Starts Here: Let’s Cripple its Infrastructure Where We Can” criticizes that “Fragments for an Insurgent Struggle…” leaves out “the most important raw material of war: oil or energy in general. Especially at the beginning of a war, the amount of energy needed to move troops is gigantic, but throughout the war, fuel has to be transported from some stockpile and/or refinery to the front, where it is needed to fuel the engines of the war machines. And especially when a war is not taking place directly in their own territory, but the logistics of supplying the troops with energy pass through this territory, it might be worthwhile to take a closer look at this infrastructure.”

In a very inspiring recent initiative, comrades did exactly that in the context of the EU’s infrastructure of war. Their words are no less relevant here:

We encourage people to make their own analyses of the military-industrial complex, its raw materials and its logistics, with no less than its efficient sabotage in mind. We feel the lack of such analysis all the more sharply because we believe that our ability to fight domination (and its wars) is irrevocably dependent on knowing its infrastructures, understanding the mechanisms that make them function and, not least, establishing the necessary skills and a certain routine for attacking identified vulnerabilities.

An insurgent struggle against militarism

Identifying vulnerabilities is certainly a step in the right direction. Mapping the “defense industrial base” with an eye to its vulnerabilities is an enormous and long-term project that anarchists in the U.S. have barely begun. An initiative in the German context could provide inspiration: “Attack the Arms Industry.” It collects companies and institutions into the categories of producers, suppliers, logistics, research, financing, and legitimization. They have written a tutorial sharing their approach entitled “An Introduction to Mapping the Local Arms Industry and its Vulnerable Points.” As in the ’60s, disillusioned soldiers and veterans are well positioned to undermine the military with their access to insider knowledge, and this information would be easier for them to share anonymously if an equivalent project existed for the U.S. context.

Studying the enemy to identify vulnerabilities enables a quality of action, but putting that knowledge into practice is what makes it truly consequential. What are the current obstacles to anarchists developing a capacity for action on a significant scale, organized in small autonomous groups that can coordinate around a particular focus? In other words, what needs to happen for more anarchists to establish the necessary skills and a certain routine for attacking identified vulnerabilities?

Only by fostering an incisive quality of action can we hope to bring the factories of death to a standstill, to disrupt the infrastructure of war, and more broadly, to make meaningful contributions to the social upheavals on the horizon. The task at hand is not straightforward, but that does not make it any less necessary.

Submitted Anonymously Over Email

  1. Microelectronics products containing silicon die chips are typically described as being manufactured at a certain technology node (e.g., 45 nanometers), which refers to the dimension in nm of the smallest element in a transistor. State-of-the-Art (SOTA) is currently considered to be <10nm and is used in advanced computing (data centers, artificial intelligence, supercomputers, etc.). State-of-the-Practice (SOTP) is between 10nm-90nm and is generally what is used in conventional weapons, although today’s SOTA will become SOTP and legacy in the future. The industry needs ASML’s EUV technology to keep Moore’s Law alive (“the number of transistors on microchips doubles every 2 years”), which is necessary for computing to progress. The DoD action plan goes on to say that “although most of DoD’s current systems are reliant on State-of-the-Practice (SOTP) and legacy microelectronics, State-of-the-Art (SOTA) microelectronics are DoD’s primary differentiator for asymmetric technology advantage over potential adversaries.”
  2. A sub-tier is any tier below the first.
§Waiting for the anarchist guerrilla…
by Anonymous

Translated from German, originally posted to kontrapolis.info

Spring 2024, the situation is unbearable. Fascism has conquered the minds of many people, not only in the territory controlled by the German State. The rulers of many countries seem to be on a death trip; hot wars between States, wars against migration, war against the planet’s resources and social war are in a phase of enthusiasm for death, reminiscent of descriptions shortly before the outbreak of the First World War. Meanwhile, humanity has its fingers glued to smartphones, numbed by the flickering of algorithms.

As for the hot wars, many anarchists remain in the spectator position. In one of these wars, there are good reasons to join the Kurdish structures and be active against the Turkish State and its Islamist proxies. There are also good reasons to stay away from the PKK’s cult of personality and instead attack Erdogan’s interests in Europe, although the initial waves of action here have subsided considerably. The anarchist space has also not yet developed any practice against the State systems that are largely responsible for the current massacres (NATO/EU/Israel/Iran/Russia) or the war profiteers that is capable of influencing the course of history.

Now, a text published on March 2, 2024 under the title “Developing Incisive Capacity: Making Actions Count”1 raises questions that are certainly relevant to many of us:

What could equip anarchists to carry out more significant strikes, to hone a quality of action that goes beyond the symbolic? What are the current obstacles to anarchists developing a capacity for action on a significant scale, organized in small autonomous groups that can coordinate around a particular focus? In other words, what needs to happen for more anarchists to establish the necessary skills and a certain routine for attacking identified vulnerabilities?

To answer these questions not only theoretically but also practically requires nothing less than an anarchist guerrilla. For with the methods developed in the autonomous movement over the last few decades, we have come no further than exactly where we have been for some time now. In order not to indulge in lengthy analyses, which could hardly be more appropriate than issue 2 of the newspaper “Antisistema”, spring 2024, please refer to this issue.

A guerrilla, or at least guerrilla activities, require, among other things, that a group of people organize themselves over a longer period of time. This is where the first shortcoming of anarchist non-organization comes in: a short stay in the scene and a lack of commitment. The development of a militant life takes longer than most people spend in the radical left milieus of the western metropolises. Combined with a misinterpretation of the anarchist perspective on committed organizing, this leads to the historical fact that, with few exceptions, most guerrilla groups were communist and/or aimed at national liberation. The resistance in Spain against Franco can be seen as an example of commitment to subversion as a life’s work. Anarchist, libertarian, and communist militants waged an armed struggle against the dictatorship from 1939 to 1965, in which most of them were killed rather than fleeing to the safety of exile in France. Francesc Sabaté Llopart became synonymous with these anarchist guerrillas, a struggle whose tragic end was marked by the execution of Salvador Puig Antich in 1974.

Very little has been written about the scale of the armed struggle against Franco following the civil war. A thick blanket of silence has been drawn over the fighters, for a variety of reasons. According to Franco’s personal friend, Guardia Civil General Camilo Alonso Vega — who was in charge of the anti-guerrilla campaign for twelve years — banditry (the term the Francoists always used to describe the guerrilla activity) was of “great significance” in Spain, in that it “disrupted communications, demoralised folk, wrecked our economy, shattered our unity and discredited us in the eyes of the outside world”.

