

Discontents at Rome: 63 B.C.

Notebook 3

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Phenomenology of Spirit

G. W. F. Hegel
(A. V. Miller, trans.)

§ 32 This power is identical with what we earlier called the Subject, which by giving determinateness an existence in its own element supersedes abstract immediacy.

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it is far harder to bring fixed thoughts into fluid state than to do so with sensuous existence.

§ 36 The immediate existence of spirit, consciousness, contain the two moments of knowing and the objectivity negative to knowing

Consciousness knows and comprehends only what fall within its experience; for what is contained in this is nothing

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but spiritual substance, and
this, too, as object of the self.

Spirit : (a) other to self
(b) object to itself

Experience is the name we give to just
this moment.

the abstract becomes alienated from
itself and then returns to itself from
this alienation

§ 37 some of the ancients conceived the
void as the principle of motion, for they
rightly saw the moving principle as
the negative, though they did not as
yet grasp that the negative is the
self.

§ 39 'True' and 'false' belong among
those determinate notions which are
held to be inert and wholly separate
essences, one here and one there...
Against ~~this~~ this view it must be

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§ 39 maintained that truth is not a minted coin that can be given and pocketed ready-made.

↳ To know something falsely means that there is a disparity between knowledge and its substance.

To say that in every falsehood there is a grain of truth is to treat the two like oil and water, which cannot be mixed and only externally combined.

Just as to talk of the unity of subject and object, of finite and infinite, of being and thought, etc. is inept, since object and subject, etc. signify what they are outside of their unity, and since in their unity they are not meant to be what their expression says they are,

§46 the principle of equality, of abstract lifeless unity, cannot cope with that sheer unrest of life and its absolute distinction.

§47 Philosophy, on the other hand, has to do, not with unessential determinations but with a determination ~~in so far~~ in so far as it is essential.

Appearance is the arising and passing away that does not itself arise and pass away, but is 'in itself', ... and constitutes the actuality and the movement of the life of truth. The True is thus the Bacchanalian revel in which no member is not drunk; yet because each member collapses as soon as he drops out, the revel is just as much transparent and simple repose.

Judged in the coast of this movement, the single shape of Spirit do not persist any more than determinate thoughts do, but they are as much positive and necessary moments, ...

Phenomenology of Spirit

Hegel (A. V. Miller)

§ 51 Sache - essence

Wesen der Sache - living essence

This monochromatic character of the schema and its lifeless determinations, this absolute identity, and the transition from one to the other, are all equally products of the lifeless Understanding and external cognition.

§ 52 The excellent, however, not only cannot escape the fate of being thus deprived of life and spirit, of being flayed and then seeing its skin wrapped around lifeless knowledge and its conceit.

§ 54 The subsistence or substance of anything that exists is its self-identity; for a failure of self-identity would be its dissolution. Self-identity, however, is pure abstraction; but this is thinking.

55. Existence is Quality, self-identical determinateness, or determinate simplicity, determinate thought; this is the Understanding of existence [i.e. the nature of existence from the standpoint of the Understanding]

Hence, it is Noûs, as Anaxagoras first ~~was~~ recognized the essence of things to be.

Eidos - (Idea) determinate Universality

Precisely because existence is defined as Species, it is a simple thought; Noûs, simplicity, is substance.

56 It is in this nature of what is to be in its being its own Notion, that logical necessity in general consists.

The self-moving concrete shape makes ~~it~~ itself into a simple determinateness; in so doing it raises itself to logical form

57 A reception of this kind is usually the first reaction on the part of knowing to something unfamiliar; it resists it in order to save its own freedom and its own insight, its own authority, from the alien authority

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58

At the opposite extreme, argumentation is freedom from all content, and a sense of vanity towards it. What is looked for here is the effort to give up this freedom.

59

There are two aspects of the procedure of argumentation to which speculative ~~that~~ [begreifende] thinking is opposed and which call for further notice.

(1) First, such reasoning adopts a negative attitude towards the content it apprehends; it knows how to refute and destroy it. That something is not the case, is a merely negative insight, a dead end which does not lead to a new content beyonds itself. In order to have content again, something new must be taken over from elsewhere.

Looked at as a result, what emerges from this process is the determinate negative which is positive content in itself.

§ 60 argumentation has another side which makes comprehension difficult for it.

§ 62 when one says: 'the actual is the universal,' the actual as subject disappears in its predicate.

§ 63 Here we see the reason behind one particular complaint so often made against them: that so much has to be read over and over before it can be understood... We learn by experience that we meant something other than we meant to mean; and this correction of our meaning compels our knowing to go back to the proposition, and understand it in some other way.

§ 65 The proposition should express what the True is; but essentially the True is Subject. As such it is merely the dialectical movement, this course that generates itself, going forth from, and returning to itself.

The Politics

Aristotle

1252a

If, accordingly, we begin at the beginning, and consider things in the process of their growth, we shall best be able, in this as in other fields, to attain scientific conclusions by the method we employ.

There must necessarily be a union of the naturally ruling element with the element which is naturally ruled, for the preservation of both. The element which is able, by virtue of its bodily power, to do what the ~~slavest~~ other element plans, is a ruled element, which is naturally in a state of slavery.

1252b

Among the barbarians, however [contrary to the order of nature], the female and the slave occupy the same position - the reason being that no naturally ruling element exists among them, and conjugal union thus comes to be a union of a female who is a slave with a male who is a slave also a slave.

Aristotle compared the Barbarians to oxen.

1252b The first ... two elementary associations
male and female and master and slave.
is the household or family ... oxen serve the
poor in lieu of household slaves.

Charondas - 'associates of the bread chest'

Epimenides the Cretan - 'associates of the
manager'

1252a all associations are instituted for the
purpose of attaining some good.

the particular association which is the
most sovereign of all, and includes all
the rest, will pursue this aim the most,
and will thus be directed to the most sovereign
of all goods. This most sovereign and
inclusive association is the polis.

CC.
Politicians
Plato.
258E-
259D.
It is a mistake to believe that the 'statesman'
[πολιτικός] is the same as the monarch
of a kingdom, or the manager of a kōra
household, or the master of a number of
slaves.

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§66

the reasons given are themselves in need of further reasons, and so on ad infinitum

§69

It is just the point, however, that the best should not remain in the recesses of what is inner, but should be brought out of these depths into the light of day.

For 'sophistry' is a slogan used by ordinary common sense against educated reason, just as the expression 'visionary dreaming' sums up, once and for all, what philosophy means to those who are ignorant of it.

empyrean

§ 71

We must hold to the conviction that it is the nature of truth to prevail when its time has come, and that it appears only when this time has come, and therefore never appears prematurely, nor finds a public not ripe to receive it.

§ 73

It is a natural assumption that in philosophy before we start to deal with its proper subject-matter, viz. the actual cognition of what truly is, one must first of all come to an understanding about cognition...

to get hold of the Absolute, or as a medium through which one discovers it...

There is a boundary between cognition and the Absolute that completely separates them.

Problem of Cognition

(a) the use of an instrument on a thing certainly does not let it be what it is for itself, but rather set out to reshape and alter it.

(b) If, on the otherhand, cognition is not an instrument of our activity but a more or less passive medium through which the light of truth reaches us,

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§ 73 then again we do not receive the truth as it is in itself, but only as it exists through and in this medium. Either way we employ a means which immediately brings about the opposite of its own end.

(c) if the Absolute is supposed merely to be brought nearer to us through this instrument, without anything in it being altered like a bird caught by a lime-twig, it would surely laugh our little ruse to scorn ... For a ruse is just what cognition would be in such a case.

(d) if we remove the ray of truth because of its refraction ... all that would be indicated would be pure direction or a blank space.

§ 74 if the fear of falling into error sets up a mistrust of Science ... it is hard to see why we should not turn around and mistrust this very mistrust ... Indeed, this fear takes something — a great deal in fact — for granted as truth, supporting its scruples and inferences on what is itself in need of prior scrutiny to see if it is true ... it ... assumes that there is a difference between ourselves and this cognition. Above all, it presupposes

that the Absolute stands on one side and Cognition on the other ... it presupposes that cognition ... is surely outside of the truth as well, is nevertheless true, an assumption whereby what calls itself fear of error reveals itself rather as fear of the truth.

§ 76 Instead of troubling ourselves with such useless ideas and locutions about cognition as 'an instrument for getting hold of the Absolute', or as 'a medium through which we view the truth' ...

When confronted with a knowledge that is without truth, science can neither reject it merely reject it as an ordinary way of looking at things, while assuring us that its science is a quite different sort of cognition for which that ordinary knowledge is of no account ... science would be declaring its power to lie simply in its being; but true knowledge likewise appeals to the fact that it is, and assures us that for it science is of no account.

The Republic

Plato

1.330

1.331 the chief value of wealth... It can do much to save us from going to that other world in fear of having cheated or deceived anyone unintentionally or of being in debt to some god for sacrifice or to some man for money.

it really consists in nothing more nor less than telling the truth and paying back anything we may have received.

1.332 [justice] it is just to render every man his due.

95 It is then, sense-certainty itself that must be asked: 'What is the Thing?' If we take the 'Thing' in the twofold shape of its being as 'Now' and as 'Here', the dialectic it has in it will receive a form as intelligible as the 'Thing' itself.

96 The 'Now' does indeed preserve itself, but as something that is set alight; again it preserves itself in the face of the

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§ 78 following one's own conviction is, of course more than giving oneself over to authority; but changing an opinion accepted on authority into an opinion held out of personal conviction, does not necessarily alter the content of the opinion held ~~out of personal conviction~~ or replace error with truth.

~~§ 78~~

92. in sense-certainty, pure being at once splits up into what we have called the two 'Thises', one 'this' as 'I' and the other 'This' as object

95. It is, then, sense-certainty itself that must be asked: 'What is the ^{now} This?' If we take the 'This' in the twofold shape of its being, as 'Now' and as 'Here', the dialectic it has in it will receive a form as intelligible as the 'This' itself is.

