Do police read indymedia (and myspace, etc)?

The other thing that you forgot to recommend is, don't use your real name if using it online could ever come back and bite you in the ass. Pick a consistent nickname to use online. Don't carry anything on you, especially if you're going to run the risk of getting arrested, that connects you to that name. Common sense- better late than never.

Not sure, but it seems they don't have the right to defame you in that manner. They have to have a bonafide reaon to contact them? Maybe

Check out this comment posted to Indymedia shortly after the initial posting of the call for solidarity earlier this week with the tree sit.

http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2007/12/17/18467481.php?show_comments=1#18467532

It was posted at 9:28 AM, and by 1:15 the "Public (mis)Information Office" had posted their response. Not only that, it seems to try to attempt to make some claim that riot gear was claimed to be in use by the UC police, when the word "riot" doesn't appear in the article at all. Gear is mentioned and I'm sure there were many different kinds of gear in use for the clean up/recon mission. But they seem to want to discredit and sensationalized the language being used by activisists to justify their own violence. This occurs in another post later in the newswire where supposed "faculty" attack and try to discredit the activists, language, and tactics utilized.

http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2007/12/17/18467525.php?show_comments=1#comments

Just thought we should know....

AC

And finally, just to freak out the cops who'll probably eventually read this....

Why even use myspace at all? There doesn't seem to be a reason for the site. It's owned by Murdoch. It is just a place to share private information so that it becomes public. Don't use facebook either or any other social networking site.

Social networking and blogging sites draw us away from each other and away from actual human interaction.

because of the lax evidence rules, these things end up in front of juries.... ultimately what's online may or may not doom you in front of a jury. have heard of a few times where imc materials have been used in actual court cases for both civil and criminal trials, both to benefit or detriment of the criminal defendant or plaintiff in civil case. think before ya post away...

Security Culture: a handbook for activists
Produced by the Earth Liberation Front

This handbook is the first edition of what we hope will be an
evolving and growing document dealing with security issues and
canadian activism. A lot of this information is general and can be
applied to any locality -other information is easily adapted to fit
other situations.

For more information or to make contributions to this document
Email: securitysite [at] tao.ca

Second edition - prepared August 2000

INTRODUCTION:

Resistance has been on the rise for the past few years, with
activists adopting more and more effective tactics for fighting
back. Now, more than ever, we pose some threat to the status quo.
Our increased activity and effectiveness has meant that the RCMP,
FBI, and local police have continued to escalate their activities
against us. If we want our direct action movement to continue, it is
imperative we start tightening our security and taking ourselves
more seriously. Now is the time to adopt a security culture. Good
security is certainly the strongest defense we have.

This is a handbook for the Canadian (and even US) activist who is
interested in creating and maintaining security awareness and
culture in the radical movements. It is not nearly complete - but is
what we have got finished at the moment. We are always looking for
contributions - so please feel free to email securitysite [at] tao.ca
with any images or text you think belong in a handbook such as this.

If this material appears familiar to you - it's because this is the
second edition of this zine that we have put out... mostly to
correct spelling errors and other small things. The three articles
in this pamphlet have been mostly cobbled together from other
writings that already exist on this subject out there so we don't
claim any of this to be 100% original material - though we have
included quite a bit of fresh info on the Canadian state and its
operation (mostly because we have found the majority of info out
there to be very focused on US law enforcement). We hope that you
will put the material contained within to good use!

SECURITY CULTURE

What it is, why we need it

and how we implement it...

Agitators; liberationists; abolitionists; union organizers;
revolutionaries... From large uprisings challenging the entire
political structure, to isolated environmental and social struggles,
people have always worked to create a better world. For government
the response has usually been to jail activists and revolutionaries
through use of the courts and police forces.

As direct action movements become more effective, government
surveillance and harassment will increase. To minimize the
destructiveness of this political repression, it is imperative that
we create a security culture within our movements.

This pamphlet is essential reading for anyone who is associated with
groups that advocate and/or utilize sabotage, theft, arson and more
militant tactics. The advice herein also applies to anyone who is
associated with groups that practice civil disobedience, especially
since membership often overlaps and gossip travels freely between
groups.

