Anarchists who want to take action, when confronted with the choice of tactics, often default to large mass actions, like black bloc. Imagination is ceded to tactical hegemony; autonomy diminishes; creativity recedes; resistance is franchised with stale, processed, prepackaged ideologies and tactics; questionable organizational methods like spokes-councils and democratic decision making give a participatory veneer to a sealed deal–just like in any liberal democracy; most participants spectate rather than act, learning by passive imitation of the leaders rather than active involvement in intimate relations with experienced trusted friends.

We hope to put an end to this stagnation by giving anarchists some ideas about tactical alternatives to large mass actions. Here we discuss Coordinated Attacks, an extension of single group clandestine actions to multiple groups operating in loose collaboration simultaneously. While the tactics discussed here are not new, we believe our analysis can help anarchists better understand their action options, avoid getting into a rut of the same old tired tactics, choose the option most suited to their objectives, and most importantly, be creative and experiment with new ways of acting.

Continua of Tactics

We propose some ways of comparing alternative tactics, such as single group clandestine actions, large mass actions, and calls to action, so as to aid selection among these tactics, and aid generation of new ones. Some important features that differentiate these tactics are

(i) Total group size. the total number of people participating in an action

(ii) Subgroup size. if there are subgroups, usually in the form of affinity groups, the number of people in the subgroups and whether they are too big, too small, or just right sized for their task

(iii) Timing. whether subgroups act simultaneously or asynchronously

(iv) Communication. whether the subgroups communicate with each other to coordinate prior to the action

(v) Complementarity. whether the subgroup actions complement each other

(vi) Dependency. whether the actions of subgroups depend on the actions of other subgroups

Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks

With the hope of expanding the reader's tactical imagination, we draw on a type of tactic that is feared by the US government, and used by serious resistance movements across the world. Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks, so called by the US government, are tactics that use large groups composed of small coordinated subgroups that work simultaneously and complementarily, but have low or no dependency across subgroups during the action.

https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/planning-considerations-complex-coordinated-terrorist-attacks.pdf

A complex coordinated terrorist attack works to complete some nefarious objective with smaller subgroups that each have a number of members right sized to their subtasks, usually act simultaneously to keep their opposition off balance and maximize impact, and communicate directly with each other prior to the action so as to act in ways that are complementary, or at least not work at cross purposes.

It is worth thinking about why the US government fears these tactics, and why groups that use these tactics rarely, or never, use large mass actions. Why is the US government afraid? Because these tactics are difficult to predict, prevent, and control once they've started. Why do these groups use complex coordinated terrorist attacks rather than large mass actions? Because they need to maximize their impact while minimizing risk. For this reason, they tend to only engage in open battle [large mass actions] when it is very likely to yield immediate surrender by the opposition. Look at the resistance movements in Afghanistan and Iraq over the last 20 or so years, and you'll see extensive use of complex coordinated terrorist attacks, with large mobilizations only used as an end game tactic.

Why Coordinated Attacks?

While complex coordinated terrorist attacks with high degrees of complementarity are more aspirational given the current stages of development in the anarchist movement in the US, coordinated attacks, where the participant subgroups have similar objectives but involve less complex coordination, are highly feasible.

Coordinated attacks have several advantages over other tactics.

i. Because the overarching group has the same goal, but not necessarily the same targets, the total group size can be arbitrarily large. This prevents situations where only one target is chosen, so only a few people can participate, or where many people want to participate, but there are not enough targets for them to all contribute to the action.

ii. Subgroups can be autonomously sized and organized to do specific tasks rather than being subsumed into a large mass with unclear objectives and an implicit leadership hierarchy. Each subgroup makes and executes their own plan within the framework of the agreed upon time and objectives.

iii. Simultaneity increases the shock factor, potential impacts, as well as reduces risks by spreading law enforcement thin.

iv. Prior communication between the subgroups allows for the coordination of timing, selection of common objectives, avoidance of target overlap, and minimization of risk to other subgroups, for example by accidentally leading the police into another subgroup.

v. Coordinated attacks have complementarity without dependency. An advantage of having low dependency is that if a subgroup decides to not participate or if a subgroup fails in their task, the other subgroups, who are not highly dependent on each other, can still do their part of the action. Although we do not emphasize high levels of dependency here–which would make the action significantly more complex–there is the possibility for actions to complement each other, for example by clearing contiguous parts of a travel corridor of surveillance cameras.