We have no reliable breakdown of the overall figures for guerrillas or for the casualties sustained by or inflicted upon the security forces and Army. If we are to have some grasp of what this unequal struggle against the Dictatorship was like, our only option is to turn to figures made public in 1968, according to which the Guardia Civil sustained 628 casualties (258 deaths) between 1943 and 1952.2

A definition of what a guerrilla actually means emerges from the realities that people have faced in seemingly hopeless wars. Andrew Mack noted that in asymmetric wars, the stronger actor loses because it “has a lower interest in winning due to being less threatened,” which is true of the Algerian FLN’s war against France. And Ivan Arreguín-Toft: “Strong actors lose asymmetric conflicts when they adopt the wrong strategy vis-à-vis their weaker adversaries. The focus of State forces on symmetrical warfare leads to the strong actor reacting to the asymmetrical strategies of the weak actor with the wrong strategy.” The anti-colonial guerrilla groups won because they did not lose. They prevented the stronger actor from winning hearts and minds3.

Applied to today’s situation, this means that the militants of the anarchist space in Europe and the US, due to their class origins (mostly white middle class), may not be able to develop a sufficient sense of being threatened, and that this cannot be compensated for by empathy with those affected by European aggression. This is against the backdrop of Europe’s uninterrupted war against the rest of the world’s population since Columbus landed in “America” in 1492.

Looking back at old issues of Interim and Radikal or the archive of Linksunten Indymedia, it is striking that the insurrectionary texts of the last twenty years have not taken a position on how to organize with those involved in the wave-like cycles of insurrection. Affinity groups have been conceptualized as being as ephemeral as many revolts themselves. With the level of sabotage this has made possible, participation in asymmetric warfare is not feasible at this time. This does not necessarily mean the use of weapons, but the creation of conditions that allow the use of whatever means are deemed necessary. At the moment, anarchist counter-violence stands in a reactive relationship to State power. We use the means that we assume the State and society will not extinguish us for. Currently, the State is shifting the discourse on violence against Nazis from “forbidden, but it happens” to “forbidden, and you’ll be hunted down for it”. The next step would have to be a paradigm shift that would force State power to react to our counter-violence. Or for State power to accept losing control of discursive and physical space.

After the uprising in Greece in December 2008, some of those who were involved called for urban guerrilla warfare to be adopted as the main strategic direction. This development was the subject of intense anonymous debate. Some people said that the expansion of guerrilla attacks was going too far too fast, that most people were unable to make or understand this tactical leap. They also said that the anarchists would become isolated and vulnerable to violent repression. Another criticism was that Greek society had some historical references to specialized leftist guerrilla groups, while there was hardly any tradition of the anarchist model of dispersed, non-vanguardist groups. In the absence of such a framework of historical references, it was argued, the new strategy of informal and flexible formations would not succeed in winning over a larger part of the population to participation in guerrilla actions.

Years earlier, the 17 November organization had published a critique of an anti-authoritarian group, arguing that choosing more mundane targets in line with an anarchist analysis would create more fear than recognition in society because people would not understand why that particular target was being attacked. Basing the strategy on more and more people carrying out similar attacks was seen as a problem because the necessary critique of capitalism is not widespread.

Another position was that a strategy of clandestine guerrilla warfare would lead to specialization and be spectacular. It requires such a high degree of specialization and knowledge that the vast majority of society cannot participate, as opposed to an uprising in which everyone can participate in their own way. By their very nature, guerrilla actions are spectacular due to the small number of people involved, which means that attacks are infrequent, which in turn increases the level of preparation and intensity. Their primary target is virtual reality. The way an urban revolt communicates itself is essentially immediate. However, clandestine attacks are mainly experienced through the eyes of the media. As a result, people become spectators of the struggle rather than protagonists, as is the case with riots. As the spearhead of the struggle moves further and further away from the realities of people’s lives, in the long run they are transformed even more into spectators. At the same time, the State and the media, for their part, turn the attacks into a spectacle and make them a symbol of the entire struggle. Finally, the State could simply eliminate the struggle by ordering the media to stop reporting on the attacks. Decapitated in this way, the remnants of the struggle could be enticed to collaborate with the institutional left.

Proponents of this critique point out that this is exactly what happened in Germany and Italy in the seventies and eighties. The group Ta Paidia Tis Galarias, which converted to communism from its anarchist roots, went further, claiming that “on this basis, the armed struggle finds itself in alliance with the State: both are challenged by proletarian subversive activity, the continuation of which threatens the survival of both.” The proponents of the guerrilla strategy, on the other hand, argued that if an insurrection is to develop into a revolution, it must prevail in armed struggle against the State, and it cannot do so unarmed4.

Be that as it may, as class antagonism subsided in Greece, so did the public guerrilla debate. One lesson for the future might be to be better prepared for the closing of a historical window, for occasionally this reset occurs, as in Portugal on April 25, 1974, when the dictatorship was swept away in a matter of hours by the Movimento das Forças Armadas. This overthrow cameas a surprise to Portuguese society, and after initial attempts to collectivize farmland and some businesses, it was quickly forced into social-democratic channels under pressure from NATO. The armed resistance of communist groups such as the Brigadas Revolucionarias had little impact on the course of events. Although the BR had already begun attacking NATO installations in Portugal in 1971, robbing banks and engaging in gun battles with the police that left officers dead, society did not take up the fight against NATO. After the end of the colonial wars and sending the proletariat to the slaughter in them, internal peace was stablized. Nonetheless, the BR remained active until 1980 and maintained anti-colonial cooperation with the Polisario.

Preparing for historical windows is not so far-fetched, since only fifteen years after the fall of the regime in Portugal, two States in Europe — East Germany and Yugoslavia — dissolved completely. In both territories, however, this was accompanied by a rise in nationalist violence during a period of general depression for radical left militancy following the collapse of “real socialism”.

Preparing for a sudden or foreseeable situation, or even better, creating a situation yourself, is a frequently expressed idea. At this point we would like to engage with some of the ideas raised by the newspaper Antisistema. In response to the question of how we want to act (quantitatively or qualitatively?), they write:

It might be interesting to take a closer look at the three points mentioned above — energy grids, microchip factories and mining, especially deep-sea mining. […] Perhaps the multiplication of different forms of action — sabotage, mass disruption, small reproducible attacks — fueled by radical criticism on the streets and a growing disillusionment with politics can ensure that the possibility of direct action against those responsible for industrial destruction spreads.

A zine from France entitled “Blackout: Controversy about the meaning and effectiveness of sabotage” responds to the mass sabotage during the Covid lockdown by asking, “How could we undermine technological control? Could we provoke a tipping point in this situation? What scenarios did these sabotage actions open up? How could we consider effectiveness, organization, and ethics as a whole?”