Even if you have never picked up a monkeywrench or been arrested for
civil disobedience, even if you think you have nothing to hide,
these guidelines will enhance your personal safety as well as the
movement's overall effective-ness. Surveillance has been set up on
all sections of political movements in the past.

Governments in the western industrialized world have targeted groups
that have advocated sabotage and groups that have not, movements
that have been militant and movements that have been markedly
pacifist. The government's security machinery serves political and
economic objectives, and there are over 250 political prisoners in
Canada and the US that can testify to this from firsthand
experience. By adopting a security culture, we can defeat various
counterintelligence operations that would otherwise disrupt both
mainstream organizing and underground resistance.

SO WHAT IS A SECURITY CULTURE?

It's a culture where the people know their rights and, more
importantly, assert them. Those who belong to a security culture
also know what behavior compromises security and they are quick to
educate those people who, out of ignorance, forgetfulness, or
personal weakness, partake in insecure behavior. This security
consciousness becomes a culture when the group as a whole makes
security violations socially unacceptable in the group.

WHAT NOT TO SAY

To begin with, there are certain things that are inappropriate to
discuss. These things include:


> your involvement or someone else's involvement with an underground

group


> someone else's desire to get involved with such a group


> asking others if they are a member of an underground group


> your participation or someone else's participating in any action

that was illegal


> someone else's advocacy for such actions


> your plans or someone else's plans for a future action


Essentially, it is wrong to speak about a specific individual's
involvement (past, present or future) with illegal activities. These
are unacceptable topics of discussion regardless of whether it is
rumor, speculation or personal knowledge.

Please note: this is not to say that it is wrong to speak about
direct action in general terms. It is perfectly legal, secure and
desirable that people speak out in support of monkeywrenching and
all forms of resistance. The danger lies in linking individual
activists to specific actions or groups.

THREE EXCEPTIONS
There are only three times that it is acceptable to speak
specifically about actions and involvements.

The first situation would be if you were planning an action with
other members of your small group (your "cell" or "affinity group").
However, you should never discuss these things over the Internet
(email), phone line, through the mail, or in an activist's home or
car, as these places and forms of communication are frequently
monitored. The only people who should hear this discussion would
include those who are actively participating in the action. Anyone
who is not involved does not need to know and, therefore, should not
know.

The second exception occurs after an activist has been arrested and
brought to trial. If she is found guilty, this activist can freely
speak of the actions for which she was convicted. However, she must
never give information that would help the authorities determine who
else participated in illegal activities.

The third exception is for anonymous letters and interviews with the
media. This must be done very carefully and without compromising
security. Advice on secure communication techniques can be found in
other publications.

These are the only situations when it is appropriate to speak about
your own or someone else's involvement or intent to commit illegal
direct action.

SECURITY MEASURES

Veteran activists only allow a select few to know about their
involvement with direct action groups. Those few consist of the cell
members who they do the actions with AND NO ONE ELSE!

The reason for these security precautions is quite obvious: if
people don't know anything, they can't talk about it. It also means
that only the people who know the secret can also face jail time if
the secret gets out. When activists who do not share the same
serious consequences know who did an illegal direct action, they are
far more likely to talk after being harassed and intimidated by the
authorities, because they are not the ones who will go to jail. Even
those people who are trustworthy can often be tricked by the
authorities into revealing damaging and incriminating information.
It is safest for all cell members to keep their involvement in the
group amongst themselves. The fewer people who know, the less
evidence there is in the long run.

SECURITY VIOLATING BEHAVIOURS

In an attempt to impress others, activists may behave in ways that
compromise security. Some people do this frequently -they are
habitually gossiping and bragging. Some activists say inappropriate
things only when they consume alcohol. Many activists make
occasional breeches of security because there was a momentary
temptation to say something or hint at something that shouldn't have
been said or implied. In most every situation, the desire to be
accepted is the root cause.