96 The Now does indeed preserve itself, but as something that is ⁱⁿ not Night; equally, it preserves itself in the face of the Day

that now is, as something that is also not Day, in other words, as a negative in general. This self-preserving Now is therefore, not immediate but mediated; for it is determined as a permanent and self-preserving Now through the fact that something else, viz. Day and Night ~~is~~ is not.

A simple thing of this kind which is through negation, which is neither This nor That, a not-This, and is with equal indifference This as well as That — such a thing we call a universal. So it is in fact the universal that is the true [content] of sense-certainty.

Here > mediated simplicity, or universality
Now >

99 Pure being remains, therefore, as the essence of this sense-certainty, since sense-certainty has demonstrated in its own self that ~~truth~~ the truth of its object is the universal.

But this pure being is not an immediacy, but something to which negation and mediation are essential.

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100 the universal which the object has come to be is no longer what the object was supposed essentially to be for sense-certainty
... the certainty is now to be found in the opposite element, viz. in knowing.

gewesen ist - has been.

kein Wesen - is

107 what has been is not

A This is posited; but it is rather an other that is posited, or the This is superseded: and this otherness, or the setting-aside of the first, is itself in turn set aside

109 It is clear that the dialectic of sense-certainty is nothing else but the simple history of its movement or of its experience, and sense-certainty itself is nothing else but just this history.

110

Consequently, what is called the unutterable is nothing else than the untrue, the irrational, what is merely meant [but is not actually expressed].

But if I want to help out language - which has the divine nature of directly reversing the meaning of what is said, of making it into something else

111

Perception, on the other hand, takes what is present to it as a universal

'I' is a universal and the object is a universal.

the way we take in perception is no longer something that just happens to us like sense-certainty; on the contrary, it is logically necessitated. With the emergence of the principle, the two moments which in their appearing merely occur,

(a) the movement of pointing out, perceiving

(b) a simple event, the object perceived.

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112 Since the principle of the object, the universal, the object must express this nature its nature in its own self. This it does by showing itself to be the thing of many properties.

113 The This is, therefore, established as not This, or as something superseded; and hence not as Nothing, but as a determinate Nothing.

The Politics

Aristotle

1252a

(Platonic)

is concerned
On this view a man who deals with a few persons is a master, etc...
This view abolishes any real difference between a large household and a small polis; and it also reduces the difference between the 'statesman' and the monarch to the one fact that the latter has an uncontrolled and sole authority, while the former exercises his authority in conformity with the rules imposed by the art of statesmanship...
But this is a view which cannot be accepted as correct.

There is an essential difference...

there must... be a... pairing of those who cannot exist without one another

(a) male & female

(b) ruling element & the ruled.

Ruling element - by virtue of its intelligence, to exercise forethought, is naturally a ruling element.

Slave - the element which is able, by virtue of its bodily power, to do what the other element plans, is a ruled element, which is naturally in a state of slavery.

master and slave have accordingly ... a common interest.

1252b The first form of association naturally instituted for the satisfaction of daily recurrent needs is thus, the family.

(a) family

(b) village 'sons and the sons of sons'

households are always monarchically governed by the eldest of the kin

the 'nature' of things consists in their end or consummation

1253a the end, or final cause is ~~best~~ the best. Now self-sufficiency [which is the object of the state to bring about] is the end, and so the best

the polis belongs to class of things that exist by nature, and that man is by nature an animal intended to live in a polis

The Politics

Aristotle

1253a He who is without a polis, by reason of his own nature and not some accident, is either a poor sort of being, or a being higher than man.

The man who is isolated — who is unable to share in the benefits of political association, or has no need to share because he is already self-sufficient — is not part of the polis, and must therefore be either a beast or a god.

Injustice is all the graver when it is armed injustice.

if he be without virtue, he is a most unholy savage being, and worse than all others in the indulgence of lust and gluttony.

terminus a quo vs. terminus ad quem.

household : (a) master / slave
(b) husband / wife
(c) parent / child
(d) chrematistic (χρηματιστικ)

1253b

There are some who hold that the exercise of authority over slaves is a form of science. They believe (as we said at the beginning) that the management of a household, the control of slaves, the authority of the statesman, and the rule of the monarch, are all the same. Then there are others, however, who regard the control of slaves by a master as contrary to nature ... the relation of master to slave is based on force.

the slave is an animate article of property.

1254a instruments of production.

instruments of action (slaves)

(a) ποροεις

cf. Ethics 6. c. 4

(b) πραξεις

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113 when it expresses this in its immediacy it is a differentiated, determinate property

each is itself a simple relating of self to self it leaves the others alone, and is connected with them only by the indifferent also

114 they are only determinate in so far as they differentiate themselves from one another, and relate themselves to others as to their opposites... it is not an indifferent differentiation but is exclusive, each property negating the others

The One is the moment of negation; it is itself quite simply a relation of self to self and it excludes an other; and it is that by which 'thinghood' is determined as a Thing.

¶ The indeterminate Pure Spirit passes over to the otherside and forms itself up not as mere opposition, opposition simpliciter, but as genuine opposition and launches its attack. It is not a determinate thing, or mere thinghood, not a relation of self to self but of self to other.

497 the consciousness that is in and for itself ... finds that the state ^{power} disowns actions ^{qua} individual action and subdues it into obedience

117 The object which I apprehend presents itself purely as ~~one~~ a One

many properties are present as sensuous universalities, each existing on its own account and, as determinate, excluding the others.

118 Consciousness, therefore, necessarily runs through this cycle again, but this not in the same way as it did the first time. For it has experienced in perception that the outcome and truth of perception is its dissolution, or is ~~the~~ reflection out of the ~~things~~ True and into itself.

this return into itself has shown itself to be essential to perception - alters the truth.

120 the Thing is a One precisely by being opposed to others.

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G. W. F. Hegel.

121 we say of the Thing: it is white, also cubical, and also tart, and so on. But in so far as it is white, it is not cubical, and in so far as it is cubical and also white, it is not tart, and so on.

for the Thing itself is the subsistence of the many diverse and independent properties.

122 we see that Consciousness alternately makes itself, as well as the Thing, into both a pure, ~~manyless~~ many-less One, and into an Also that resolves itself into independent matters'.

(a) distinct moments of apprehension

(b) withdrawal into itself

the truth itself, the Thing, reveals itself in a two fold way, ... the Thing exhibits itself for the consciousness apprehending it, in a specific manner, but is at the same time reflected out of the way in which it presents to Consciousness and back into itself; in other words, it contains in its own self an opposite truth

123 The Thing is a One, reflected into itself; it is for itself, but it is also for another an other; and, moreover, it is an other on its own account, just because it is for an other.

but also a One; but the oneness contradicts this diversity

Consciousness ... would have to say that in so far as it is for itself, the Thing is not for an other.

124 for itself ~~It~~ it is a simple determinateness which constitutes the Thing's essential character, and differentiates it from others.

125 This determinateness, which constitutes the essential character of the Thing and distinguishes it from all others, is now defined in such a way that the Thing is thereby in opposition to other Things, but is supposed to preserve its independence in this opposition.

to be connected with others it is to cease to exist on its own account,

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G. W. F. Hegel

128 the object is in one and the same respect the opposite of itself: it is for itself, so far as it is for another, and it is for another, so far as it is for itself... but this 'for itself'... is posited in a unity with its opposite, with its 'being for another', and hence only as cancelled... this being-for-self is just as unessential as the only aspect that was supposed to be essential unessential

129 the object in its pure determinateness... is overcome just as surely as it was in its sensuous being. From a sensuous being it turned into a universal; but this universal, since it originates in the sensuous, is essentially conditioned by it, and hence is not truly self-identical universality at all, but one affected with an opposition... universality splits into

- (a) singular individuality
- (b) universality

pure determinatenesses is burdened with 'being-for-another'. Since both are essentially in a single unity, what we now have is unconditioned absolute universality, and consciousness here for the first time truly enters the realm of Understanding.

130 The sophistry of perception seeks to save these moments from their contradiction, and it seeks to lay hold on the truth by distinguishing between aspects, by sticking to the 'Also' and to the 'in so far', and finally, by distinguishing the 'unessential' aspect from an 'essence' which is opposed to it.

131

This 'sound common sense' which takes itself to be a solid, realistic consciousness is, in the perceptual process, only the play of these abstractions; generally, it is always at its poorest where it fancies itself to be the richest... it sets itself against the truth and holds the opinion that philosophy is concerned only with mental entities. As a matter of fact, philosophy does have to do with them too... but in doing so, recognizes them in their specific determinateness as well, and it is therefore master over them, whereas perceptual understanding [or 'sound common sense'] takes them for the truth and is led on by them from one error to another.

The Odyssey

Homer

1.1-2 the man of many turns ... had sacked
Troy's holy citadel; he saw the cities of many
men, and he knew their thought.

Cattle of Hyperion

Agamemnon was the leader of the Greeks at
Troy; killed by Clytemnestra ... Orestes killed
Clytemnestra

1.30-34 Thinking of that man, he made his
speech to the immortals: "Well now, how
indeed mortal men do blame the gods! They
say it is from us evils come, yet they
themselves by their own recklessness have
pains beyond their lot.

Phenomenology of Spirit

Hegel

132

In the dialectic of sense-certainty, Seeing and Hearing have been lost to consciousness; and, as perception, consciousness has arrived at thoughts, which it brings together for the first time in the unconditioned universal.

135 this unconditioned universal is an object for consciousness, .. on the one side, a universal medium of many subsistent 'matters', and on the other side, a One reflected into itself, in which their independence is extinguished.

136 they mutually interpenetrate, but without coming into contact with one another because, conversely, the many diverse 'matters' are equally independent. This means that they are absolutely porous, or are sublated.