Comparison of Coordinated Attacks to Other Tactics

How do coordinated attacks compare to single group clandestine actions, large mass actions, calls to action, and complex coordinated terrorist attacks? Here we distinguish three dimensions that may be useful for this comparison.

Direct effects of the action. How much damage was done? Was the target taken out?

A direct effect might be a police vehicle disabled, a surveillance camera destroyed, or enemy communication disrupted.

Risks of the action. Will people get caught? Will information be revealed to law enforcement?

This considers the number of action participants caught by law enforcement, as well as the chances of getting caught. Information revelation might be whether an infiltration route to a target is made known to the opposition.

Indirect effects of the action. How do participants learn to relate to each other? How are observers inspired and encouraged, or paralyzed with fear?

Are action participants following the leader or are they taking initiative to construct the action themselves by actively choosing targets, crafting infiltration and exfiltration routes, and agreeing on proper roles for the subgroup individuals? Are observers inspired by the action because of its high impact and low risk, or are observers fearful after the action because participants got caught?

As shown in the table, we believe that coordinated attacks compare favorably to other tactics across these three dimensions.

Comparison of direct effects. Coordinated attacks have the potential to hit multiple targets and do large amounts of damage to each target. This damage could be greater than a single group clandestine action, due to the greater number of participants; greater than a large mass action, because the subgroups avoid redundancy by focusing on specific discrete targets; and greater than a call to action because of the tendency for communication between subgroups to increase follow through and impact. Complex coordinated terrorist attacks are likely to have the greatest direct effects.

Comparison of risks. Single group clandestine actions are likely to have the lowest risk because of the small chance for information leak and small number of participants that need to exfiltrate the target area. When there are more subgroups and more total participants, there is a greater chance of someone being an infiltrator or unintentionally leaking information. Coordinated attacks and complex coordinated terrorist attacks have an advantage due to simultaneity, where subgroups, if located in a similar geography, could spread law enforcement thin, lowering the overall risk to each subgroup. Large mass actions have the greatest risk because it is difficult to exfiltrate many participants in the same area, participants tend to rely on organizers and as a result are often not as well prepared, hampering their exfiltration, and large numbers of people in a single area attract law enforcement attention and thus greater repression.

Comparison of indirect effects. Complex coordinated terrorist attacks require the largest amount of collaboration, coordination, and inititative from the individual participants and subgroups, fostering the creation of a superb type of anarchist and militant. Coordinated attacks follow closely behind, lacking some of the complexity and complementarity. Single group clandestine actions and calls to action yield similar results: small groups with high levels of initiative but no coordination across groups. Finally, large mass actions lead to the creation of many individuals who get used to following the leader, but due to their size and visibility, large mass actions are often inspiring to observers.

Some Drawbacks of Coordinated Attacks

The main drawback of coordinated attacks relative to single group clandestine actions and large mass actions is the difficulty of planning. It is often challenging to find other affinity groups who are willing to participate. These subgroups may not have the skills and resources necessary to plan and act on their own. Without a larger group for support or detailed guidance from experienced people, some might have second thoughts and decide to opt out. For this reason, coordinated attacks can easily devolve into a single group action. Calls to action have a similar problem, where it is even possible for no groups to take action in response to the call. Single group clandestine actions only require a single dedicated group of individuals, and large mass actions and calls to action only require the leaders or organizers to be coordinated.

Another drawback relative to large mass actions is that, for some targets, a large number of people are needed to overwhelm law enforcement. It may be possible, however, to use a coordinated attack approach to overwhelm a target's defenses, where each subgroup focuses on a single target with well-defined roles. Such a coordinated approach requires significantly more planning, and creates dependency between the outcomes of each subgroup, where if one fails–for example, to take out surveillance–another can also fail–by getting surveilled and then being intercepted by law enforcement.

Mitigating Risk

Single group clandestine actions have the lowest risk because group participants tightly control information. Everything is communicated on a need-to-know basis, and those outside the group don't need to know anything about who is participating, when the action will happen, and the location of the target.

The most important way to mitigate the risk of information being leaked outside the action group is affinity between subgroups. When subgroups know each other, have close ties, have done actions together before, and have a track record of keeping their mouths shut, risks of information being leaked to law enforcement with multiple subgroups are not much larger than risks with a single group.