Those people who tend to be the greatest security risks are those
activists who have low

self-esteem and strongly desire the approval of their peers.
Certainly it is natural to seek friendship and recognition for our
efforts, but it is imperative that we keep these selfish desires in-
check so we do not jeopardize the safety of other activists or
ourselves. People who place their desire for friendship over the
importance of the cause can do serious damage to our security.

The following are examples of security-violating behaviors:

Lying: To impress others, liars claim to have done illegal actions.
Such lies not only compromise the person's security--as cops will
not take what is said as a lie--but also hinders movement solidarity
and trust.

Gossiping: Some weak characters think they can win friends because
they are privy to special information. These gossips will tell
others about who did what action or, if they don't know who did it,
guess at who they think did what actions or just spread rumors about
who did it. This sort of talk is very damaging. People need to
remember that rumors are all that are needed to instigate a grand
jury or other investigation.

Bragging: Some people who partake in illegal direct action might be
tempted to brag about it to their friends. This not only jeopardizes
the bragger's security, but also that of the other people involved
with the action (as they may be suspected by association), as well
as the people who he told (they can become accessories after the
fact). An activist who brags also sets a horrible example to other
activists.

Indirect-Bragging: Indirect-braggers are people who make a big
production on how they want to remain anonymous, avoid protests, and
stay "underground." They might not come out and say that they do
illegal direct action, but they make sure everyone within ear-shot
knows they are up to something. They are no better than braggers,
but they try to be more sophisticated about it by pretending to
maintain security. However, if they were serious about security,
they would just make up a good excuse as to why they are not as
active, or why they can't make it to the protest (that kind of lying
is acceptable).

EDUCATE TO LIBERATE

It is fairly easy to spot those activists who compromise our
movement's security. So what do we do with people who exhibit these
behaviors? Do we excommunicate them from our movement? Actually, no -
at least, not for a first offense.

The unfortunate truth is there are numerous security-ignorant people
in the movement and others who have possibly been raised in
a "scene" that thrives on bragging and gossiping. It doesn't mean
these people are bad, but it does mean they need to be educated.
Even seasoned activists can make mistakes when there is a general
lack of security consciousness in our groups. And that's where those
of you who are reading this can help. We must NEVER let a breach in
security occur without acting to correct it. If an acquaintance of
yours is bragging about doing an action or spreading security-
compromising gossip, it is your responsibility to explain to her or
him why that sort of talk violates security and is inappropriate.

You should strive to educate this person in a manner that encourages
him to listen and to change his behavior. It should be done without
damaging his pride. You should be humble and sincerely interested in
helping him to become a better person and a more effective activist.
Do not maintain a "holier than-thou" attitude. This will inevitably
raise his defenses and prevent him from absorbing or using any of
the advice you offer. Remember, the goal of educating people is to
change their behavior, not boost your ego by showing them how much
more security-conscious you are.

If possible the educational session should be done in private, so
the person does not have to contend with the potential "pride"
issues. The educational reprimand should also be done as soon as
possible after the mistake to increase its effectiveness.

If each of us takes on the responsibility of educating those who
slip up, we can dramatically improve movement security. Once people
recognize lying, gossiping, bragging, and indirect-bragging as the
damaging behaviors that they are, they will soon end. When we
develop a culture where all breaches of security result in an
immediate reprimand, all sincere activists will quickly get with the
program.

DEALING WITH CHRONIC SECURITY PROBLEMS

So what do we do with activists who repeatedly violate security
precautions even after multiple educational sessions? It's
unfortunate, but the best thing to do with these people is cut them
loose and kick them out of our meetings, basecamps and
organizations. With law enforcement budgets on the increase and with
courts handing down long sentences for political "crimes", the
stakes are too high to allow chronic security-offenders to work
among us.

By creating a security culture, we have an effective defense against
informers and agents who try to infiltrate groups. Imagine an
informer who, every time she asked another activist about that
person's activity, received a reprimand and an education on
security. That informer would get frustrated really easily. Once the
activists discovered she continued to violate security precautions
after being repeatedly educated, they would have grounds for her
dismissal. And that would be one less informer for us to deal with!