Sublated -

Force

(a) the dispersal of the independent 'matters' in their [immediate] being, is the expression of Force; but Force, taken as that ^{in which} in which they have disappeared, is Force proper, Force which has been driven back into itself.

the Understanding, to which the Notion of Force belongs, is strictly speaking the Notion which sustains the different moments ^{now} qua different; for, in themselves, they are not supposed to be different. Consequently, the difference exists only in thought.

diremption -

The Odyssey


Homer

Odysseus - the man of many turns (1.1)
godlike (1.20)
godlike (1.65)

Zeus - (1.29-34) remembering excellent Aegisthus
Whom Agamemnon's son, far-famed Orestes
had slain. "Well now, how indeed mortal
men do blame the gods! They say it is from
us evils come, yet they themselves by their own
recklessness have pains beyond their lot."

Heracles - sharp-eyed (1.38)

Athene - bright-eyed goddess (1.44, 1.156)
(1.178)

(1.46-47)  "As for that man [Aegisthus], he
surely lies in a fitting death. May
anyone else also perish who would
do such deeds."

Odysseus - skillful (1.48)
hard-fated (1.49)

flood circled island (1.50)

destruction minded Atlas (1.52)

Zeus - How could I at any time
forget godlike Odysseus, who stands
out among mortals for thought, and
for the sacrifices - (1.65-66)

thoughtful

πολυεργων
many-minded Odysseus (1.83)

stout-hearted Odysseus (1.87) (1.129)

εταροεργων

long-haired Achaeans (1.90)

patient

sheep (1.92)

κοιτων

servants (1.109)

godlike Telemachos (1.113)

handmaid (1.136)

heralds (1.146)

skillful Anchioles (1.180)

Mentes - We declare we are guest friends of
one another through our fathers (1.187)

troublesome men hold him, savages, who
somehow keep him back against his will.
(1.198-99)

The Odyssey Homer

Telemachos - My mother calls me the son of that man. But I myself do not know. No one has ever been certain of his father. (1.215-216)

he [Odysseus] has been the most ill-fated of mortal men. (1.119)

Athene (Mentes) - The gods have not set it down that your race hereafter be nameless. (1.222-223)

Sound-minded Telemachos. (1.230)

πολυ-τροπος - much turned, much traveled, much-wandering

m. nom. sing. his
 m. acc. sing. me
 αὐδρα μου ΕΥΕΠΕ, ΜΟΥΣΑ ΠΟΛΥΤΡΟΠΟΝ,
 very many tell Muse
 ὅς Μαλα ΠΟΛΛΑ ΠΛΑΝΧΘΗ, ΕΠΕΙ.
 after

Τροίης ἱερὸν πολιεθρον επερσεν

Tell to me, Muse, about the well traveled man, who roamed very many things, after he sacked the divine polis of Troy

(to waste, ravage, sack, destroy act, ind. act.)

Nestor - he is very sound of mind. (3.20)

Telemachos - Modesty becomes a young man addressing an elder. (3.24)

aegis -

decorum

hospitality

reverence - prayer & libation

two handed
gold cup

gold cup of libation goes first to the elder.

Athene was pleased at the sound-minded, judicious man. (3.52) Because, he had given her first the gold cup of libation. (3.52-53)

(3.55)
- 62

The prayer of Athene to Poseidon:

- (a) you who hold up the earth
- (b) bear no grudge
- (c) bring these deeds to pass.
 - (i) grant renown to Nestor & sons.
 - (ii) and men of Pylos.
 - (iii) recompence for their sacrifice (hecatombs)
- (d) that Telemachos may return home.

Parmenides

289

Ξυνὸν δέ μοι ἔστιν
ὅπποθεν ἄρξωμαι· τόθι γὰρ
πάλιν ἕξομαι αὐθις.

It is a common point from which I start ;
for there again and again I shall return.

Fr. 5 Proclus in Parm. 1
p. 705, 16 Cousin.

291

Fr. 2 Proclus in Tim. 1, 345, 18 ;
Simplicius in Phyp. 116, 28 3-8

εἰ δ' ἄγ' ἔχων ἔρεω, κόμισαι
δὲ σύ μῦθον ἀκούσας,
αἵπτερ ὁδοῖ μοῦνα δαζησιός εἶσι
νοῦν νοήσαι· ἢ μὲν ὅπως ἔστιν
τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι,
περθεὺς ἔστι κέλευθος (Ἀληθεῖη
γὰρ ὀπηδεῖ), ἢ δ' ὡς οὐκ
ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς χρεῶν ἔστι μὴ
εἶναι, τὴν δὴ τοι φράζω παναπτεῦθεά
ἔμμεν ἀκαρπὸν· οὔτε γὰρ ἄν
γνοίης τό γε μὴ εἶόν (οὐ γὰρ
ἀνυστόν) οὔτε φράσας.

Come now, and I will tell you (and you
must carry my account away with you

when you have heard it) the only ways
of enquiry that are able to be thought of.
The one, that [it] is and that it is
impossible for [it] not to be, is the path
of Persuasion (for she attends upon Truth);
The other, that [it] is not and that it
is needful that [it] not be, that I
declare to you is an altogether indiscernible
track: for you could not know what
is not & that cannot be done - nor
indicate it.

293. What is there to be said and thought
must needs be: for it is there for
being, but nothing is not. I bid you
ponder that, for this is the first way of
enquiry from which I hold you back,
but then from that on which mortals
wander knowing nothing, two-headed;
for helplessness guides the wandering
thought in their breasts, and they are
carried along, deaf and blind at
once, dazed, indiscriminating hordes,
who believe that to be and not to be
are the same and not the same, and
the path taken by them all is
backward turning.

Fr. Co Simplicius in Phip. 86, 27-8.
117, 4-13.

χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ' εἶναι
ἔμμενας· ἔσσι γὰρ εἶναι, μηδὲν
δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· τὰ σ' ἐγὼ

φράζεσθαί, ἴνωγα, πρώτης γὰρ
σ' ἄφ' ὁδοῦ ταύτης ἴθα

δελφίος <εἶρω>, αὐτὰρ
ἔπειτ' ἀπὸ τῆς, ἣν δὴ βροτοὶ

ἐκδοῦσσι οὐδὲν πλάττονται, δέκραναι·

ἄμηχανή γὰρ ἐν αὐτῶν στήθεσιν

ἔϋθύνει πλακτὸν νόον· οἳ δὲ

φοροβνεαί κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοί τε,

τεθηπότες, ἄκρτα φύλα, οἷς τὸ

πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταῦτόν

νενόμισται κοῦ πάρα ταῦτόν,

παντῶν δὲ παλιτροπὸς ἔστι

κέλευθος·

(6.206-8) Now this man, a
wretched wanderer, has come here,
Whom we must look after, for all
strangers and beggars are in the care of
Zeus.

The Odyssey

Homer

Nestor - the Gerenian horseman. (3.68)

Now is the best time to inquire, and to ask strangers who they are, after they have enjoyed food. (3.69-70)

"For some sort of gain, or do you wander at hazard the way pirates do who wander over the sea, risking their lives, bearing evils to foreigners?" (3.72-74)

(3.82) It is a private affair, not a public one...

(3.86) all the other men who waged war on the Trojans, we have heard where each one perished by a woeful death.

(3.92-93) I now embrace your knees to ask if you are willing to tell about that man's woeful death.

ΠΕΤΤΛΕΥΜΕΝΟΝ (intricately woven)

ἀναγνῶσις (recognition)

Albert Cook.

p. 446 yet Odysseus' adequacy remains everywhere the same in all its aspects (Πολυτροπος)

447

And since everyone's experience is appropriate tasks for his character.

(3.132-33) Then Zeus plotted out in his mind a woeful return for the Argives, since they were not all prudent or just.

(3.156) Agamemnon, shepherd of the people

(3.163) devious-minded Lord Odysseus

(3.195-6) how good it is for a man to leave behind when he dies a son, since that son avenged his father's murder.

(3.200) Be brave, so that a man born in the future would praise you.

(3.227) wonder holds me

Phenomenology of Spirit

H. W. F. Hegel

139

The interplay of the two ~~forces~~ Forces thus consists in their being determined as mutually opposed.

The soliciting Force, e.g. is posited as a universal medium, and the one solicited, on the other hand, as Force driven back into itself; ~~that the~~

The external, soliciting Force appears as a universal medium, but only through its having been solicited by the other Force to do so.

141

These two Forces exist as independent essences; but their existence is a movement of each toward the other.

They do not exist as extremes which retain of themselves, something fixed and substantial... on the contrary, what they are, they are, only in this middle term and in this contact.

Force that solicits and Force that is solicited, ... each is in solely through the other, and what each thus is it immediately no longer is, since it is in the other.

143 consciousness has a mediated relation to the inner being and, as the Understanding, looks through this mediating play of Forces into the true background of ~~things~~ Things. The middle term which unites the two extremes, the Understanding and the inner world, is the developed being of Force which, for the Understanding itself, is henceforth only a vanish vanishing.

This 'being' is therefore called appearance; for we call being that is directly and in its own self a non-being a surface show. But it is not merely a surface show; it is appearance, a totality of show.

Show - Schein

appearance - Erscheinung

144 the vanishing present world there opens up a permanent beyond; an in-itself which is the first, and therefore imperfect appearance of Reason, or only the pure element in which the truth has its essence.

Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel

145

Our object is thus from now on the syllogism which has for its extremes the inner being of ~~Things~~ Things and the Understanding and for its middle term, appearance.

146

The inner world is, for consciousness, still a pure beyond, because consciousness does not as yet find itself in it.

This mode of the inner being [of Things] finds ready acceptance by those who say that the inner being of Things is unknowable ... in order, that there may yet be something in the void ... be taken as also void of all spiritual relationships and distinctions of consciousness qua consciousness — in order, then, that in this complete void, which is even called the holy of holies, there may yet be something, we must fill it up with reveries, appearances, produced by consciousness itself ... even reveries are better than its own emptiness.