It is well known that many sabotage actions in France do not come only from the anarchist spectrum, and “Blackout” attaches some importance to how we understand effectiveness:

Simultaneously, another proposal is taking shape whose strategy is to reach the infrastructural field, that is, the deep layers of power. The power of the war-research-industry complex is not unshakeable, since it relies on diffuse infrastructures. Understanding, identifying and destroying key infrastructures also means to start reconsidering the possibility of radical change. Although less spectacular, this way of action has a triple advantage: it is less seizable by repressive forces; it can concretely stop, though temporarily, the techno-industrial machinery; and it prevents any central direction from taking hold, since it is the result of the work of a multitude of small, dispersed and autonomous groups. What strategies emerge when we separate or combine anarchist, ecologist and techno-critical perspectives? How do these strategies integrate a now-decisive element: the war in Europe, which will guide and harden the grip of States on their populations.

First of all, in order to be able to speak of a strategy at all, the fight would have to be more long-term than is usually the case. Anyone who reacts to a new urgent issue every few months is only one factor in the strategy of the enemy, who is also acting. Making an impact becomes possible when a group of people can be found who are willing to commit themselves to a specific issue for a longer period of time. The anarchist guerrilla is not defined by the use of weapons and bombs, but by the decision to seriously engage in one aspect of the numerous wars. The current practice of beating up a Nazi today, smashing up a new building tomorrow, and setting fire to a company car next week is a politics of autonomous fire brigades. Better than nothing, but not enough to answer any of the questions outlined above. Last year’s intensification of worldwide attacks in support of Alfredo Cospito’s hunger strike revealed the nature of anarchist militancy. It is understood as a tactical tool — in this case as a show of solidarity — but it evaporates before it leaves any material impact on the enemy’s camp.

Determination is the strongest weapon of our enemies, not their guns or tanks. The determination of the police, military and security authorities to throw away their own lives and the lives of others at any moment stands in our way. The anarchist guerrilla will not counter this with the same cadaverous obedience, but rather with the determination to take the arduous path of resistance: conspiring with comrades despite interpersonal contradictions, pursuing long-term plans, eternal research without quick successes, moving through camera-infested cities on cold nights, etc.

About the possibilities: Either in Paris during the lockdown or in Grenoble a couple days later, the step seems to have taken, moving beyond targets with low strategic value (since they are easily replaceable) towards multiple targets that, once coordinated, considerably increase the efficiency of an offensive action. Whether it is the 100 000 people deprived of internet and phone services in Paris, or in Grenoble where we learned that an additional antenna would have shut down the metropolis’ entire network. Not that the recipe is anything new, but I find it exciting that we allow ourselves to think it, to do it, to coordinate ourselves, to hit simultaneously, and to disappear. It is a step forward, from what can be considered as low intensity conflict to what could become an open conflict. Given the way things are going, with on one side an all-technological over-controlled system and on the other, the increasingly intense destruction of what we still dared to call nature not so long ago, I sincerely believe that we do not have time anymore. No time to hope that another social movement will become uncontrollable if we break enough windows; a mass of increasingly servile people will become an angry mob. To me, not to have time anymore does not mean to rush behind every emergency (climate or social), nor to follow the increasingly rapid flux of the net, to be ‘present’ in order to spread ‘counter-information’. No. It means planning meaningful operations, to dare think in terms of strategy. With our own temporality and not that of power.5

As long as this form of guerrilla fails to materialize, Kurdish Apoism, centered around the ideas Abdulah Öcalan the founder of the PKK, will continue to attract anarchists, and others will lose themselves in the delirium of anarchist participation in the service of the Ukrainian military. Before deciding on the use of weapons, the anarchist guerrilla will have to engage with successful uprisings of the past. For example, the Arab uprising against Turkey in 1916-1918. Its main initiator, Lawrence of Arabia, said at the time:

Any kind of traditional warfare should be dispensed with and guerrilla warfare should be waged instead. This consists primarily of a negation of regular warfare. The central idea of regular war is the “encounter”. Two opponents meet at a given time to decide on victory or defeat through the orderly clash of their armies. Guerrilla warfare neither achieves a decision nor attempts to bring about an encounter with the enemy. Guerrilla warfare is a “war of evasion”. The guerrilla warrior hides from the enemy. At a safe distance, they look for the place where the enemy is weakest and attack there. Without forcing a decision, they retreat again and repeat the small attacks elsewhere. They do not wage war in the strict sense, but disturb their opponent with constant pinpricks of ambush, sabotage and raids until the latter, worn down in every respect, collapses.

According to Lawrence, the fact that Arabia was a land of revelatory religion with a tremendous longing for freedom was advantageous — a kind of reflection in the mind of the barrenness of the desert. Lawrence harnessed the prophetic power for the uprising with a strategy of perpetual ambush. It was less a matter of conquering territory than of creating a desire for freedom. Of course, it should not be forgotten that Lawrence was acting in the service of the British government, but the insurgents’ desire for freedom was authentic and their determination greater than that of the Turkish colonial power.

In 2024, Germany and Europe are littered with facilities, installations, vehicles and those responsible for the massacres at the borders, in Ukraine, in Palestine, in Kurdistan, and the colonial wars on other continents…

The initiative “Switch off! The system of destruction” has provided a positive and feasible example of a framework for action that enables coordination. To hone a quality of action that goes beyond the symbolic, as formulated from the Atlanta Forest, requires strong reference to each other, both in published texts and in the informal contacts between anonymous protagonists. In order not to become prematurely frustrated with the lack of change, we should take into account the time frame of the EZLN, which prepared for the armed uprising in the jungle for ten years.

Reducing effective strikes against the war machine to a militarist perspective prevents the emergence of an anarchist guerrilla. With all sympathy for the resistance in Turkey and despite recognizing the important attacks on the AKP regime, the Halkların Birleşik Devrim Hareketi (HBDH) wants something different from us when it says “we are the vanguard of the revolution in the struggle of the peoples in Turkey and Kurdistan against AKP/MHP fascism. The HBDH will fulfill its task as a vanguard. It will raise the consciousness of the working people in the right way. It will support and lead them in organizing. It will lead and inspire actions and mobilize people for them. The HBDH is a leading force. Against AKP/MHP fascism, it represents the future, hope, determination, freedom and democracy of Turkey. The HBDH is the force that will overthrow this fascism”6 Their utopia fills the vacuum in the absence of anarchist practice that is social and armed. So, is a form of resistance against the war that impacts reality only possible at the price of the leftist power dialectic, as expressed by the Kurdish groups?