A BRIEF PRIMER ON THE CANADIAN STATE SECURITY APPARATUS

Recent repression against activists in British Columbia illuminates
the need for grassroots people to understand and practice movement
security. Police monitoring, infiltration and agent provocateurs are
all techniques used by the state routinely against activists to turn
up information about the activities of our movements and our-selves.

Although many activists have trouble believing that state security
agencies have that much interest in their affairs, a few key court
cases and hearings have helped activists to gain access to
information that proves that police spying on activists is routine
in Canada.

During the APEC hearings, it was revealed that over seventy groups
and individuals were monitored before and during the APEC meetings
in 1997. A paid industry informant/disruptor was identified at a
wilderness action camp in 1999, and local activists have been
targeted by provocateurs who have tried to convince them not only to
disclose information but to break the law.

The Canadian security apparatus has identified a number of our
movements as threatening to national security. They have targeted
people and organizations widely. Even avowed pacifists have been
included in surveillance and repressive measures. According to
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) annual reports of the
past five years, the Native Resistance and the Environmental/ Animal
Rights movements have been primary targets.

With the rise in militant First Nations struggles, covert direct
action against corporations, and the growing focus by the media on
general "anarchist" politics due to events in Seattle around the WTO
among other major increases in movement strength and militancy, we
can be pretty sure that this has been marked by a growing level of
surveillance and monitoring as well.

The need for security in our movements is obvious - however, it is
incredibly important that we don't fall into the trap of using our
awareness of security issues to shut other people out of our growing
movements. One of the key aims of COINTELPRO operations against the
Black Panthers and American Indian Movement was to spread paranoia
and distrust among those freedom fighters so that they would find it
hard to accept new people into their work.

It is possible to build a movement large and at the same time create
security culture. Arming ourselves with knowledge about how the
system works against activists is the first step to creating that
culture. The central aim of this article is to give a brief run down
of how domestic intelligence works in Canada so that we can better
understand how to avoid its traps.

AN OVERVIEW OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS
The Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) is probably
the best known of the "security" agencies that deal with
activist "threats". They were originally a special surveillance wing
of the RCMP until 1983 when they were split off into a separate
agency due to protests that they were acting as a secret
organization that was contravening Canadians' democratic rights to
organize. Essentially, the split from the RCMP allowed the new spy
agency to do legally what the Mounties had been doing illegally. At
the operations level, the new agency was granted more freedom and
more leeway than the Mounties ever had.

Today they continue to carry out a wide range of surveillance. As
they are not a law-enforcement agency and therefore their evidence
is not used in court, there is nothing stopping them from
contravening the few regulations that exist regarding privacy
rights. For example, CSIS is not required to inform people, as the
RCMP does, ninety days after they have been wiretapped or bugged.

Agents working for CSIS are allowed, with "authorization", to enter
people's homes to plant bugs, wiretap phones, open mail and look
into health, employment and government records without ever having
to tell a targeted individual what they are doing. The information
that they gather is used to build profiles and dossiers (files) on
individuals, organizations, networks, etc. The information that they
gather is often passed on to other wings of the federal security
system who are responsible for "law enforcement", and will then
obtain whatever war-rants are necessary for legal surveillance (to
be brought into court as evidence).

The National Security Investigation Service (NSIS) is the primary
law-enforcement wing of domestic security. The NSIS is a section of
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). Most cities across Canada
have an NSIS office including Vancouver, Edmonton, Montreal, Ottawa,
and Toronto. The NSIS maintains a computer database on activists,
immigrants and so called "terrorists" which is housed in Ottawa.

It is believed that the Vancouver NSIS employs between 12 and 18
members. Within NSIS there are several sub-groups called Team 1,
Team 2, Team 3 - etc. that have different investigative targets.

They employ informants, infiltrators, personal physical
surveillance, electronic surveillance including phone and
room "bugs" and other means of investigation and research.