147 The inner world, or supersensible ~~being~~, ~~is~~ beyond ... comes from the world of appearance which has mediated it.

The supersensible is the sensuous and the perceived posited as it is in truth; but the truth of the sensuous and the perceived is to be appearance.

148

by appearing in determinate form, it solicits the other side to express itself ...

In this way there vanishes completely all distinction of separate, mutually contrasted forces which were supposed to be present in this movement, for they rested solely on those distinctions.

149

it is the outcome of the flux itself, or the flux is its essence ... negation is an essential moment of the universal ... This difference is expressed in the law, which is the stable image of unstable appearance. Consequently, the supersensible world is an inert realm of laws.

The Odyssey Homer

(3.248) Murder of Agamemnon

(3.328) He will not speak falsely. For he is very sound of mind.

(3.329) So he said. The sun went down and darkness came on.

washing of hands before prayer (3.338)

destitute — (3.348)

As from someone wholly without raiment, or destitute.

Tritogeneia (3.379)

Nestor shepherd of the people (3.469)

(3.496-97) So the swift horses bore onward. The sun went down and all the ways were shadowed.

(4.12) From a slave girl; the gods no longer granted childbirth to Helen when

(4.23) Capable servants.

(4.55) A respected housekeeper.

(4.59) making a sign.

(4.62) The race of your parents is not lost
in you; (63) but you are of the race of
men who are scepter-bearing kings,

(4.86) The sheep give birth three times within
a complete year.

(4.115) the purple mantle

(4.121) Helen came out of the high
-roofed fragrant bedroom, she who
resembled Artemis.

(4.140) Shall I dissemble or speak the
truth?

(4.145) He did so when you Achaians,
because of my bitch-faced self, went
up under Troy intending a strenuous war.

—
Helen
TO
Menelos
—

4.157 son of the man

4.169 son of a man.

ABC of Reading

Ezra Pound

p 29

It doesn't, in our contemporary world, so much matter where you begin the examination of a subject, so long as you keep on until you get round again to your starting point. As it were, you start on a sphere, or a cube; you must keep on until you have seen it from all sides.

New Directions : New York 1939.

p 17 We live in an age of science and abundance. The care and reverence of books as such, proper to an age when no book was duplicated until someone took the pains to copy it out by hand, is obviously no longer suited to 'the needs of society', or to the conservation of learning. The weeder is supremely needed if the Garden of the Muses is to persist as a garden.

Mark 2.17 Jesus said: "Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick."

Rabbi (Mark 14.45)

(1 Corinthians 5.1) that a man has his father's wife.

(Hebrews 13.2) Do not forget to entertain strangers, for by so doing some have unwittingly entertained angels.

p 84 Real education must ultimately be limited to men who INSIST on knowing, the rest is mere sheep-herding

Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel

150

This realm of laws is indeed the truth for the Understanding, and that truth has its content in the law... with every change of circumstance the law has a different actuality... What seems to be defective in it is that while it does contain difference, the difference is universal, indeterminate... in so far as it is not law in general, but ⁱⁿ a law, it does contain difference, ~~the difference is universal, indeterminate~~ determinateness; consequently, there are indefinitely many laws. But this plurality is itself rather a defect; for it contradicts the principle of the Understanding for which... the True is the implicitly universal unity.

It must therefore let the many laws collapse into one law... what is found is, in fact, not the unity of these ~~specific~~ ^{universal} laws, but a law which leaves out their specific character.

154

This ~~is the process of~~ this process is called 'explanation'. A law is enunciated; from this its implicitly universal element or ground is distinguished as Force; but it is said

that this difference is no difference, rather the ground is constituted exactly the same as the law.

157 The immediate copy of the perceived world, is changed into its opposite. The law was, in general, like its differences, that which remains selfsame; now, however, it is posited that each of the two worlds is really the opposite of itself. The selfsame really repels itself from itself, and what is not selfsame really posits itself as selfsame.

158 According, then, to the law of this inverted world, what is like in the first world is unlike to itself, and what is unlike in the first world is equally unlike to itself, or it becomes like itself.

In another sphere, revenge on an enemy is, according to the immediate law, the Supreme Satisfaction of the injured individuality. This law, however, which bids me confront him as himself a person who does not treat me as such, and in fact bids me destroy him as an individuality - this law is turned round by the principle of the other world into its opposite: the reinstatement of myself as a person through the destruction of the alien individuality is turned into self-destruction.

Phenomenology of Spirit G.W.F. Hegel

158 The punishment which under the law of the first world disgraces and destroys a man, is transformed in its inverted world into a pardon which preserves his essential being and brings him to honour.

159 punishment is punishment only in the world of appearance; in itself, or in another world, it may be a benefit for the criminal.

171 Life consists rather in being the self-developing whole which dissolves its development and in this movement simply preserves itself.

174 self-consciousness is thus certain of itself only by superseding this other that presents itself to self-consciousness as an independent life; self-consciousness is Desire. Certain of the nothingness of this other, it explicitly affirms that this nothingness is for it the truth of the other; it destroys the independent other object and thereby gives itself the certainty of itself as a true certainty.

175 An account of the independence of the object, therefore, it can achieve satisfaction only when the object itself effects the negation within itself.

Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.

(a)

176 The notion of self-consciousness is only completed in these three moments:

(a) The pure undifferentiated 'I' is ~~the~~ its first immediate object.

(b) But this immediacy is itself an absolute mediation, it is only a suppression of the independent object, in other words, it is Desire. The satisfaction of Desire is, it is true, the reflection of self-consciousness into itself, or the certainty that has become truth.

(c) But the truth of this certainty is really a double reflection, the duplication of self-consciousness. Consciousness has for its object one which, of its own self, posits its otherness or difference as a nothingness, and in so doing is independent.

The Odyssey + Homer

4. 119 -

Then Helen, who was born of Zeus, had another thought. Right away she dropped a drug in the wine they were drinking, ~~a~~ a soothing pain-killer, that made one forget all his ills, and whoever swallowed it down when it was mixed in the bowl would not shed a tear down his cheeks ~~the~~ the whole day long, not if his mother and his father were both to die, not if right in front of him his brother or his dear son were slaughtered with a sword.

oppresses (4. 423)

Menelaos captive on the island of Pharos.

20 days saved by the Eidothée daughter of Proteus.

"old man of the sea" (4. 365)
"the immortal Egyptian"

Hera "wife and sister of Zeus" (4. 513)

"shepherd of the people" (4. 528)

Agamemnon. "He led him unaware to his destruction" ~~4. 531~~ (4. 534)

(4.563) But the immortals will send you
to the Elysian plain and the end of the
earth, where blond Rhadamanthys is
and where the easiest living exists for men.
No snow is there, not much winter, and
never rain.

(4.611) "You are of good blood ... to judge
by what you say."

(4.621) Godly king

(4.643) Were they the chosen of Ithaca
or his own slaves and hirelings.

(4.652) The young men who are best in the
district, next to us went with him.

Nedon to Penelope: "well my queen"

Odysseus - Danaan

twelfth day (4.747) also (4.588)

(4.789) proud-spirited servants.

Thyestes

Seneca

Baltimore trans. with an introduction by E.F. Watling
Penguin books: 1966

p 45

Ghost
of
Tantalus

if there can be yet more intollerable penalties
... to fill my soul with terror, find one
for me! For from my loins is sprung
a generation ~~of~~ whose iniquities,
whose crimes, of horror never known till
now, make all their predecessors sins look
small and me innocent. Does any place
in hell still lack a tenant? I can furnish
one from my posterity.

Fury

Let evil vie with evil, sword with sword;
Let anger be unchecked, repentance dumb.

let crimes be born ever anew and, in
their punishment, each single sin give birth
to more than one.

Pelops

Ovid, Met. 6.403-11

Apollodorus, Epitome 2.5-9; 5.10

Pindar, Olympian Ode 1

Sophocles, Electra 504

Oenomaus Fr. 433

Euripides, Orestes 1024-1062

Diodorus Siculus 4.73

Hyginus, Fables 84 (Oenomaus)

Pausanias, Description 5.1.3-7, 5.13.1,
6.29.9, 8.4.10-11

Philostratus, Imagines 1.30 (Pelops)

Homer, ~~Il. 5.86-71~~ 11.582-592

Pindar, Isthm. 1.7 (8), 21

Tantalus - A wealthy king of
Sipylus in Phrygia (or Lydia), son
of Zeus and Pluto, father of Pelops
and Niobe, grandfather of Atreus and
Thyestes.

Tartarus

1. Quis inferorum sede ab iniusta
2. extrahit avido fugaces ore
captantem cibos?
3. quis male deorum Tantalō invisas
4. domos ostendit iterum?


who perversely lets Tantalus
see once more the hate homes
of the gods?

to Catilineae

Thyestes

Seneca

What god bids Tantalus return again.



Which ✓ not have seen. who
evil of the gods. what

shows Tantalus
what evil of the gods returns Tantalus

M. J. ...

Cicero calls Herodotus: "father of history" (de Legibus 1.1.5)

from my loins is sprung a generation whose iniquities, whose crimes, of horror never known till now.

p 45 Does any place in hell still lack a tenant? I can furnish one from my posterity.

p 53 You cannot say you have avenged a crime unless you better it.

Minister: You do not fear your people's disapproval?

Atrius: of the advantages of monarchy, the greatest is that the subjects are compelled not only to endure but to approve their masters actions.

Atrius: Men must be made to want what they dislike.

p 56 The kindest king can put a man to death; under my rule a culprit should be made to beg for death.

Minister Is nothing sacred?

Phenomenology of Spirit

G. W. F. Hegel

177. A self-consciousness exists for a self-consciousness. A self-consciousness, in being an object, is just as much 'I' as 'object', this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousness which in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 'I'.