In discussions with comrades from the three internationalists, we repeatedly came across the topic of tactical alliances, which are often unavoidable in war situations in order to become a force. Bawer, who still knew Finbar from Rojava, drew parallels to the time when he fought alongside the Kurdish movement in Raqqa and described the situation for anarchists in Ukraine as follows: “The way to build your own unity as an anarchist is to shake hands with forces like the State or disagreeable groups. However, it does not mean that you lose your principles. Many Western leftists cannot stand this contradiction.”7

Indeed, enduring contradictions is a necessary prerequisite for enabling autonomous small action groups to take a step forward. However, the current tendency in some circles to dismiss contradictions as irrelevant stands in the way of achieving freedom after the end of violence. While it is obvious that Israel’s war against the Palestinian population requires armed resistance, the uncritical solidarity that often happens speaks to the inconsequential non-practice of anarchy, with its lack of perspective on the battlefields. Where war, which is to say life and death, is discussed, it is necessary to clarify one’s own ideas. When, for example, the leader of the Saraya Al-Quds — Tulkarem Brigade answers five interview questions with “God”8, this requires us in the safe global North to take a real stand instead of resorting to empty phrases (if we are serious about practical solidarity).

In order to provide an answer to the questions brought up earlier, the development of an anarchist guerrilla is proposed. This does not require a founding declaration or acronyms. It is not defined by the question of weapons or the desire to escalate violence, but is rather characterized by the determination of those involved to build a long-term committed structure that is capable of acting against the war waged from above. Only the sequence of determination — commitment — organization in a collective structure leads to further questions about the choice of means or any strategic orientation. We must also fight the incredible success that the capitalist system achieves every day by framing war in the consciousness of the masses as a war of nations and religions, thereby concealing its true nature as a class war.

  1. https://scenes.noblogs.org/post/2024/03/02/developing-incisive-capacity-making-actions-count/
  2. Antonio Téllez Solà, Armed resistance to Franco, 1939-1965
  3. Arreguín-Toft, I. (2001). How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. Mack, A. (1975). Why big nations lose small wars: The politics of asymmetric conflict.
  4. https://libcom.org/library/specialised-guerilla-diffuse-guerilla
  5. Blackout – Controversy about meaning and effectiveness of sabotage, page 12
  6. https://anfdeutsch.com/hintergrund/kalkan-die-hbdh-als-avantgarde-der-revolution-26384
  7. https://anfdeutsch.com/hintergrund/gastbeitrag-zum-internationalen-gedenktag-an-anarchistische-gefallene-im-russisch-ukrainischen-krieg-41875
  8. https://abolitionmedia.noblogs.org/post/2024/04/22/tulkarem-brigade-commander-abu-shujaa-returns-alive-sending-palestine-into-celebration/
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by Anonymous
PDF version of the text to distribute as a zine or pamphlet offline.

Anarchists who want to take action, when confronted with the choice of tactics, often default to large mass actions, like black bloc. Imagination is ceded to tactical hegemony; autonomy diminishes; creativity recedes; resistance is franchised with stale, processed, prepackaged ideologies and tactics; questionable organizational methods like spokes-councils and democratic decision making give a participatory veneer to a sealed deal–just like in any liberal democracy; most participants spectate rather than act, learning by passive imitation of the leaders rather than active involvement in intimate relations with experienced trusted friends.

We hope to put an end to this stagnation by giving anarchists some ideas about tactical alternatives to large mass actions. Here we discuss Coordinated Attacks, an extension of single group clandestine actions to multiple groups operating in loose collaboration simultaneously. While the tactics discussed here are not new, we believe our analysis can help anarchists better understand their action options, avoid getting into a rut of the same old tired tactics, choose the option most suited to their objectives, and most importantly, be creative and experiment with new ways of acting.

Continua of Tactics

We propose some ways of comparing alternative tactics, such as single group clandestine actions, large mass actions, and calls to action, so as to aid selection among these tactics, and aid generation of new ones. Some important features that differentiate these tactics are

(i) Total group size. the total number of people participating in an action

(ii) Subgroup size. if there are subgroups, usually in the form of affinity groups, the number of people in the subgroups and whether they are too big, too small, or just right sized for their task

(iii) Timing. whether subgroups act simultaneously or asynchronously

(iv) Communication. whether the subgroups communicate with each other to coordinate prior to the action

(v) Complementarity. whether the subgroup actions complement each other

(vi) Dependency. whether the actions of subgroups depend on the actions of other subgroups

Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks

With the hope of expanding the reader's tactical imagination, we draw on a type of tactic that is feared by the US government, and used by serious resistance movements across the world. Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks, so called by the US government, are tactics that use large groups composed of small coordinated subgroups that work simultaneously and complementarily, but have low or no dependency across subgroups during the action.

https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/planning-considerations-complex-coordinated-terrorist-attacks.pdf

A complex coordinated terrorist attack works to complete some nefarious objective with smaller subgroups that each have a number of members right sized to their subtasks, usually act simultaneously to keep their opposition off balance and maximize impact, and communicate directly with each other prior to the action so as to act in ways that are complementary, or at least not work at cross purposes.

It is worth thinking about why the US government fears these tactics, and why groups that use these tactics rarely, or never, use large mass actions. Why is the US government afraid? Because these tactics are difficult to predict, prevent, and control once they've started. Why do these groups use complex coordinated terrorist attacks rather than large mass actions? Because they need to maximize their impact while minimizing risk. For this reason, they tend to only engage in open battle [large mass actions] when it is very likely to yield immediate surrender by the opposition. Look at the resistance movements in Afghanistan and Iraq over the last 20 or so years, and you'll see extensive use of complex coordinated terrorist attacks, with large mobilizations only used as an end game tactic.

Why Coordinated Attacks?

While complex coordinated terrorist attacks with high degrees of complementarity are more aspirational given the current stages of development in the anarchist movement in the US, coordinated attacks, where the participant subgroups have similar objectives but involve less complex coordination, are highly feasible.

Coordinated attacks have several advantages over other tactics.

i. Because the overarching group has the same goal, but not necessarily the same targets, the total group size can be arbitrarily large. This prevents situations where only one target is chosen, so only a few people can participate, or where many people want to participate, but there are not enough targets for them to all contribute to the action.

ii. Subgroups can be autonomously sized and organized to do specific tasks rather than being subsumed into a large mass with unclear objectives and an implicit leadership hierarchy. Each subgroup makes and executes their own plan within the framework of the agreed upon time and objectives.

iii. Simultaneity increases the shock factor, potential impacts, as well as reduces risks by spreading law enforcement thin.

iv. Prior communication between the subgroups allows for the coordination of timing, selection of common objectives, avoidance of target overlap, and minimization of risk to other subgroups, for example by accidentally leading the police into another subgroup.

v. Coordinated attacks have complementarity without dependency. An advantage of having low dependency is that if a subgroup decides to not participate or if a subgroup fails in their task, the other subgroups, who are not highly dependent on each other, can still do their part of the action. Although we do not emphasize high levels of dependency here–which would make the action significantly more complex–there is the possibility for actions to complement each other, for example by clearing contiguous parts of a travel corridor of surveillance cameras.