The RCMP/NSIS also have other resources at their disposal during
counter-insurgency operations. "Special O" is a team of surveillance
specialists that may be called upon. "Special I" is a penetration
team whose specialty is to break into homes, vehicles and other
properties for investigative purposes. They are the team, which
among other things, installs listening devices, photo-graphs
building interiors, etc.

In a long-running case based in Vancouver, all of these methods of
surveillance were used against several Vancouver activists. During
the Vancouver investigation, house and vehicle bugs were located by
some targeted individuals. The bugs had large battery packs attached
to facilitate less frequent battery changes. The NSIS also visited
several activists across Canada in an attempt to question them
regarding the individuals under investigation.

It cannot be stressed enough that no one is under any legal
obligation to provide the police with any information other than
one's own name and address. That is it. Saying anything more
jeopardizes individuals' and movement security. Even answering
seemingly insignificant questions can assist the police in
developing personality profiles on a range of activists which may
not contain "evidence" but may instead be used to give
police "leads" on other suspects and to construct intent during
legal proceedings. The only principled response to police
questioning is to say nothing more than name and address.

The Communications Security Establishment is an agency of the
defense department which has been long clouded in secrecy. They
collect and process telephone, fax and computer communications of
foreign states, corporations and individuals. The federal government
uses the intelligence gleaned from the data to support troops
abroad, catch "terrorists" and "further Canada's economic goals"
(and what that means is up to them).

Although the CSE is not technically allowed to collect the
communications of Canadian citizens, it is known to be a partner in
the Echelon project -a multinational monitoring operation which sees
CSE and counterpart agencies in the United States, Britain,
Australia and New Zealand share intercepted communications of
interest with one another, effectively creating a global
surveillance web.

The Terrorist Extremist Section (TES Unit) is British Columbia's
anti-terrorist unit. A joint Vancouver/Victoria Police Department/
RCMP unit called the Organized Crime Agency (formerly the
Coordinated Law Enforcement Unit - CLEU), it is believed that the
this unit employs two or three members only.

Most activists will be initimately familiar with their local police
forces. Be aware that cops do not only show up in blue uniforms -
but routinely practice crowd infiltration and carry out surveillance
and investigative activities either alone or jointly with the RCMP
depending on the type of case. Watch for them on demonstrations - as
they like to come along and take photo-graphs and video for the
record - and they often appear in crowds as "fellow demonstrators".

THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY MODEL

Most Western nation-states follow a model of counter-insurgency
developed by a British intelligence expert named Kitson who wrote,
Low Intensity Operations, after much field work in the colonies. He
broke down movement development into three stages:

The Preparatory Phase: is when the movement is small, tends to focus
on education, publishing and groundwork.

The Non-Violent Phase: is when the movement takes on more of a mass
character. Large demonstrations are the norm.

In the Insurgency Phase: the movement has taken on a popular
character. Perhaps a more assertive, guerrilla component has emerged.

Kitson advises that the primary work of the intelligence agency
should occur during the preparatory phase. At this time the
movements are most vulnerable. They have not experienced a high
degree of repression. They consider talk of security as mere
paranoia. As they are not breaking laws they believe that it is safe
to organize completely openly. The intelligence agency is therefore
able to exploit these conditions and develop detailed dossiers on a
wide range of people. The information will be extremely valuable to
them later on.

It is important that as a move-ment in we need to learn to practice
security at all points in the movement's development. Remember that
the State is interested in knowing about activists' beliefs, not
just in "hard evidence". Learn and practice security to protect
ourselves and our peoples. Don't be afraid. Remember - If an agent
comes knockin', do no talkin'.

EVERYTHING YOU EVER WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT INFORMERS AND INFILTRATORS

Informants and infiltrators operate in every radical movement.

The rise of militant radicalism as seen at the WTO protests in
Seattle, and the declarations by activists to continue the struggle
in the streets and underground mean that more and more attention
will be paid to activists by law enforcement. Part of this will mean
sending more infiltrators amongst our ranks to bribe and entice
those weak individuals already involved.

Non-violent movements need to learn to identify such people and and
let them know that their actions will never be tolerated by
activists in any way.