178 it exists only in being acknowledged.

The twofold significance of the distinct moments has in the nature of self-consciousness to be infinite, or directly the opposite of the determinateness in which it is posited.

Recognition

179

184 The middle term is self-consciousness which splits into the extremes; and each extreme is this exchanging of its own determinateness and an absolute transition into its opposite.

187 In so far as it is the action of the other, each seeks the death of the other. But in doing so, the second kind of action on its own part, is also involved; for the former involves the staking of its own life. Thus the relation of the two self-conscious individuals is such that they prove themselves and each other through a life and death struggle.

188 This trial by death, however, does away with the truth which was supposed to issue from it.

189 In this experience, self-consciousness learns that life is as essential to it as pure self-consciousness.

One is the independent consciousness whose essential nature is to be for itself, the other is the dependent consciousness whose essential nature is simply to live for another. The former is lord, the other is bondsman.

195

← fear of the lord is indeed the beginning of wisdom,

Thyestes Seneca

p57 What if the father could be made to tear his children ~~to~~ into pieces, happily, with eager appetite - eat his own flesh?

A picture of the murder, done, complete rises before my eyes ... the father's mouth devouring his lamented little ones

p59 A hardship may be easy to accept, but very irksome to endure forever.

p61 It is not worldly wealth that makes a king ... A king is he who has no ill to fear ... Looks down upon the world, faces his end with confidence, and greets death as a friend.

p62 Peace and obscurity are all I seek. Enough for me to live alone, and please myself with idleness and leisured ease.
etc.

p 64 power supreme ... As nothing,
when a man wants nothing.

p 71 Kings of the earth must bow
to a higher kingdom.

good p 72 Never was man so sure of the
god's favor that he could promise
himself a safe tomorrow. Under
God's hand, life's circle is ever
revolving, the swift wheel turning.

p 73 What country is it that can be
the scene of such unspeakable abomination?

A picture of the brutal deed still floats
before my eyes.

p 75 the gods of death

p 76 the sacrificial wine was changed
to blood.

Thyestes

Seneca

p 81

Is all the order of the universe plunged into chaos? Will there be no more East and no more West?

This is the fear, the fear that knocks at the heart, that the whole world is now to fall in the ruin which Fate foretells; that Chaos will come again to bury the world of gods and men.

p 83

And are we chosen out of all earth's children to perish in the last catastrophe of a disjointed universe? Are we to see the world's end come?

Too fond of life is he who would not die when all the world dies with him.

Varro. 5. 12

there is never time without there
being motion.

quod neque unquam tempus,
quin fuerit motus: eadem enim

un

(5.92) Opulentus ab ope, cui
eae opimae; ab eadem inops
qui eius indiget, et ab
eodem fonte Copis ac Copiosus.

Pecuniosus a pecunia
magna, pecunia a pecu.

Frank Justice Kelly 1968
sheep (P-888)

Bruni 1.2 1.6
1.4-1.7

Varro The first gods were Caelum

Terra Ops

Jerome 60.16

Alioquin ad haec merito
explicanda et Thucydides et
Sallustius multi sunt.

Varro 5.57

Principes dei Caelum et Terra. Hi
dei idem qui Aegypti Serapis et
Isis ~~et~~ etsi Harpocrates
digito significat, ut faceam. Idem
principes in Latia Saturnus
et Ops.

(883-4) ^{is} ^{adv.} ^{greedy.}
Vitae est avidus quisque
non vult mundo secum
pereunte mori. Volo

(700-1) libata in ignes vina
mutata fluunt creuenta Baccho.

(619-622) nemo tam divos
habuit faventes, / crastinum
ut posset sibi polliceri: / res
deus nostras celeri citatas /
turbine versat. /

(612) / omne sub regno graviose
regnum est. /

(533-34) liceat in media mihi
latere terba.

Thyestes Seneca

(18-21) iam nostra subit / e stirpe
turba quae suum vincat genus /
ac me innocentem faciat et inausa
dudeat. / regione quidquid impia
cessat loci / complebo;

(911-12) o me caelitem excelsissimum
regum atque regem!

TAN. Summa est potestas

Thy. Nulla, si cupias nihil

→ The height of power is

→ nothing, if you want nothing

Scelera non intrant Casas, /
tutusque mensa capitur
angusta Cibus; / Venenum
in auro bibitur.

391 -

stat quicumque volet potens /

392 aulae culmine lubrico; /

393

me dulcis saturet quies; /

394 obscuro positus loco /

395 leni perfruar otio, /

396 nullis nota Quiritibus /

397 aetas per tacitum fluat. /

sic cum ~~per~~ transierint mei /

nullo cum strepitu dies, /

400 plebeius moriar senex. /

401 illi mors gravis incubat /

402 qui, notus nimis omnibus, /

403 ignotus meritis sibi. /

De fine poenae loqueris; ego

poenam volo. / perimat tyrannus

lenis; in regno meo /

mors impetratur. /

Oedipus

Seneca

Creon Dark and uncertain is the oracle

... It is the custom of the Delphic god
to wrap his secrets up in dark enigmas.

Oedipus is the man for solving problems.

pc 221

The wine - libation turning into blood

Evil is here but deeply hidden yet

Something is here that shames the
gods.

Phenomenology of Spirit

G. W. F. Hegel

193 But just as lordship showed that its essential nature is the reverse of what it wants to be, so too servitude in its consummation will really turn into the opposite of what it immediately is; as consciousness forced back into itself, it will withdraw into itself and be transformed into a truly independent consciousness.

194 We have seen what servitude is only in relation to lordship. ~~servitude~~ Servitude has the lord for its essential reality; hence the truth for it is the independent consciousness that is for itself.

For this consciousness has been fearful, not of this or that particular thing or just at odd moments, but its whole being has been seized with dread; for it has experienced the fear of death, the absolute lord.

Through his service he rids himself of his attachment to natural existence in every single detail; and gets rid of it by working on it.

195

Through work, however, the bondsman becomes conscious of what he truly is.

Work ... is desire held in check ... it is precisely for the worker that the object has ~~independent~~ independence

In this way ... consciousness, qua worker, comes to see in the independent being [of the object] its own independence.

196 in fashioning the thing, the bondsman own negativity, his being-for-self, becomes an object for him only through his setting at naught the existing ~~in~~ shape confronting him.

he destroys this alien negative moment, posits himself as a negative in the permanent order of things, and thereby becomes for himself, someone existing on his own account.

the bondsman realizes that it is precisely in his work wherein he seemed to have only an alienated existence that he ~~had~~ acquires a mind of his own.

Phenomenology of Spirit

G. W. F. Hegel

196

Without the discipline of service and obedience, fear remains at the formal stage, and does not extend to the known real world of existence. Without the formative activity, fear remains inward and mute, and consciousness does not become explicitly for itself.

If it has not experienced absolute fear but only some lesser dread, the negative being has remained for it something external, its substance has not been infected by it through and through.

198

This freedom of self-consciousness when it appeared as a conscious manifestation in the history of Spirit has, as we know, been called Stoicism. Its principle is that consciousness is a being that thinks, and that consciousness holds something to be essentially important, or true and good only in so far as it thinks it to be such.

What alone has importance is the difference posited by thought, "Consciousness accordingly has a negative attitude towards the lord and bondsman relationship.

Whether on the throne or in chains, in utter dependence of its individual existence, its aim is to be free, and to maintain that lifeless indifference which steadfastly withdraws from the bustle of existence, alike from being active as passive, into the simple essentiality of thought.

Stoicism could only appear on the scene in a time of universal fear and bondage, but also a time of universal culture which had raised itself to the level of thought.

Freedom of thought has only pure thought as its truth, a truth lacking the fullness of life. Hence freedom in thought, too, is only the Notion of freedom, not the living reality of freedom itself.

Phenomenology of Spirit

G. W. F. Hegel

200

For the essence of that freedom is at first only thinking in general ... But since individuality in its thinking should grasp the living world a system of thought

202 just as Stoicism corresponds to the Notion of the independent consciousness which appeared as the lord and bondsman relationship, so Scepticism corresponds to its realization as a negative attitude towards otherness, to desire and work.

because it is thinking, or is in its own self infinite, and in this infinitude the independent things in their differences from one another are for it only vanishing magnitudes.

Scepticism

203

exhibits the dialectical movement which Sense - Certainty, Perception, and the Understanding each is; as also the unessential character of what, in the relationship of lord and bondsman.

That relationship at the same time embraces a specific mode in which ethical laws, too, are present as sovereign commands... holding as valid only determinate Notions, even though these are only pure abstractions.

204

What Scepticism causes to vanish is not only objective reality as such, but its own relationship to it,

Through this self-conscious negation it procures for its own self the certainty of its freedom, generates the experience of that freedom, and thereby raises it to truth

205

Consciousness itself is the absolute dialectical unrest

This consciousness is therefore the unconscious unconscious, thoughtless rambling which passes back and forth ~~far~~ from the one extreme of self-identical self-consciousness to the other extreme of contingent consciousness that is both bewildered and bewildering.

The Odyssey Homer

(6. 239) "white armed servants"

(6. 251) "But white-armed Nausicaa had another thought"

(7. 9) Eurymedousa, whom once the bobbing ships took away from Apeire, and they chose her as a prize for Alcinoos because he ruled all the Phaeacians, The people obeyed him like a god.

(7. 32) Those here do not easily endure strange men, and they do not befriend or welcome one coming from elsewhere

Oedipus

Seneca

In his worst hour a man can be most calm.

3. 523 Evil cannot be cured by ignorance

524 The right of silence often holds more dangers to king and kingdom than the right of speech.

He that is silent when required to speak shakes the stability of government.