Comparison of Coordinated Attacks to Other Tactics

How do coordinated attacks compare to single group clandestine actions, large mass actions, calls to action, and complex coordinated terrorist attacks? Here we distinguish three dimensions that may be useful for this comparison.

Direct effects of the action. How much damage was done? Was the target taken out?

A direct effect might be a police vehicle disabled, a surveillance camera destroyed, or enemy communication disrupted.

Risks of the action. Will people get caught? Will information be revealed to law enforcement?

This considers the number of action participants caught by law enforcement, as well as the chances of getting caught. Information revelation might be whether an infiltration route to a target is made known to the opposition.

Indirect effects of the action. How do participants learn to relate to each other? How are observers inspired and encouraged, or paralyzed with fear?

Are action participants following the leader or are they taking initiative to construct the action themselves by actively choosing targets, crafting infiltration and exfiltration routes, and agreeing on proper roles for the subgroup individuals? Are observers inspired by the action because of its high impact and low risk, or are observers fearful after the action because participants got caught?

As shown in the table, we believe that coordinated attacks compare favorably to other tactics across these three dimensions.

Tactic Direct Effects Risks Indirect Effects
Coordinated
Attacks
Potential for damage or destruction of multiple targets Greater risk than single group clandestine actions due to communication between subgroups about timing and targets; smaller risk than call to action due to simultaneous actions spreading law enforcement thin Subgroups learn to act independently as well as coordinate; encourages initiative of each subgroup participant; no hierarchy; can encourage observers if well executed
Single Group Clandestine Actions Potential for damage or destruction of one target Lowest risk due to high levels of skill and affinity between group members; low risk of information leak about timing and targets Group participants have initiative but do not learn to coordinate with other groups; actions often go unrecognized by observers
Large Mass Actions Potential for large damage at one target or small damage because of redundancy Greater risk due to many participants in a single area Participants do not necessarily have initiative; will look to leaders; creates an implicit hierarchy; can be spectacular to observers
Call to Action Potential for large damage at multiple targets or no damage if all subgroups pull out Risk not much greater than single group clandestine actions due to lack of communication about timing and targets Each subgroup has initiative but does not learn to coordinate with other subgroups
Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks Potential for large damage at multiple targets Risk of infiltration or information leak greater than other tactics Same as coordinated attacks, but subgroups learn more intricate coordination

Comparison of direct effects. Coordinated attacks have the potential to hit multiple targets and do large amounts of damage to each target. This damage could be greater than a single group clandestine action, due to the greater number of participants; greater than a large mass action, because the subgroups avoid redundancy by focusing on specific discrete targets; and greater than a call to action because of the tendency for communication between subgroups to increase follow through and impact. Complex coordinated terrorist attacks are likely to have the greatest direct effects.

Comparison of risks. Single group clandestine actions are likely to have the lowest risk because of the small chance for information leak and small number of participants that need to exfiltrate the target area. When there are more subgroups and more total participants, there is a greater chance of someone being an infiltrator or unintentionally leaking information. Coordinated attacks and complex coordinated terrorist attacks have an advantage due to simultaneity, where subgroups, if located in a similar geography, could spread law enforcement thin, lowering the overall risk to each subgroup. Large mass actions have the greatest risk because it is difficult to exfiltrate many participants in the same area, participants tend to rely on organizers and as a result are often not as well prepared, hampering their exfiltration, and large numbers of people in a single area attract law enforcement attention and thus greater repression.

Comparison of indirect effects. Complex coordinated terrorist attacks require the largest amount of collaboration, coordination, and inititative from the individual participants and subgroups, fostering the creation of a superb type of anarchist and militant. Coordinated attacks follow closely behind, lacking some of the complexity and complementarity. Single group clandestine actions and calls to action yield similar results: small groups with high levels of initiative but no coordination across groups. Finally, large mass actions lead to the creation of many individuals who get used to following the leader, but due to their size and visibility, large mass actions are often inspiring to observers.

Some Drawbacks of Coordinated Attacks

The main drawback of coordinated attacks relative to single group clandestine actions and large mass actions is the difficulty of planning. It is often challenging to find other affinity groups who are willing to participate. These subgroups may not have the skills and resources necessary to plan and act on their own. Without a larger group for support or detailed guidance from experienced people, some might have second thoughts and decide to opt out. For this reason, coordinated attacks can easily devolve into a single group action. Calls to action have a similar problem, where it is even possible for no groups to take action in response to the call. Single group clandestine actions only require a single dedicated group of individuals, and large mass actions and calls to action only require the leaders or organizers to be coordinated.

Another drawback relative to large mass actions is that, for some targets, a large number of people are needed to overwhelm law enforcement. It may be possible, however, to use a coordinated attack approach to overwhelm a target's defenses, where each subgroup focuses on a single target with well-defined roles. Such a coordinated approach requires significantly more planning, and creates dependency between the outcomes of each subgroup, where if one fails–for example, to take out surveillance–another can also fail–by getting surveilled and then being intercepted by law enforcement.

Mitigating Risk

Single group clandestine actions have the lowest risk because group participants tightly control information. Everything is communicated on a need-to-know basis, and those outside the group don't need to know anything about who is participating, when the action will happen, and the location of the target.

The most important way to mitigate the risk of information being leaked outside the action group is affinity between subgroups. When subgroups know each other, have close ties, have done actions together before, and have a track record of keeping their mouths shut, risks of information being leaked to law enforcement with multiple subgroups are not much larger than risks with a single group.

When building these close ties and executing actions, subgroups might use some of the following methods to mitigate information flow risks. [a] having some sort of vetting and vouching method before talks between subgroups begin–usually this happens informally and casually, [b] working together on small, lower risk actions before trying riskier actions together, [c] communicating in person with only a few members from each subgroup to mask the identity of all the group members, [d] revealing the action timing only immediately beforehand, [e] developing a list of regions within the same law enforcement zone for target selection, without the exact targets specified.

With respect to the last method, planners might work together to divide a single law enforcement zone into regions, with each region containing multiple possible targets that support the same goal. A slip of paper is passed around the planning group with a few of the regions already crossed out to mask who selected the first region. Subgroups sequentially cross out regions that they would like to pick for themselves. At the end, no subgroup member can tell which other subgroup chose which region, and in turn, they cannot tell which subgroup chose which target within each region. This is just one idea. Come up with better ones.

Surveillance Cameras as Small, Lower Risk Actions to Build Affinity

All these tricks and techniques for mitigating risk don't matter if you don't have close, trustworthy ties with at least one other affinity group. As a starting point, we recommend taking the first step of developing those ties, even to one other affinity group, rather than developing complex methods for controlling information flow to mitigate risk. In the end, the overall risk to a group is determined by the weakest link, so be picky with your affiliations.