When building these close ties and executing actions, subgroups might use some of the following methods to mitigate information flow risks. [a] having some sort of vetting and vouching method before talks between subgroups begin–usually this happens informally and casually, [b] working together on small, lower risk actions before trying riskier actions together, [c] communicating in person with only a few members from each subgroup to mask the identity of all the group members, [d] revealing the action timing only immediately beforehand, [e] developing a list of regions within the same law enforcement zone for target selection, without the exact targets specified.

With respect to the last method, planners might work together to divide a single law enforcement zone into regions, with each region containing multiple possible targets that support the same goal. A slip of paper is passed around the planning group with a few of the regions already crossed out to mask who selected the first region. Subgroups sequentially cross out regions that they would like to pick for themselves. At the end, no subgroup member can tell which other subgroup chose which region, and in turn, they cannot tell which subgroup chose which target within each region. This is just one idea. Come up with better ones.

Surveillance Cameras as Small, Lower Risk Actions to Build Affinity

All these tricks and techniques for mitigating risk don't matter if you don't have close, trustworthy ties with at least one other affinity group. As a starting point, we recommend taking the first step of developing those ties, even to one other affinity group, rather than developing complex methods for controlling information flow to mitigate risk. In the end, the overall risk to a group is determined by the weakest link, so be picky with your affiliations.

Developing trust within and across affinity groups requires background knowledge about each other acquired through social relationships, time to get to know each other and observe each others' actions, and acting together in lower risk contexts. Every individual and group should take action based on their individual and group desires.

One suggestion that has proved useful in the past is destroying surveillance cameras together. This has the effect of teaching participants about scouting, infiltration and exfiltration routes, proper clothing attire, lookouts, use of police scanners, and police response timing. Possibly more important, participants learn that law enforcement is not omniscient and omnipotent, that cameras are often highly directional and often get no footage or useless footage, and that cameras are often not replaced, meaning the damage is permanent. A final obvious practical benefit is that there are fewer cameras around, increasing freedom of action.

An Example

Consider the following hypothetical example. A region has multiple entities that support something awful, like a fossil fuel pipeline or Israeli weapons manufacturing. Entities could include funders, providers of logistics, insurers, or other supporting infrastructure. Through whisper networks, DMs with disappearing messages, and in-person conversations, a number of affinity groups come together to discuss an action in person, away from buildings, and without phones. At least some members of each affinity group have close ties to each other, with prior experience in many contexts that indicate trustworthiness. Each subgroup sends a few people to the discussion.

For the pipeline case, the pipeline construction area spans many hundreds of miles, with various targets, such as construction equipment, temporary housing, and transportation vehicles. The area is the jurisdiction of state police. The group divides the area into 15 regions–the number 15 here is chosen arbitrarily–each with multiple possible targets. Suppose there are 5 affinity subgroups. The planning group passes around a ballot with the 15 regions listed, five of them already crossed out. Each subgroup crosses out a region in sequence until all of the regions are eliminated. Each subgroup commits to only going after targets within one of the two regions that they crossed out. Other subgroups then only have imprecise knowledge of which subgroup selected which region, and know very little about target selection. [A simpler method: Write numbers corresponding to the 15 regions on 15 playing cards, then allocate them randomly to subgroups.]

The subgroups agree on a date after which they will all be prepared to act, but delay choosing an exact time. After the preparation date has passed, they call a meeting, where the final time is chosen, possibly with very little advance notice–hours rather than days. After the action, communiques are written and contact between participants is avoided until some time has passed. The participants never talk about the action again, although they continue to collaborate if trust has been furthered through the action, and mouths are kept shut.

A Note on Group Size

The focus here has been on an alternative tactic for actions with a large number of people. However, more people does not equal better. Even a single individual can pull off complex, highly effective tasks with low risk. For an apolitical example, see Bill Mason's Confession of a Master Jewel Thief. For political examples, see some recent raids on Elbit Systems suppliers. Focus, reconnaisance, careful target selection, and precision can do much more than number of bodies.

Endnote

We don't care if you use coordinated attacks or any other tactic. What we care about is breaking the tactical hegemony, fostering creativity and new affinities, and keeping people safe while having some fun. We hope this essay builds new ideas and relationships rather than stifles and straight-jackets you into a new, different, hegemonic tactical regime.