This section is intended to arm you with information on how to spot
and deal with informers and infiltrators in our ranks.

WHO IS AN INFORMER?

There are actually two kinds of informers. The deliberate informer
is someone who infiltrates an organization with the specific intent
of getting incriminating evidence against activists or even setting
them up to be arrested. These infiltrators are either on the payroll
of a government agency or may be hired by industry. The second type
of informer is the activist-turned- informant -either unwittingly or
because of pressure put on them by the authorities. Make no mistake,
both kinds exist throughout our ranks and are equally dangerous.

Let's discuss the deliberate informer (infiltrator) first. They are
often difficult to identify, they come in all ages and types, but
they usually have a similar modus operandi--they come out of nowhere
and all of a sudden, they are everywhere. Whether it's a meeting, a
protest, or an action, this person will be right in the thick of it.

Keep in mind however that this is also the hallmark of a new
activist, whose enthusiasm and commitment is so strong that s/ he
wants to fight the power every minute of the day.

How to tell them apart? Well, a planted infiltrator will ask a lot
of questions about the direct action groups, individuals and illegal
activities. S/he will suggest targets and volunteer to do
reconnaissance as well as take part in the action.

An example of infiltration tactics can be found in an incident that
occurred a few years ago when U.S. Surgical hired a security firm to
infiltrate Friends of Animals in Connecticut. Their operative
convinced an activist to put a pipe bomb in the car of the president
of U.S. Surgical. Needless to say, the police were waiting for her
and she ended up being charged with at-tempted murder.

State and industry infiltrators have been identified in operation in
British Columbia over the past few years - attempting to incite
illegal activity, sowing disruption in action camps, and gathering
information on the who, what and when of our movement's activities

Everyone who asks a lot of questions about the direct action isn't
necessarily an infiltrator, but they ARE the ones to watch (at the
very least, we should be educating them about security culture).
Explain to new activists that direct action tactics can be risky
(though some risks are worth taking!) and that it is dangerous to
ask a lot of questions about it. If the person persists in asking
questions, STAY AWAY FROM THEM!

Any activist who can't under-stand the need for security is someone
that should be held at arm's length from the movement.

Placing infiltrators into social justice movements isn't anything
new. It was done to the Black Panthers and the peace movement in a
big way. Unless you are only working with people you've known for
years and who have earned your trust, you should assume there is an
informant in your midst and act accordingly.

This doesn't mean that no one else should ever be allowed into
the "inner circle." On the contrary, if our movement is to continue
to grow, we must always be recruiting new members; we just need to
keep security uppermost in our minds and exercise caution at all
times.

Possibly an even greater threat is the activist-turned-informer,
either unwittingly or through coercion.

The unwitting informer is the activist who can't keep his/her mouth
shut. If someone brags to you about what s/he's done, make sure this
person never has any knowledge that can incriminate you, because
sooner or later, the wrong person will hear of it. These activists
don't mean to do harm, but the results of their bragging can be
serious. It is your responsibility to instruct these people on
security culture and the importance of it.

The other type of activist-informer is person who cracks under
pressure and starts talking to save his/her own skin. Many activists
get drawn into situations they are not able to handle, and some are
so caught up in the "excitement" that they either don't realize what
the consequences can be or they just don't think they'll ever have
to face them.

We have to know the possible consequences of every action we take
and be prepared to deal with them. Someone who is easily influenced
by his/her parents or dependent on them for support is not a good
candidate for actions as they can be persuaded too easily to
cooperate with the authorities. There is no shame in not being able
to do an action because of responsibilities that make it impossible
to do jail time. If others are depending on you for support or you
aren't willing to lose your job or drop out of school, DON'T DO THE
ACTION.

Make certain that others in your affinity group are not in
situations which may cause them to cooperate with the police or
abandon their friends. Some things to look out for in people you
choose to do illegal direct action with are lengthy criminal records
and drug addictions which can often be used by the police to
pressure activists into giving them information. Two activists were
recently put in jail in Canada because a third party panicked -
mainly about not being able to get his drugs in jail - and talked to
free himself. (This is not to condemn those who have drug habits or
criminal records -but are certainly things to keep in mind).