Phenomenology of Spirit

G. W. F. Hegel

205

At one time it recognizes that its freedom lies in rising above all the confusion and contingency of existence, and at another time equally admits to a relapse into occupying itself with what is unessential

It affirms the nullity of seeing, hearing, etc., yet it is itself ~~hearing~~ seeing, hearing, etc., It affirms the nullity of ethical principles, and lets its conduct be governed by these very principles

Point out likeness or identity to it, and it will point out unlikeness or non-identity

206

From this experience emerges a ^{new form} of consciousness which brings together the two thoughts which Scepticism holds apart.

In Stoicism, self-consciousness is the simple freedom of itself. In Scepticism, this freedom becomes reality, negates the other side of determinate ~~character~~ existence, but really duplicates itself, and knows itself to be a duality.

Consequently, the duplication which formerly was divided between two individuals, the lord and the bondsman, is now lodged in one.

The Unhappy Consciousness is the Consciousness of self as a dual-natured, merely contradictory being.

211

① the Unchangeable is opposed to individuality in general; ② then, being itself an individual, it is opposed to another individual; ③ and finally, it is one with it.

214 The movement in which the unessential consciousness strives to attain this oneness is itself threefold in accordance

- ① pure consciousness
- ② a particular individual who approaches the actual world in the forms of desire and work.
- ③ a consciousness that is aware of its own being-for-self.

The Annals

Tacitus 1.1

1.1 The arms of Lepidus and Antonius before Augustus... The histories of Tiberius, Caius, Claudius, and Nero, while they were in power, were falsified through terror, and after their death were written under the irritation of a recent hatred.

Augustus won over the soldiers with gifts, the populace with cheap corn. He was wholly unopposed, for the boldest spirits had fallen in battle, or in the proscription, while the remaining, the leaders they were to be slaves, were raised the higher by wealth and promotion, so that, aggrandised by revolution, they preferred the safety of the present to the dangerous.

1.4 Thus the state had been revolutionized, and there was not a vestige left of the old sound ~~mind~~ morality. Stript of equality, all looked up to the commands of a sovereign without the least apprehension for the present... a few spoke in vain of the blessings of freedom, but most people dreaded and some longed for war.

1.6

The first crime of the new reign was the murder of Postumus Agrippa.

Tiberius gave no explanation of the matter to the Senate; he pretended that there were directions from his father ordering the tribune in charge of the prisoners not to delay the slaughter of Agrippa, whenever he should himself have breathed his last.

1.7

Meanwhile at Rome people plunged into slavery — Consuls, senators, knights. The higher a man's rank the more eager his hypocrisy, and his looks the more carefully studied, so as neither to betray joy at the ~~the~~ decrease of one emperor nor sorrow at the rise of another.

1.8 provided his heirs with abundant means to coerce the State, requires forsooth the defence of soldiers that his burial may be undisturbed.

1.9 the only remedy for his distracted country was the rule of a single man. Yet the State had been organized under the name neither of a kingdom nor a dictatorship, but under that of a prince.

The Annals Tacitus

1.10

filial duty and State necessity were merely assumed as a mask. It was really from a lust of sovereignty that he had excited the veterans by bribery.

No honour was left for the gods, when Augustus chose to be himself worshiped with temples and statues, like those of the deities, and with flamens and priests.

1.12 Tiberius happened to say that although he was not equal to the whole burden of the State, yet he would undertake the charge of whatever part of it might be intrusted to him.

1.42 The Divine Julius once quelled an army's mutiny with a single word by calling those who were renouncing their military obedience 'Citizens.'

1.43 Germanicus: "Why, on the first day of our meeting, why did you, my friends, wrest from me, in your blindness, the steel which I was preparing to plunge into my breast? Better and more loving was the act of the man who offered me the sword."

... I should have perished before I was as yet conscious of all the disgrace of my army.

1.70 equinoctial -

There was nothing to distinguish the brave from the coward, the prudent from the careless, forethought from chance; the same strong power swept everything before it.

They passed the night, without necessary food, without fire, many of them with bare or bruised limbs, in a plight as pitiable as that of men besieged by an enemy. For such, at least, have the opportunity of a glorious death, while here was destruction without honor.

1.72

Tiberius refused, nor would he allow obedience to be sworn to his enactments, though the Senate voted it, for he said repeatedly that all human things were uncertain, and that the more he had obtained, the more precarious was his position. But he did not thereby create a belief in his patriotism, for he had revived the law of treason... such as betrayal of the army, or seditious stirring up of the people... Deed only were liable... words went unpunished.

Phenomenology of Spirit A.W.F. Hegel

216 The Unhappy Consciousness is this contact; it is the unity of pure ^{my} thinking and individuality; also it knows itself to be this thinking individuality or pure thinking, and knows the Unchangeable itself essentially as an individuality. But what it does ^{not} know is that this its object, the Unchangeable, which it knows essentially in the form of individuality, is its own self, is itself the individuality of consciousness.

217 it does not relate itself as a thinking Consciousness to its object... it is only a movement towards ^{thinking} ~~consciousness~~ ^{to its object} and so is devotion. Its thinking as such is no more than chaotic jingling of bells, or a mist of warm incense, a musical thinking that does not get as far as the Notion.

222 The fact that the unchangeable consciousness renounces and surrenders its embodied form, while, on the other hand, the particular individual consciousness gives thanks [for the gift], i.e. denies itself the satisfaction of being conscious of its independence, and assigns the essence of its action not to itself but to the beyond.

231 The middle term which proclaims to the unchangeable consciousness that the single individual has renounced itself, and, to the individual, that the Unchangeable is for it no longer an extreme, but is reconciled with it.

232 Now that self-consciousness is Reason, its hitherto negative relation to Otherness turns around into a positive relation. Up till now it has been concerned only with its independence and freedom, concerned to save and maintain itself for itself at the expense of the world.

233 Reason is the certainty of consciousness that it is all reality; thus does idealism express its Notion.

The consciousness which is this truth has this path behind it and has forgotten it, and comes on the scene immediately as Reason; in other words, this Reason which comes immediately on the scene appears only as the certainty of that truth. Thus it merely asserts that it is the truth all reality, but does not itself comprehend this, &c. And equally, anyone who has not trodden this path finds this assertion incomprehensible when he hears it in its pure form.

Troades

Seneca

Act I

Anyone who trusts in royal power, anyone who rules supreme in a great place without fear of the fickle gods, anyone who surrenders his trusting heart to happiness, should look upon me, and upon you, Troy. Never did Fortune give greater proofs of how unstable the place is where the proud stand. Overthrown and fallen is the pillar of mighty Asia.

54-55

ille tot regum parens caret sepulchro

Priamus et flamma indiget ardente Troia

||| ~~totos~~ reddat Troiae gemitus
audiat omnis pontus et aether.

But give back fully Troy's groans of pain:
let sea and sky hear them all.

298-99 quis iste mos est?
quando in inferias homo
est / impensus hominis?

What kind of custom is that? When
was human life expended on tomb
offerings for a human?

Pyrrus

233 reason is the certainty of cause
Heterotopia is the reality of things that
express the notion
that strabon legitime somnol to somnol
the consciousness which in this truth has
his path behind it and has forgotten it
and continues about the things that
reason is the reality within Pyrrus which
comes immediately on the scene appears
in the form of a reality that is not
it is not a reality that has been
reality, but does not itself comprehend
i.e. And equally, anyone who has
traced this path finds this arrangement
incomprehensible when he has
sure form

The Annals

Tacitus

1.72

It was Augustus who first, under color of ~~this~~ ~~law~~ this law, applied legal inquiry to libellous writings.

1.73

It will not be uninteresting if I relate in the cases of Falanius and Rubrius . . . in order to explain the origin of ~~the~~ a most terrible scourge, how by Tiberius' cunning it crept in among us, how subsequently it was checked, finally, how it burst into flame and consumed everything.

1.81

the greater the disguise of freedom which marked it, the more cruel the enslavement into which it was soon to plunge us.

2.12 Tribunes and centurions, he knew, often reported what was welcome than what was true; freedmen had slavish spirits, friends a love of flattery. If an assembly were called, there too the lead of a few was followed by the shout of the many.

2.15 Remember only their greed, their
cruelty, their pride. Is anything left
for us but to retain our freedom or
to die before we are enslaved.

The Politics

Aristotle

1254a 'anybody who by his nature is not his own man, but another's, is by his nature a slave'

Ruling and being ruled [which is the relation of master to slave] not only belongs to the category of things necessary, but also to the things expedient... immediately at birth, between those of its members who are intended for being ruled and those who are intended to rule.

1254b The soul rules the body with the sort of authority of a master: mind rules the appetite with the sort of authority of a statesman or a monarch.

What holds good in a man's inner life also holds good outside it.

men differ from others as much as the body differs from the soul, or an animal from a man.

1255a 'Slavery' and 'slave' are terms which are used in two different senses... That slavery can be justified by such a convention is a principle against which a number of jurists bring what may be called an 'indictment of illegality'

"power goes with goodness"

one side holds that justice is a relation of mutual good... the other side holds that the rule of the superior is in itself, and by itself, justice

the superior in goodness ought to rule over, and be the master of, his inferiors.

no one would ~~may~~ ever say that a person who does not deserve to be in a condition of slavery is really a slave

1258b

The trade of the petty usurer [the extreme example of that form of art of acquisition which is connected with retail trade] is hated most, and with most reason: it makes a profit from currency itself... Currency came into existence merely as a means of exchange; usury tries to make it increase [as though it were an end in itself]. This is the reason why usury is called by the word we commonly use [the word *tokos*, which in Greek also means 'breed' or 'offspring

Phenomenology of Spirit

G. W. F. Hegel

234 The idealism that does not demonstrate the path but starts off with this assertion is therefore, too, a pure assertion which does not comprehend its own self, nor can it make itself comprehensible to others.

235 Reason is the certainty of being all reality.

idealism proclaims the simple unity of self-consciousness to be all reality, and immediately makes it the essence.