Explore.

Experiment.

Follow no leader and no rules.

We are a group of young activists that have been active for only a few years. The experience of participating in different environmental organizations made us realize the limits of these organizations with respect to the effectiveness of our struggles. So in recent months, we decided that we wanted to try to inflict economic damage on fossil fuel companies through our actions. This decision led to much in the way of questions, preparation, reflections and ideas. These things are what we would like to discuss in this text.

It began with many of us acknowledging something: the environmental struggle has hit a wall. We repeat actions of the same intensity (whether we’re 20,000 or 500,000 in the streets) for a cause that is becoming radically more urgent. We complain that the government doesn’t listen, but we choose to stay in a passive position, always in a posture of making demands while more than enough evidence has accumulated to disillusion us. Wishing to be lucid about the effectiveness of our methods as much as what little room for manoeuvre we have left, we felt the necessity to do more and to do better. These reflections emerged as well following readings like “How to Sabotage a Pipeline” by Andreas Malm, texts on the history of the Earth First movement (“Down with Empire! Up with Spring!“), and written reflections from ZADs and from current environmentalist groups.

Some may tell us that these reflections needed to come sooner. They may be right. Still, it is absurd to ask an activist to move from inaction to the most radical form of action. Every activist accumulates experiences that lead them to reflect on the effectiveness of their actions. Each one of us may then evaluate what they can do, based on their desires and abilities.

So we started to think about what would be within reach for us and have a certain impact. The first obvious obstacle that presents itself is the law. We believe that right now, everyone must reflect on their capacity and will to break the law in order to have an impact. Accepting legal risk takes time, it’s a psychological process not to be ignored — being comfortable with the actions that follow all the more so. This taking of risks may throw into question some of our aspirations and make us face our privileges as well as what they may imply as responsibilities. Therefore we invite anyone with the will to intensify their political action to reflect on the legal risks they are ready to take. Ultimately, we see it as a necessity so as to have a greater impact. It’s a matter of finding a balance between risk and intended impact. We do not seek to get arrested “to get arrested” or in a perspective of civil disobedience with an audience. We no longer want to be in a position of making demands to those in power, we want to cause direct economic damage with the goal of forcing a prohibition of fossil fuels.

The second obstacle apparent is that of preparation. We weren’t prepared to take this kind of action, and information stays hidden (with reason). We had to delve into different sources ourselves to learn certain techniques, to have good legal protection, and to communicate with each other securely. All this preparation takes more time. However, if we wish to intensify our struggle, we must get off the beaten trail and try to learn on our own the best we can. Through this process, there will be experiments and mistakes, and we will not all become perfect activists overnight. This lack of preparation and knowledge must not be an impediment to the intensification of our actions, it only requires that we make the time to learn by ourselves and share our knowledge.

The third barrier that appears is that of our (in)experience related to our age and the network of who we know. We are part of a new generation of activists that was not around for some big dates of struggle in “Quebec”. This inexperience leads us to have less practice, but also less knowledge of activist structures and practices. This inexperience can also elicit distrust from older comrades who see us as naive or unable to act in view of an escalation of pressure tactics. This distrust has its reasons, but we still would have more to gain by uniting as much as possible and sharing knowledge that was erased with the dissolution of the ASSÉ and burnout. Not that we put aside the necessity of organizing in affinity groups to build trust and maintain security.

Lastly, the fourth barrier we face, one that we may feel inside us without sharing it, is an emotional barrier. Lowering your fears about actions you’re doing, facing confrontations with the police and their intimidation tactics (we recognize that for some people confronting the police is not a matter of choice), developing the courage needed to trust yourself on new paths that lie outside societal approval: all these things require emotional work that takes time, even more so as we may carry within us the image of the perfect revolutionary who is afraid of nothing, who fights the police without fear, maybe even with a smile, and we consider that it may be a question of nature. Whereas in our lives, we want to take care of each other, promote understanding of points of view and foster kindness, our organizing asks that we harden ourselves, face our fears, express our anger and take our legitimate place even if it means confronting the order of the world. This work on our nature and our emotions should be seen not as a barrier, but as an invitation to develop sharing circles to do this work together rather than alone. Ultimately, developing these qualities will allow us to live a life that is closer to our ideals and allow us to be happier.