Developing trust within and across affinity groups requires background knowledge about each other acquired through social relationships, time to get to know each other and observe each others' actions, and acting together in lower risk contexts. Every individual and group should take action based on their individual and group desires.

One suggestion that has proved useful in the past is destroying surveillance cameras together. This has the effect of teaching participants about scouting, infiltration and exfiltration routes, proper clothing attire, lookouts, use of police scanners, and police response timing. Possibly more important, participants learn that law enforcement is not omniscient and omnipotent, that cameras are often highly directional and often get no footage or useless footage, and that cameras are often not replaced, meaning the damage is permanent. A final obvious practical benefit is that there are fewer cameras around, increasing freedom of action.

An Example

Consider the following hypothetical example. A region has multiple entities that support something awful, like a fossil fuel pipeline or Israeli weapons manufacturing. Entities could include funders, providers of logistics, insurers, or other supporting infrastructure. Through whisper networks, DMs with disappearing messages, and in-person conversations, a number of affinity groups come together to discuss an action in person, away from buildings, and without phones. At least some members of each affinity group have close ties to each other, with prior experience in many contexts that indicate trustworthiness. Each subgroup sends a few people to the discussion.

For the pipeline case, the pipeline construction area spans many hundreds of miles, with various targets, such as construction equipment, temporary housing, and transportation vehicles. The area is the jurisdiction of state police. The group divides the area into 15 regions–the number 15 here is chosen arbitrarily–each with multiple possible targets. Suppose there are 5 affinity subgroups. The planning group passes around a ballot with the 15 regions listed, five of them already crossed out. Each subgroup crosses out a region in sequence until all of the regions are eliminated. Each subgroup commits to only going after targets within one of the two regions that they crossed out. Other subgroups then only have imprecise knowledge of which subgroup selected which region, and know very little about target selection. [A simpler method: Write numbers corresponding to the 15 regions on 15 playing cards, then allocate them randomly to subgroups.]

The subgroups agree on a date after which they will all be prepared to act, but delay choosing an exact time. After the preparation date has passed, they call a meeting, where the final time is chosen, possibly with very little advance notice–hours rather than days. After the action, communiques are written and contact between participants is avoided until some time has passed. The participants never talk about the action again, although they continue to collaborate if trust has been furthered through the action, and mouths are kept shut.

A Note on Group Size

The focus here has been on an alternative tactic for actions with a large number of people. However, more people does not equal better. Even a single individual can pull off complex, highly effective tasks with low risk. For an apolitical example, see Bill Mason's Confession of a Master Jewel Thief. For political examples, see some recent raids on Elbit Systems suppliers. Focus, reconnaisance, careful target selection, and precision can do much more than number of bodies.

Endnote

We don't care if you use coordinated attacks or any other tactic. What we care about is breaking the tactical hegemony, fostering creativity and new affinities, and keeping people safe while having some fun. We hope this essay builds new ideas and relationships rather than stifles and straight-jackets you into a new, different, hegemonic tactical regime.

Explore.

Experiment.

Follow no leader and no rules.

by Anonymous

We are a group of young activists that have been active for only a few years. The experience of participating in different environmental organizations made us realize the limits of these organizations with respect to the effectiveness of our struggles. So in recent months, we decided that we wanted to try to inflict economic damage on fossil fuel companies through our actions. This decision led to much in the way of questions, preparation, reflections and ideas. These things are what we would like to discuss in this text.

It began with many of us acknowledging something: the environmental struggle has hit a wall. We repeat actions of the same intensity (whether we’re 20,000 or 500,000 in the streets) for a cause that is becoming radically more urgent. We complain that the government doesn’t listen, but we choose to stay in a passive position, always in a posture of making demands while more than enough evidence has accumulated to disillusion us. Wishing to be lucid about the effectiveness of our methods as much as what little room for manoeuvre we have left, we felt the necessity to do more and to do better. These reflections emerged as well following readings like “How to Sabotage a Pipeline” by Andreas Malm, texts on the history of the Earth First movement (“Down with Empire! Up with Spring!“), and written reflections from ZADs and from current environmentalist groups.

Some may tell us that these reflections needed to come sooner. They may be right. Still, it is absurd to ask an activist to move from inaction to the most radical form of action. Every activist accumulates experiences that lead them to reflect on the effectiveness of their actions. Each one of us may then evaluate what they can do, based on their desires and abilities.

So we started to think about what would be within reach for us and have a certain impact. The first obvious obstacle that presents itself is the law. We believe that right now, everyone must reflect on their capacity and will to break the law in order to have an impact. Accepting legal risk takes time, it’s a psychological process not to be ignored — being comfortable with the actions that follow all the more so. This taking of risks may throw into question some of our aspirations and make us face our privileges as well as what they may imply as responsibilities. Therefore we invite anyone with the will to intensify their political action to reflect on the legal risks they are ready to take. Ultimately, we see it as a necessity so as to have a greater impact. It’s a matter of finding a balance between risk and intended impact. We do not seek to get arrested “to get arrested” or in a perspective of civil disobedience with an audience. We no longer want to be in a position of making demands to those in power, we want to cause direct economic damage with the goal of forcing a prohibition of fossil fuels.

The second obstacle apparent is that of preparation. We weren’t prepared to take this kind of action, and information stays hidden (with reason). We had to delve into different sources ourselves to learn certain techniques, to have good legal protection, and to communicate with each other securely. All this preparation takes more time. However, if we wish to intensify our struggle, we must get off the beaten trail and try to learn on our own the best we can. Through this process, there will be experiments and mistakes, and we will not all become perfect activists overnight. This lack of preparation and knowledge must not be an impediment to the intensification of our actions, it only requires that we make the time to learn by ourselves and share our knowledge.

The third barrier that appears is that of our (in)experience related to our age and the network of who we know. We are part of a new generation of activists that was not around for some big dates of struggle in “Quebec”. This inexperience leads us to have less practice, but also less knowledge of activist structures and practices. This inexperience can also elicit distrust from older comrades who see us as naive or unable to act in view of an escalation of pressure tactics. This distrust has its reasons, but we still would have more to gain by uniting as much as possible and sharing knowledge that was erased with the dissolution of the ASSÉ and burnout. Not that we put aside the necessity of organizing in affinity groups to build trust and maintain security.