237 Consciousness finds itself moving about searching here and there, its object being the pure in-itself and essence; on the other hand, it knows itself to be the simple category ... Consciousness, however, as essence is the whole process itself; of passing out of itself as a simple category into a singular individual, into the object, and of contemplating this process in the object, nullify the object as distinct [from it], appropriating it as its own, and proclaiming itself as this certainty of being all reality, of being both itself and its object.

241 But even if Reason digs into the very entrails of things and opens every vein in them so that it may gush forth to meet itself, it will not attain this joy; it must have completed itself inwardly before.

it can experience the consummation of itself

242 The consciousness that observes in this way means, and indeed says, that it wants to learn, not about itself but, on the contrary, about the essence of things *qua* things... Reason as such is not as yet object for this consciousness.

244

When the unthinking consciousness declares observation and experience to be the source of truth, what it says may well sound as if only tasting, ~~and~~ smelling, feeling, hearing, and seeing were involved.

245 describing things

this activity of describing things, is not as yet a moment in the object itself; the movement is really only in the describing of the object. The object, as described, has lost its interest; when one has been described, then another must be started on, and continually looked for, in order that the activity of describing shall not come to an end.

Phenomenology of Spirit G. W. F. Hegel

242 it maintains, in fact, that it is only as Notions that things have truth. Consciousness in this observational activity, comes to know what things are; but we come to know what Consciousness itself is. The outcome of its movement will be that what consciousness is in itself will become explicit for it.

246

it is not the unessential aspect of things that has to be known.

Being that is at rest, and being that is in a relation, come into conflict with each other; a Thing in the latter case is something different from what it is in the former state, whereas the single individual maintains itself in relation to something else.

247 the differentia, the general characteristic is the unity of opposites, of what is determinate and what is universal; it must therefore split up into this antithesis.

what are the differential of an animal or a plant - by instances which rob it of every determination, invalidate the Universality to which it has risen, and reduce it to an observation and description which is devoid of thought.

248 what is determinate must, through its own nature, lose itself in this opposite.

249 To the observing consciousness, the truth of the law is found in experience.

Notion displays itself in the form of thinghood and sensuous being; but it does not on that account lose its nature ... what ought to be, in fact also is, and what only ought to be without [actually] being, has no truth.

250 we can then by analogy draw an inference about the rest with the greatest probability or with perfect right. But analogy not only does not give a perfect right, but on account of its nature contradicts itself so often that the inference to be drawn from analogy itself is rather that analogy does not permit inference to be made.

R. D. Hicks, Trans. 2004

1/2
428
40
388

Plato

Diogenes Laertius

(Plato 428

(3. 18-20)

He made three voyages to Sicily, the first time to see the island and the craters of Etna: on this occasion Dionysius, the son of Hermocrates, being on the throne, forced him to become intimate with him. But when Plato held forth on tyranny and maintained that the interest of the ruler alone was not the best end, unless he were also pre-eminent in virtue, he offended Dionysius, who in his anger exclaimed "You talk like an old dotard." "And you like a tyrant," rejoined Plato. At this the tyrant grew furious and at first was bent on putting him to death; then, when he had been dissuaded from this by Dion and Aristomenes, he did not indeed go so far but handed him over to Pollis the Lacedaemonian, who had just then arrived on an embassy, with orders to sell him into slavery. And Pollis took him to Aegina and there offered him for sale. ⁽²⁰⁾ Anniceris the Cyrenaeic happened to be present and ransomed him for twenty minae - according to others the sum was thirty minae - and dispatched him to Athens to his friends, who immediately remitted the money.

(3.18) when and

<18> "οτε και ~~η~~ Διονυσος

ο Ερμοκρατους τυραννος

then therefore

ων ηναγκασεν ωστε συμμιξαι

αυτω

caus. ind. act. con

caus. inf. act.

<18-19> "οι λογοι σου," φησι, "χερον-
τιωσι," και ος "σου δε χε-
τυραννιωσι."

συμμιξις

to have intercourse.

αναγκασω

to compel

Parmenides of Elea, Fragments, A text and translation w/ introduction by David Gallop. Toronto: University of Toronto. 1984

Parmenides B235.P22 E6

Fr. 2

2.4 Πειθοῦς ἔστι κελευθός (ἀληθείης γὰρ ὅπη δεῖ),

2.5 ἢ δ' ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς χρεῶν ἔστι μὴ εἶναι

2.6 τὴν δὲ τοι φρῆσω παναπενθέα ἔμμεν ἄταρπόν·

2.7 οὔτε γὰρ ἔν χυσιόης τό γε μὴ εἶναι (οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστόν)

2.8 οὔτε φράσας.

2.1 εἰ δ' ἄγ' ἔχων ἑρέω,

κόμισαι δὲ σὺ μῦθον ἀκούσας,

2.2 ἄπειρ' ὁδοὶ μόναι διζήσιός

εἰς νοῆσαι.

2.3 ἢ μὲν ὅπως ἔστιν τε καὶ

ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι,

Come, I shall tell you, and do you
listen and convey the story, / What
routes of inquiry alone there are for
thinking: / The one - that [it] is, and
that [it] cannot not be, / Is the path
of Persuasion (for ~~it~~ it attends upon
truth); / The other - that [it] is not and
that [it] needs must not be, / That
I point out to you to be a path
wholly unlearnable, / For you could not

English trans by Michael J. B. Allen & John
Widder. Latin text edited by James Heilbrunn
& William Bowen. Cambridge Mass. Harvard 2001

Parmenides (515 B.C.)

know what-is-not (for that is not feasible),
Nor could you point it out.

9.1 αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ πάντα φάος
καὶ νύξονομαστάς

But since all things have been named
light and night.

Noble-souled Lorenzo! Plato, the father
of the 'philosophers', realizing that our
senses bear the same relationship to
that as our sight to the light of the
sun, and that therefore they can never
understand anything without the light of
the considered, it just and since the
human mind behaves only the
same that, so it should desire only
that that

English trans by Michael G.B. Allen w John Warden, Latin text edited by James Harkins w/ William Bowen. Cambridge Mass. Harvard 2001

Platonic Theology Marsilio Ficino

Proem

13 (1)
Plato, philosophorum pater, magnanime Laurenti, cum intellegeret que modum se habet visus ad solis lumen, ita se habere mentes omnes ad deum, ideoque eas ~~ut~~ nihil unquam sine dei lumine posse cognoscere, merito iustum ~~per~~ pi^umq^e censuit, ut mens humana sicut a deo habet omnia, sic ad deum omnia referat.

Noble-souled Lorenzo! Plato, the father of the philosophers, realizing that our minds bear the same relationship to God as our sight to the light of the sun, and that therefore they can never understand anything without the light of God, considered it just and pious that, as the human mind receives everything from God, so it should restore everything ~~to~~ God.

¶¶

(2)

Quo factum est ut et ipse sine
 controversia divinus et doctrina
 eius apud omnes gentes theologia
 nuncuparetur, cum nihil
 usquam sive morale sive dialecticum
 aut mathematicum aut physicum
 tractet, quin mox ad contemplationem
 cultumque dei summa cum pietate
 reducat.

And that is why he has been ^{considered} called
 indisputably divine and his teaching
 called "theology" among all peoples. For
 whatever subject he deals with, be it
 ethics, dialectic, mathematics or physics,
 he quickly brings it round, as in a
 spirit of utmost piety, to the contemplation
 and worship of God.

Proem of Ficino

adv.
how, in what way

(3) In quo quidem componendo id ^{f. abl.} self
praecipue consilium fuit, ut in ipsa
creatae ^{f. gen. 4r.} mentis divinitate, cum speculo
rerum omnium medio ^{f. abl. sing.} ^{next. nom/pl.}

My main intention in writing it has been
this: that in the divinity of the Created
mind, as in a mirror at the center of
things

1.1 Si animus non esset immortalis,
nullum /
animal esset infelicius homine. /

Phenomenology of Spirit GWF Hegel

352 In a free nation, therefore, Reason is in truth realized...

▷ 354 The life of a free people is only in principle or immediately the reality of an ethical order.

The wisest men of antiquity have therefore declared that wisdom and virtue consist in living in accordance with the customs of one's nation.

367

It knows that it has the universal of law immediately within itself, and because the law is immediately present in the being-for-self of consciousness.

368 The law, therefore, which is immediately self-consciousness's own law, or a heart which, however, has within it a law, is the End which self-consciousness proceeds to realize.

369 This heart is confronted by a real world; for in the heart the law is, in the first place, only for itself, it is not yet realized, and is therefore at the same time something other than what the Notion is. This other is thereby characterized as a reality which is the opposite of what is to be realized, and consequently is the contradiction of the law and the individuality. This reality is, therefore, on the one hand a law by which the particular individuality is oppressed, a violent ordering of the world contradicts the law of the heart, and, on the other hand a humanity suffering under that ordering, a

808 But the other side of it Becoming, History, is a Conscious, self-mediating process. — Spirit emptied out into time

praestare pres. inf. act.

ope aid, help, support
f. abl. sing.
m.

Nitor

Nitor
brightness, splendor,
lustre, sheen.

niti - pres. inf. passive, / to bear upon, press upon,
lean, support oneself.

deceat pres. ind. act. 3rd sing.

f. fitting, suitable, proper.

fax finxit perf. ind. act. 3rd sing.

has

made.

to touch, handle, shape, fashion
frame, make.

to form by instruction, to teach, train

(βασιλικός) βασιλικῆν - f. acc. sing.

Royal, kingly

ἔσται ἔσται

pres. ind. act

3rd sing. pres. act. ind.

δεσποτικῆν - fem. acc. sing.

of or for a master.

(ἀρχω) ἀρχεῖ pres. ind. act 3rd sing.

to be first.

νοοσ (νοῦς) - masc. acc. pl.

masc. nom. sing.

ορεξίς desire appetite

ορεξεως - fem. gen. sing.