Surmounting these barriers as much as possible, we carefully planned our action. The action aimed to damage gas stations in order to render them inoperable for several days. In the course of things, we had our challenges. One location ended up being surveilled, and another closed a few weeks before our action, rendering it useless. We nevertheless gained practical experience by which we faced our fears and learned lessons from our mistakes. It is necessary to begin acting, even if we are not perfect, even if we don’t know everything. What’s important is to organize as well as we can but above all to act, because all that stops us is essentially fear and a lack of time.

In conclusion, we believe it is necessary for the struggle to evolve toward a plurality of direct actions. Our goal in this text is to share that it is not necessary to know everything, that it’s normal for many obstacles to appear along the way, and that we can all autonomously gain the knowledge and reflections needed towards this end. Ecological struggles will mark the coming years. They are struggles that we have no choice but to win. We would like for the next people who organize in the context of the ecological crisis to not take the typical peaceful path. We also want to call for activists from previous generations to share their knowledge with us so that we can move forward together. However, we do not overlook the impact that repression had on some of our friends. We recognize the courage of the people who were or are in any way a part of struggles past and present.

-History is watching

Vouching means different things to different anarchists. For some, to vouch for a person means the vouchee is felt to be trustworthy and competent enough for an action. For others, vouching means that the voucher has concrete evidence of the trustworthiness and competence of the vouchee, and is willing to stake their reputation on that evidence.

To agree on whether to vouch for someone or not, we need to be clear about what we mean by vouching. We propose three components of a vouch that might be helpful in discussing that meaning: trustworthiness, competence, and the voucher's reputation.

Trustworthiness refers to whether or not the vouchee has or will intentionally or unintentionally assist law enforcement. This includes that the vouchee is not currently, and has never been, a law enforcement agent or worked for law enforcement as an infiltrator, that the vouchee has never been a confidential informant and is not currently one, that the vouchee will not intentionally or unintentionally reveal information to those not involved in the action, and that the vouchee will not cooperate with any investigation in the future, even if facing prison time.

Competence refers to whether the vouchee is mentally and physically capable of doing the proposed action, including not abandoning the action before it starts, not having a panic attack during the action, and not becoming physically incapacitated during the action.

Reputation refers to the consequence of giving a bad vouch. Depending on the severity of the violation, and risk of the action, the reputational consequences could range from not taking the voucher seriously in the future, to not doing actions with the voucher or vouchee ever again, to retribution against the voucher and the vouchee for deception or gross incompetence.

Below we give additional detail on the strength of evidence that can be used to assess the trustworthiness and competence of a vouchee, along with a short discussion of the voucher's reputation, and the consequences of a bad vouch.

Trustworthiness

If someone is going to believe that a person you vouch for is trustworthy, it's worth considering what evidence might be brought forth to support your case. As the consequences for getting caught increase, so should the required strength of evidence for trustworthiness of a vouch.

Some suggestions for evidence of trustworthiness of the vouchee, in order of strength:

-From talking to this person, do you get the feeling that they are genuine in their attitudes and convictions?

Talk is cheap, but one can often get a feeling from people about whether they care about what they're talking about. Reading Kropotkin, Stirner, the Invisible Committee, or Blessed is the Flame are not things that normal people enjoy, including law enforcement. Does this person seem, from their words, to be passionate about something? Does this person have a basic sense of security culture? Does this person propose activities, including illegal ones, that are appropriate for the relationship? Does this person talk about their criminal activities, and the activities of others, openly in a way that is inappropriate for the relationship?

-Has this person done actions on their own, without the prompting of others?

While the need-to-know principle would ideally exclude awareness of the criminal activities of others, sometimes two and two can be put together. When people take action without needing you or others to participate, this is an indication that their feelings are genuine, and if that action is destructive, then they are unlikely to be an infiltrator. However, although committing crimes is frowned upon by law enforcement agencies, undercover agents and infiltrators can get away with committing crimes, even if initiated on their own and done by themselves.

Can the Police Commit Crimes While Undercover?

-Has this person participated in actions with you, and kept their mouth shut to people who are not in law enforcement?

A common mistake is getting excited about actions and their results, particularly when that action makes headlines, and bragging about the action to others. A strong vouch means that the vouchee has consistently kept discussions of their illegal activities to themself, particularly when they had the opportunity to brag about something but decided against it.