Don't be afraid to talk about this. Ask hard questions, and if you
aren't convinced that someone will be able to stay strong if the
worst happens, then designate that person to do support. Make sure
that those who go into battle with you are willing and able to take
whatever comes, even if it means giving up their freedom for your
goals. Remember - there is no excuse for turning in action comrades
to the police - and those activists that do effectively
excommunicate themselves from our movements. We must offer no legal
or jail support to those activists who turn-in others for their
impact on our movement is far reaching and can have devastating
effects.

Using an alias IS NOT adequate "security," especially if you use it "consistently." The comment suggesting this was incredibly misleading. IP addresses can easily be tracked and the individual computer being used pinpointed. Better never to write anything related to illegal activities on the computer at all. When browsing, use tor (http://www.torproject.org/) or anonymouse.org. And sure, use an alternate name when posting to indymedia.

Well, of course, one should never talk about anything illegal on the computer or, for that matter, on the phone. Especially if they're talking about something they are planning or have done!

I already do assume that everything I do online is being read, both at home and at work. I guess I forgot that other people don't live in the same reality as I do.

BTW, Indybay doesn't track IP addresses of people who read or post to the site (that's not to say that someone else doesn't track them)

a short flash vid about how fucked up facebook is

Don't have illusions of tor providing security. Any one (including govt) can have entry/exit nodes and someone with a large enough view of the Internet (think feds monitoring all traffic) can surmise who is going where in the tor network.

I wish tor could offer better protection, but it isn't perfect.

Look, activists have always had to face the fact that if they are effective at all - they are under surveillance. Acitivists have always had to therefore be very clear about what is public and what is private. So, having said that ... why is everyone acting all surprised that all the social networks and much of their online activity is open to scrutiny? These discussions are always kind of a go-around about the obvious and then, they come off as alarmist and self-defeating. What is healthy is to realize that to have a public face ... a public campaign ... a public life is good and only natural. So, anything on Myspace or Facebook or Indymedia is PUBLIC. Think of it as having a discussion in front of a security guard or holding a press conference. Activists today need to get over themsevles and learn to exist in this realm with poise and purpose.

And, then, OK, there is sometimes a need for "security culture" ... but, some people are so intense about this all the time that they seem supsicious. The "security culture" becomes anti-security. Most of the time, we all need to relax and maintain an open, curious and guilt-free composure. We need to allow oursleves the human basics ... things like the need to socialize, the need to express ideas and engage the larger public. Those that need to be secret should obviously not be putting anything on Myspace or anything like that. The rest of us need to write our own histories and we need to be able to do this without fear or even condmenation from more radical than thou newcomers.

So, relax. Tell the world what you need to and go have the "security" discussion - IN PRIVATE!

Whatever happened to the First Amendment? The police are going on MySpace pretending to be 12 years old? Then no crime has been committed since the police officer in NOT 12 years old. They are setting up stings. But if they have a right to pretend to be something then anyone has the right to pretend to be something, including a sexual predator.

Lawyers for the defendants have argued that tree sitting and supporting the demonstrators are First Amendment rights. Politics professor Michael Urban agrees, saying his choice to feed the tree sitters should be protected.

[see: Delivering Food to Tree-sitters at UCSC on Christmas
http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2007/12/25/18468834.php]

Urban says he received a phone call from a university official Jan. 10 warning him that he had been spotted in a photograph posted on an activist Web site documenting the tree sit. The photo showed Urban delivering pumpkin and pecan pies to demonstrators on Christmas Day -- an act he defiantly repeated last week by delivering chicken salad, though he was not arrested.

"It was an absolute clear threat," Urban said of the call, during which he said the university official mentioned Schlesinger's arrest and added, "We don't want anything like that to happen to you."

Taken from: Faculty leaders want UCSC to reverse policy of arresting tree-sit supporters
http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2008/01/21/18473962.php

Promoe - Murder Murdoch