Lastly, the fourth barrier we face, one that we may feel inside us without sharing it, is an emotional barrier. Lowering your fears about actions you’re doing, facing confrontations with the police and their intimidation tactics (we recognize that for some people confronting the police is not a matter of choice), developing the courage needed to trust yourself on new paths that lie outside societal approval: all these things require emotional work that takes time, even more so as we may carry within us the image of the perfect revolutionary who is afraid of nothing, who fights the police without fear, maybe even with a smile, and we consider that it may be a question of nature. Whereas in our lives, we want to take care of each other, promote understanding of points of view and foster kindness, our organizing asks that we harden ourselves, face our fears, express our anger and take our legitimate place even if it means confronting the order of the world. This work on our nature and our emotions should be seen not as a barrier, but as an invitation to develop sharing circles to do this work together rather than alone. Ultimately, developing these qualities will allow us to live a life that is closer to our ideals and allow us to be happier.

Surmounting these barriers as much as possible, we carefully planned our action. The action aimed to damage gas stations in order to render them inoperable for several days. In the course of things, we had our challenges. One location ended up being surveilled, and another closed a few weeks before our action, rendering it useless. We nevertheless gained practical experience by which we faced our fears and learned lessons from our mistakes. It is necessary to begin acting, even if we are not perfect, even if we don’t know everything. What’s important is to organize as well as we can but above all to act, because all that stops us is essentially fear and a lack of time.

In conclusion, we believe it is necessary for the struggle to evolve toward a plurality of direct actions. Our goal in this text is to share that it is not necessary to know everything, that it’s normal for many obstacles to appear along the way, and that we can all autonomously gain the knowledge and reflections needed towards this end. Ecological struggles will mark the coming years. They are struggles that we have no choice but to win. We would like for the next people who organize in the context of the ecological crisis to not take the typical peaceful path. We also want to call for activists from previous generations to share their knowledge with us so that we can move forward together. However, we do not overlook the impact that repression had on some of our friends. We recognize the courage of the people who were or are in any way a part of struggles past and present.

-History is watching

Vouching means different things to different anarchists. For some, to vouch for a person means the vouchee is felt to be trustworthy and competent enough for an action. For others, vouching means that the voucher has concrete evidence of the trustworthiness and competence of the vouchee, and is willing to stake their reputation on that evidence.

To agree on whether to vouch for someone or not, we need to be clear about what we mean by vouching. We propose three components of a vouch that might be helpful in discussing that meaning: trustworthiness, competence, and the voucher's reputation.

Trustworthiness refers to whether or not the vouchee has or will intentionally or unintentionally assist law enforcement. This includes that the vouchee is not currently, and has never been, a law enforcement agent or worked for law enforcement as an infiltrator, that the vouchee has never been a confidential informant and is not currently one, that the vouchee will not intentionally or unintentionally reveal information to those not involved in the action, and that the vouchee will not cooperate with any investigation in the future, even if facing prison time.

Competence refers to whether the vouchee is mentally and physically capable of doing the proposed action, including not abandoning the action before it starts, not having a panic attack during the action, and not becoming physically incapacitated during the action.

Reputation refers to the consequence of giving a bad vouch. Depending on the severity of the violation, and risk of the action, the reputational consequences could range from not taking the voucher seriously in the future, to not doing actions with the voucher or vouchee ever again, to retribution against the voucher and the vouchee for deception or gross incompetence.

Below we give additional detail on the strength of evidence that can be used to assess the trustworthiness and competence of a vouchee, along with a short discussion of the voucher's reputation, and the consequences of a bad vouch.

Trustworthiness

If someone is going to believe that a person you vouch for is trustworthy, it's worth considering what evidence might be brought forth to support your case. As the consequences for getting caught increase, so should the required strength of evidence for trustworthiness of a vouch.

Some suggestions for evidence of trustworthiness of the vouchee, in order of strength:

-From talking to this person, do you get the feeling that they are genuine in their attitudes and convictions?

Talk is cheap, but one can often get a feeling from people about whether they care about what they're talking about. Reading Kropotkin, Stirner, the Invisible Committee, or Blessed is the Flame are not things that normal people enjoy, including law enforcement. Does this person seem, from their words, to be passionate about something? Does this person have a basic sense of security culture? Does this person propose activities, including illegal ones, that are appropriate for the relationship? Does this person talk about their criminal activities, and the activities of others, openly in a way that is inappropriate for the relationship?

-Has this person done actions on their own, without the prompting of others?

While the need-to-know principle would ideally exclude awareness of the criminal activities of others, sometimes two and two can be put together. When people take action without needing you or others to participate, this is an indication that their feelings are genuine, and if that action is destructive, then they are unlikely to be an infiltrator. However, although committing crimes is frowned upon by law enforcement agencies, undercover agents and infiltrators can get away with committing crimes, even if initiated on their own and done by themselves.

Can the Police Commit Crimes While Undercover?

-Has this person participated in actions with you, and kept their mouth shut to people who are not in law enforcement?

A common mistake is getting excited about actions and their results, particularly when that action makes headlines, and bragging about the action to others. A strong vouch means that the vouchee has consistently kept discussions of their illegal activities to themself, particularly when they had the opportunity to brag about something but decided against it.

-Have you done actions with this person where, if the person were a snitch, one would already know about it?

Their participation in the action, and knowledge of who is involved in the action, is enough for serious convictions, yet nobody has ever been charged. This is a pretty strong indicator that the person is not currently an infiltrator or confidential informant, unless they are waiting to gain more information, for example to network map, or hoping to get more severe charges. A vouchee who has engaged in riskier actions, such as felonies, in many different contexts, over an extended period of time, where no information is leaked to law enforcement or anyone outside the action group, is an indicator of trustworthiness.

-Has this person kept their mouth shut, even when facing severe consequences?

As we've learned from many examples, such as the Green Scare and Standing Rock, many hardcore anarchists say they will never snitch, and do not snitch when things are going well. However, when they get caught, and are facing many years in prison, things change. The strongest test of the trustworthiness of a comrade is knowing that they have had the opportunities for leniency, in the form of cooperating plea deals, but decided not to cooperate, and instead endured the punishment, sometimes meaning a longer prison sentence. Contrast Daniel McGowen versus Jake Ferguson, or Jessica Reznicek versus Ruby Montoya.

Even here, trustworthiness is not guaranteed. A person who has done time, who has always kept their mouth shut, may face a new prison sentence that is beyond their threshold for endurance. Life Sentence has examples from Sandtown Baltimore of gang members in the drug game who, when facing the threat of going back to prison, decided to snitch. There's no sure thing when it comes to vouching.

Taking these all into account, the strongest vouch, in terms of trustworthiness, would be for a person who:

1) In conversations seems to have genuine attitudes and convictions for doing the action.

2) Has done actions on their own or with other groups without your prompting.

3) Has consistently done actions where it would be socially beneficial to brag about participating, but has not done so.

4) Has done actions with others that are severe enough to get people thrown in prison for a long time, but nothing has come of it.