-Have you done actions with this person where, if the person were a snitch, one would already know about it?

Their participation in the action, and knowledge of who is involved in the action, is enough for serious convictions, yet nobody has ever been charged. This is a pretty strong indicator that the person is not currently an infiltrator or confidential informant, unless they are waiting to gain more information, for example to network map, or hoping to get more severe charges. A vouchee who has engaged in riskier actions, such as felonies, in many different contexts, over an extended period of time, where no information is leaked to law enforcement or anyone outside the action group, is an indicator of trustworthiness.

-Has this person kept their mouth shut, even when facing severe consequences?

As we've learned from many examples, such as the Green Scare and Standing Rock, many hardcore anarchists say they will never snitch, and do not snitch when things are going well. However, when they get caught, and are facing many years in prison, things change. The strongest test of the trustworthiness of a comrade is knowing that they have had the opportunities for leniency, in the form of cooperating plea deals, but decided not to cooperate, and instead endured the punishment, sometimes meaning a longer prison sentence. Contrast Daniel McGowen versus Jake Ferguson, or Jessica Reznicek versus Ruby Montoya.

Even here, trustworthiness is not guaranteed. A person who has done time, who has always kept their mouth shut, may face a new prison sentence that is beyond their threshold for endurance. Life Sentence has examples from Sandtown Baltimore of gang members in the drug game who, when facing the threat of going back to prison, decided to snitch. There's no sure thing when it comes to vouching.

Taking these all into account, the strongest vouch, in terms of trustworthiness, would be for a person who:

1) In conversations seems to have genuine attitudes and convictions for doing the action.

2) Has done actions on their own or with other groups without your prompting.

3) Has consistently done actions where it would be socially beneficial to brag about participating, but has not done so.

4) Has done actions with others that are severe enough to get people thrown in prison for a long time, but nothing has come of it.

5) Has served time in jail or prison instead of taking a cooperating plea deal which could lighten their sentence.

Competence

It has been our experience that vouchers tend to almost entirely overlook the competence of the vouchee to complete the action. While it's great that you like someone and trust them, their participation in an action is highly inappropriate if they are not capable of carrying it out.

For this reason, comptence matches trustworthiness in its importance to a vouch. We propose that, with respect to vouching, competence has two components: mental and physical.

Mental competence indicates that the person has mental capability to do what is required for the action, including any special skills, knowledge, charisma, or other non-physical attributes required, but often more importantly, that they have the mental fortitude to stay focused and not panic under pressure. Someone who cannot focus, cannot remember their tasks, or misrepresents their ability to do parts of the action, should not be seen as competent for that action.

Physical competence means that the person can physically do the action. If the action involves running, the person is capable of running (note that almost all actions require running implicitly because of the risk of police chase). If the action requires jumping, the person can jump. If the action requires bicycling, climbing, swimming, repelling, hiking long distances, carrying heavy packs, the person is capable of doing these things.

Just as with trustworthiness, a vouch of competence is weakest when the person says that they will be capable, and strongest when the person has a proven track record of effectively doing the types of things that need to be done for the action.

Some suggestions for evidence of mental competence, in order of increasing strength:
-Does the vouchee say that they know how to do what is required for the action?
Talk is cheap, but one would expect that the voucher at least communicate with the vouchee well enough to help them understand what needs to be done for the action, and the vouchee at least verbally confirms that they believe they are capable of what is required.

-Has the vouchee demonstrated knowledge, during conversations, about how to complete the activities of the action?
It is often possible to understand whether someone has the mental competence to do an action by discussing the action with them. If the action involves tree climbing, for example, if the person cannot explain how to construct a Figure 8 knot, then they probably do not have the required competence.

-Has the vouchee demonstrated, in conversation, that they can remember their part of the action plan and think through what they need to do carefully?
If the vouchee cannot remember anything, cannot stay focused in conversation, and cannot see the obvious implications of what they need to do, such as thinking of bringing gloves if there is gear that needs to be used that might leave fingerprints, then they are unlikely to have the mental competence to stay focused during the action.

