The spiral of uncertainty

The spiral of uncertainty
Ukraine It is said that Vladimir Putin is the prisoner of his historical myths. But this is also true for the countries of the West
by Jakob Augstein
[This article published in March 2022 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://www.freitag.de/autoren/jaugstein/ukraine-krieg-die-spirale-der-unsicherheit.]

Disgust for the attacker and pity for the victims: these are the two strong feelings currently shaping public action and thinking

Germany once had a chancellor who was famous for thinking things through “from the end.” For her successor, the motto is apparently more like: the journey is the destination. That fits a time when politics often seems like the continuation of Twitter by other means. Russia has launched a criminal war against Ukraine. The West has decided to respond with military support and unprecedented sanctions. Anyone who takes sides in this way makes himself a party to the conflict, intervenes in the war himself – and thus also shares responsibility for the course and end of the war. There is much speculation about Vladimir Putin’s war aims. But the West should also be clear about its own goals. So does Chancellor Olaf Scholz have an idea of how this war should end and what should happen afterwards?

Disgust for the attacker and pity for the victims: these are the two strong feelings that are currently shaping public action and thinking. Even if it is difficult under these circumstances, it should be noted: The Western response to Putin’s war was a choice, not a necessity. Ukraine is not a member of NATO, yet the West perceives the attack on that country as an attack on itself – and responds accordingly.

When Putin called the economic sanctions against Russia an “act of war,” it was not a rhetorical exaggeration. War has long since been waged not only with bombs. The idea of what constitutes a means of war has changed. Even the so-called cyberattacks do not have to claim victims of life and limb in order to be classified as an act of war. How much more must this apply to the economic measures that will make life even more difficult for people in every last corner of Russia? This is a paradox: as we know, the conflict over Ukraine was sparked, among other things, by whether the country would one day be accepted into NATO. Now we find out: the protection of Article 5 is also granted to non-members in selected cases.

It’s always the others who wage war. This is a widespread misunderstanding in the West, which can also be seen in the reception of the Russian attack. It took the Germans years to admit to themselves that they waged war in Afghanistan. Now they balk at the realization that they entered the war against Russia alongside Ukraine. But in matters of war, repression and forgetfulness prevail. That is why we are again ignoring the lessons that can be learned from Vietnam to Afghanistan: It is much easier to start or wage a war than to end it. That’s true for Putin. But it’s also true for us.

For example, it could be difficult to recapture all the enthusiasm for the military and the heroic that has spilled out of the net into reality and is now driving the mills of a new politics. After all, the scenario of hearts – unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops, restoration of the status quo ante, reparations paid by the aggressor – is the only one that will certainly not come to pass. By the attack alone, Putin has ensured that Ukraine and the West will have to make him any of the concessions that they have until then declared quite out of the question. Perhaps Ukraine will have to give up Crimea; perhaps it will have to commit never to join NATO; perhaps it will have to agree to demilitarization under OSCE supervision.

And then, for example, the German chancellor would have to explain to the public, which has become accustomed to calling Putin in the same breath as Hitler, that these agreements are the best that could be achieved for Ukraine and that, incidentally, economic relations with Russia will now be normalized again and, of necessity, talks will also have to be resumed with the Russian president. Or does Scholz want to “cancel” Putin forever?

The war in Ukraine has a history. It did not fall from the sky and did not rise from hell. In 2008, the NATO summit in Bucharest ended with a promise to Ukraine and Georgia to admit both to the Western defense alliance. As a result, Russia invaded Georgia that same year. In 2014, the EU offered Ukraine an association agreement and the pro-Russia government (elected after all) was deposed. Russia responded by occupying Crimea. What Russia and the West set in motion then is what political scientists call a “spiral of insecurity.” It occurs when a country chooses a certain policy to promote its own security interests and in the process violates those of another country – which then reacts accordingly, and on and on.

Exiting such a spiral is difficult. The first step is to acknowledge one’s own involvement. It is said that Putin is the prisoner of his historical myths. But this is also true for the countries of the West. Their myth is that of their own blamelessness.