5) Has served time in jail or prison instead of taking a cooperating plea deal which could lighten their sentence.

Competence

It has been our experience that vouchers tend to almost entirely overlook the competence of the vouchee to complete the action. While it's great that you like someone and trust them, their participation in an action is highly inappropriate if they are not capable of carrying it out.

For this reason, comptence matches trustworthiness in its importance to a vouch. We propose that, with respect to vouching, competence has two components: mental and physical.

Mental competence indicates that the person has mental capability to do what is required for the action, including any special skills, knowledge, charisma, or other non-physical attributes required, but often more importantly, that they have the mental fortitude to stay focused and not panic under pressure. Someone who cannot focus, cannot remember their tasks, or misrepresents their ability to do parts of the action, should not be seen as competent for that action.

Physical competence means that the person can physically do the action. If the action involves running, the person is capable of running (note that almost all actions require running implicitly because of the risk of police chase). If the action requires jumping, the person can jump. If the action requires bicycling, climbing, swimming, repelling, hiking long distances, carrying heavy packs, the person is capable of doing these things.

Just as with trustworthiness, a vouch of competence is weakest when the person says that they will be capable, and strongest when the person has a proven track record of effectively doing the types of things that need to be done for the action.

Some suggestions for evidence of mental competence, in order of increasing strength:
-Does the vouchee say that they know how to do what is required for the action?
Talk is cheap, but one would expect that the voucher at least communicate with the vouchee well enough to help them understand what needs to be done for the action, and the vouchee at least verbally confirms that they believe they are capable of what is required.

-Has the vouchee demonstrated knowledge, during conversations, about how to complete the activities of the action?
It is often possible to understand whether someone has the mental competence to do an action by discussing the action with them. If the action involves tree climbing, for example, if the person cannot explain how to construct a Figure 8 knot, then they probably do not have the required competence.

-Has the vouchee demonstrated, in conversation, that they can remember their part of the action plan and think through what they need to do carefully?
If the vouchee cannot remember anything, cannot stay focused in conversation, and cannot see the obvious implications of what they need to do, such as thinking of bringing gloves if there is gear that needs to be used that might leave fingerprints, then they are unlikely to have the mental competence to stay focused during the action.

-Has the vouchee demonstrated, in conversation, that they are able to think through the entire action plan carefully enough to see its strengths and weaknesses, and propose ways of dealing with those weaknesses?
Thinking through the overall plan, finding flaws, and fixing those flaws to the greatest degree possible, indicates that this person understands what the action is about, can remember the relevant information and remain focused when thinking about the action, and may be capable of making needed adjustments if things go wrong. Someone who can't think through the plan is unlikely to be able to make effective changes to that plan when necessary.

-Has the vouchee demonstrated that they have the skillset required for the action in a non-action context?
Going back to the example of tying a Figure 8 knot, if the person can demonstrate, in a non-action context without the help of anyone else, that they can reliably tie a Figure 8 knot, then this is a good indicator that they know how to do what they say. This does not mean, however, that under pressure, with adrenaline pumping, that they can tie a Figure 8 knot.

-Has the vouchee demonstrated that they have the skillset required for the action in an action context?
Communicating using radios to evade police is a skill. If the voucher has personal experience that the vouchee is capable of this type of evasion, from prior actions, then this is a good indicator that the vouchee will be able to do this again. Evidence that the vouchee can do the task under real pressure during a real action is very different from demonstrating that knowledge in a low stakes scenario.

-Has the vouchee demonstrated, in multiple high risk action contexts, that they have the required skills to do the action, and can draw on those skills under pressure?
Over and over again, the vouchee has been able to do what is needed under pressure. The vouchee rarely makes mistakes, and when they make mistakes, is able to compensate for them.

-Has the vouchee demonstrated, in multiple high risk action contexts, that they can stay calm and focused, even when things go wrong, and come up with solutions to problems on the fly?
Effectively dealing with problems during a high risk action is the best test of the mental competence of the vouchee. This requires bringing forth background knowledge and knowledge of the action plan, knowledge of the enemy and their tactics, as well as staying calm and focused enough to turn that knowledge into a new plan.

Just as with mental competence, the weakest evidence of physical competence comes from conversation or casual observation, while the strongest evidence comes from direct experience with the person in high risk contexts. When the adrenaline hits because one is in imminent danger of arrest or injury, knees can go weak, people suddenly need to urinate or shit, someone might pass out or have an asthma attack or a heart problem. The best evidence comes from seeing that the vouchee can handle their physical condition during intense high risk scenarios.

Summarizing, the strongest vouch, in terms of mental and physical competence, would be for a vouchee who:
1) Says that they can do the action, both mentally and physically.
2) Demonstrates in conversation that they can do what is required for the action.
3) Demonstrates that they can plan and think through their part of the action.
4) Can think through the entire action plan and analyze its strengths and weaknesses.
5) Demonstrates that they have the skillsets and physical capabilities in a non-action context.
6) Demonstrates that they have the skillsets and physical capabilities in an action context.
7) Demonstrates, in multiple high risk action contexts, that they have the skills and physical capabilities required to do the action, even under pressure and when problems arise.

Reputation

A bad vouch for a small low risk action is usually not a big deal. We have conversations about what went wrong, and try to get our understanding to align. However, vouching for someone who snitches, or can't keep their mouth shut, or who can't do the action at all because of some mental or physical issue, is a major problem. While snitching is obviously the worst outcome of a vouch, talking too much or panicking and becoming a liability to the action group are also extremely difficult to deal with. Anyone making a vouch should know that their reputation depends on their vouching, and that the actions of the vouchee will reflect on the reputation of the voucher. The point is not to make people nervous and calculating about their vouches, nor is it to create a punitive social hierarchy, but instead to get people to take seriously what they are saying when they vouch for someone.

Forgiveness and Cutting Ties

People make mistakes in their actions, their words, and their vouches. In most circumstances, it is worth having a discussion and forgiving minor issues. Even highly experienced anarchists can panic and make mistakes. Usually problems with competence arise, and these often can be forgiven.

But problems with trustworthiness are usually much more severe. Having an incompetent comrade usually does not indicate ill intent, but often incomplete knowledge. Having an untrustworthy comrade sometimes comes accidentally, for example the common accident of blurting out someone's government name, and doing a poor job covering it up. But snitching and talking to people outside the action group about the action aren't accidents, they are choices that deserve very little, if any, forgiveness. It's important to consider that if you vouch for someone who is untrustworthy, and continue to associate with them, then you will be considered untrustworthy.

If we do not cut ties with people who intentionally harm us, then all of us are vulnerable.

If we do not take risks with others, then we do not have the opportunity for anything great to happen.

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