-Has the vouchee demonstrated, in conversation, that they are able to think through the entire action plan carefully enough to see its strengths and weaknesses, and propose ways of dealing with those weaknesses?
Thinking through the overall plan, finding flaws, and fixing those flaws to the greatest degree possible, indicates that this person understands what the action is about, can remember the relevant information and remain focused when thinking about the action, and may be capable of making needed adjustments if things go wrong. Someone who can't think through the plan is unlikely to be able to make effective changes to that plan when necessary.

-Has the vouchee demonstrated that they have the skillset required for the action in a non-action context?
Going back to the example of tying a Figure 8 knot, if the person can demonstrate, in a non-action context without the help of anyone else, that they can reliably tie a Figure 8 knot, then this is a good indicator that they know how to do what they say. This does not mean, however, that under pressure, with adrenaline pumping, that they can tie a Figure 8 knot.

-Has the vouchee demonstrated that they have the skillset required for the action in an action context?
Communicating using radios to evade police is a skill. If the voucher has personal experience that the vouchee is capable of this type of evasion, from prior actions, then this is a good indicator that the vouchee will be able to do this again. Evidence that the vouchee can do the task under real pressure during a real action is very different from demonstrating that knowledge in a low stakes scenario.

-Has the vouchee demonstrated, in multiple high risk action contexts, that they have the required skills to do the action, and can draw on those skills under pressure?
Over and over again, the vouchee has been able to do what is needed under pressure. The vouchee rarely makes mistakes, and when they make mistakes, is able to compensate for them.

-Has the vouchee demonstrated, in multiple high risk action contexts, that they can stay calm and focused, even when things go wrong, and come up with solutions to problems on the fly?
Effectively dealing with problems during a high risk action is the best test of the mental competence of the vouchee. This requires bringing forth background knowledge and knowledge of the action plan, knowledge of the enemy and their tactics, as well as staying calm and focused enough to turn that knowledge into a new plan.

Just as with mental competence, the weakest evidence of physical competence comes from conversation or casual observation, while the strongest evidence comes from direct experience with the person in high risk contexts. When the adrenaline hits because one is in imminent danger of arrest or injury, knees can go weak, people suddenly need to urinate or shit, someone might pass out or have an asthma attack or a heart problem. The best evidence comes from seeing that the vouchee can handle their physical condition during intense high risk scenarios.

Summarizing, the strongest vouch, in terms of mental and physical competence, would be for a vouchee who:
1) Says that they can do the action, both mentally and physically.
2) Demonstrates in conversation that they can do what is required for the action.
3) Demonstrates that they can plan and think through their part of the action.
4) Can think through the entire action plan and analyze its strengths and weaknesses.
5) Demonstrates that they have the skillsets and physical capabilities in a non-action context.
6) Demonstrates that they have the skillsets and physical capabilities in an action context.
7) Demonstrates, in multiple high risk action contexts, that they have the skills and physical capabilities required to do the action, even under pressure and when problems arise.

Reputation

A bad vouch for a small low risk action is usually not a big deal. We have conversations about what went wrong, and try to get our understanding to align. However, vouching for someone who snitches, or can't keep their mouth shut, or who can't do the action at all because of some mental or physical issue, is a major problem. While snitching is obviously the worst outcome of a vouch, talking too much or panicking and becoming a liability to the action group are also extremely difficult to deal with. Anyone making a vouch should know that their reputation depends on their vouching, and that the actions of the vouchee will reflect on the reputation of the voucher. The point is not to make people nervous and calculating about their vouches, nor is it to create a punitive social hierarchy, but instead to get people to take seriously what they are saying when they vouch for someone.

Forgiveness and Cutting Ties

People make mistakes in their actions, their words, and their vouches. In most circumstances, it is worth having a discussion and forgiving minor issues. Even highly experienced anarchists can panic and make mistakes. Usually problems with competence arise, and these often can be forgiven.

But problems with trustworthiness are usually much more severe. Having an incompetent comrade usually does not indicate ill intent, but often incomplete knowledge. Having an untrustworthy comrade sometimes comes accidentally, for example the common accident of blurting out someone's government name, and doing a poor job covering it up. But snitching and talking to people outside the action group about the action aren't accidents, they are choices that deserve very little, if any, forgiveness. It's important to consider that if you vouch for someone who is untrustworthy, and continue to associate with them, then you will be considered untrustworthy.

If we do not cut ties with people who intentionally harm us, then all of us are vulnerable.

If we do not take risks with others, then we do not have the opportunity for anything great to happen.