πρωτον εν ζωιω θεωρησα

m. acc. sing.

before

in front.

Patnam (c B.C. 69) N. H. Watts
1931

Pro Fonteius Cicero

31 Finally, can anything appear holy or sacrosanct to men who, if ever they are so worked upon by some fear as to deem it necessary to placate the gods, defile the altars and temples of those gods with human victims, so that they cannot even practice religion without first violating that very religion with a crime?

Postremo his quicquam sanctum ac religiosum videri potest, qui etiamsi quando aliquo metu adducti deos placandos esse arbitrantur, humanis hostiis eorum aras ac templa funestant, ut ne religionem quidem colere possint, nisi eam ipsam prius scelere violarint?

Forum (C.B.C.) W.H. Wertz
1891

For who does not know that to this very day they retain the monstrous and barbarous custom of sacrificing men?

Quis enim ignorat eos usque ad hanc diem retinere illam immanem ac barbaram consuetudinem hominum immolandum?

Remains of Old Latin I

E. H. Warmington Harvard. 1956

Ennius

Quintus Ennius (239 B.C. at Rudiae - 169 B.C.)

P xvii

It was probably because this Italian district had been deeply influenced by Greek culture that Ennius was in later ages called 'Greek' or 'Half-Greek.' (cf. Suetonius de grammaticis.)

(p xviii) [he] used to say that he had three 'brains' because he could speak Greek, Oscan, and Latin. (cf. Gellius XVII, 17, 1.)

taught Cato Major the Greek letters

he took to writing original poetry

introduced ^{into} Latin the Greek hexameter

(cf. Cicero de Oratore II 68, 276)

" de Senect. 5, 14 |

his Annals was an epic poem written over a long period of time (p. xxv) ended writing 172

From the Sack of Troy to the Death of Romulus

Telephus.

Regnum reliqui saeptus mendici stola.

(Tragedies 341)

from Euripides Τηλέφος 698

Sallustius VII 17, 10

But it behoves a man to live a life
Inspired with virtue true, to stand steadfast
With guiltless bravery in the face of foes.
/The man who bears himself both ~~pure~~ pure
and staunch — /

That is true liberty. All conduct else
Lies lurking in dim darkness, fraught with guilt.

Sed virum vera virtute vivere animatum addeceat
fortiterque innoxium stare adversum adversarios.
/ea libertas est qui pectus purem et firmum
gestitat /
aliae res obnoxiosae nocte in obscura latent.

with Erko
+ notes
trans. Susan H. Braund
Oxford University Press

Oxford: 1999

Civil War

Lucan

7.62

The utterances of all were conveyed by the
great master / ^{<63>} of Roman eloquence,
Tullius — under his civilian authority /
^{<64>} fierce Catiline had trembled at the
peace making Axes. ^{<65>} He was enraged at
warefare, because he longed for Rostrum /
^{<66>} and for Forum, after enduring silence
so long a soldier.

fascis.

De Bello Civili sive
Pharsalia

7.62 Cunctorum voces Romani maximus auctor
Tullius eloqui, cuius sub iure togae
pacificas saevos tremuit Catilina securus,
pertulit iratus bellis, cum rostra forungue
7.66 Optaret passus tam longa silentia miles.

Phenomenology of Spirit G.W.F. Hegel

252 Matter on the contrary, is not an existent thing, but is being in the form of universal, or in the form of a Notion... when it interprets the moments of the law as 'matters', their essential nature has become for Reason a universal.

253 We find as the truth of this experimenting consciousness, pure law, which is freed from sensuous being... it presents itself to consciousness as a particular kind of object.

255 The aspects of law which the instinct of Reason here proceeds to observe are, as follows from the above characterization, in the first instance, organic Nature and inorganic Nature in their relation to one another.

Air, water, earth, zones, and climate are universal elements of this sort, which constitute the indeterminate simple essence of [natural] individualities... Neither the individuality, nor the universal element, is absolutely in and for itself; on the contrary, though they appear to observation as free and independent, they behave at the same time as essentially connected.

In the Notion of acid lies the Notion of
base, just as the Notion of ^{min} positive
electricity implies that of negative; but
the Notion of nath does not imply the Notion
of a thick, hairy pett.

256 It is true, for the observing
consciousness, this Notion is not the organism's
own ^{min} essence, but something falling outside it
of it, and is then only the above mentioned
external teleological relation

257 We must examine more closely this
determination of End, both as it is ^{inst}
itself, and as it is for the instinct of
Reason, in order to see how the latter finds
itself therein, but does not recognize itself
in what it finds.

it demonstrates itself to be something that
has its own self for its End, and thus,
as a ^{min} prius, has already returned to itself
or is ^{min} in and for itself.

ΚΟΙΝΟΝ m. acc. sing. (ΧΥΝΟΣ)
/ neut. n/voc./acc. sg.

public, general, concerning, belonging to all in common.

ὅτι ποθεν

ἀρχῶμαι - began.

τοῦθι ^{for} γὰρ πάλιν ἰξομεν αὐθις.
| there | | once again

Spirit knows itself as spontaneously active in the face of things and struggles out from them something for itself, it follows its own inclinations and desires, making the object conform to it.

(1) Consciousness behaves towards itself as an individual.

Phenomenology of Spirit

G.W.F. Hegel

285 This Notion, or pure freedom, is one and the same life, no matter how many and varied its shapes or its being-for-other.

In the next place, the being-for-other, or the determinateness of the actual structured shape, is taken up into this simple universality which is its essence.

this determinateness is the middle term of the shape which links indeterminate life with the actual life, simple like the former and determinate like the latter.

302 A new field thus opens up for observation in the behavior of consciousness in its actual actuality

Spirit knows itself as spontaneously active in the face of them, and singling out from them something for itself, it follows its own inclinations and desires, making the object conform to it.

① Consciousness behaves negatively towards itself as an individuality

(2) consciousness behaves negatively towards itself as a universal being

1st independence gives to what is already there merely the form of self-conscious individuality

2nd it gives the actuality at least a peculiar modification, an opposition which becomes wrongdoing or crime when it sets aside that actuality in a merely individual manner, or when it does this in a general way and thus for all, putting another world, another right, law, and customs in place of those already existing.

306 We should have a double gallery of pictures, one of which would be the reflection of the other: the one gallery of external circumstances which completely determine and circumscribe the individual, the other, the same gallery translated into the form in which those circumstances are present in the consciousness individual.

(1) the spherical surface.

(2) the latter the center which represents that surface within it.

"Human Sacrifices at Rome and Other Notes on Roman Religion," J. S. Reid The Journal of Roman Studies Vol. II. 1912 London.
The Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies.

p. 35 Pliny clearly implies that neither at Rome nor outside after 97 B.C. was the ritual of human sacrifice tolerated by the Roman government.

cf. Plutarch's Marcellus. c. 3

Bernadotte Perrin New York Putnam's Sons. 19

Marcellus ^(1.1) Marcus Claudius, who was five times consul of the Romans. Means Martial

(2.3) During his aedileship, he was compelled to bring a disagreeable impeachment into the senate. He had a son, named Marcus, like himself, who was in the flower of his boyish beauty, and not less admired by his countrymen for his modesty and good training. To this boy Capitolinus, the colleague of Marcellus, a bold and licentious man, made overtures of love. The boy first repelled the attempt by himself, but when it was made again, told his father

(3.3) For though they have no barbarous or unnatural practices...

226 B.C. (3.4) at the time when this war burst ~~was then~~ upon them they were constrained to obey certain oracular commands from the Sibylline books, and to bury alive two Greeks a man and a woman, and likewise two Gauls, in the place called the "forum boarium," or cattle-market; and in memory of these victims, they still to this day in the month of November, perform mysterious and secret ceremonies.

(3.3) βαρβαρικὸν μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν
οὐδ' ἔκφυλον ἐπιτηδευόντες ...
τότε τοῦ πολέμου συμπεσόντος
ἤναγκάσθησαν εἴξασθαι λοχίους
τίσιν ἐκ τῶν Σιβυλλείων,
καὶ δύο μὲν Ἕλληνας, ἄνδρα
καὶ γυναῖκα, δύο δὲ Γαλάτας
ὁμοίως ἐν τῇ καλουμένῃ
βοῶν ἀγορᾷ κατορύξασθαι ζῶντας,
οἷς ἐτι καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ
Νοεμβρίῳ μηνὶ δρῶσιν Ἕλληνας
καὶ Γαλάτας ἀπορρήτους
καὶ ἀθέατους ἐφρουρούσας.

J. A. Reid

Blethonasioi -

The Odyssey 4.140

γεύσομαι ἢ ἔσθμιον ἔρω; κέλεται
δέ με θυμός.

Orosius Livy's 63rd book

In the life of Pelopidas

p 37 Plutarch tells how a supposed divine injunction to sacrifice a maiden was satisfied by the substitution of an animal, after a debate about the attitude of the gods towards human sacrifice

Pelopidas

(20.3) Pelopidas had a dream which greatly disturbed him. Now, in the plain of Leuctra are the tombs of the daughters of Scedaeus, who are called from the place Leuctridae, for they had been buried there, after having been ravished by Spartan strangers. At the commission of such a

killed themselves
out of shame

grievous and lawless act, their father, since he could get no justice at Sparta, heaped curses upon the Spartans, and then slew himself upon the tombs of the maidens; and ever after, prophecies and oracles kept warning the Spartans to be on watchful guard against the Lacedaemonian wrath. Most

XXIII (21.1) After Pelopidas had lain down to sleep in the camp, he thought he saw these maidens weeping at their tombs, as they invoked curses upon the Spartans, and Seeladasus bidding him sacrifice to his daughter a virgin with auburn hair, if he wished to win victory over his enemies. The injunction seemed a lawless and dreadful one to him, but he rose up and made it known to the seers and the commanders. Some of these would not bear of the injunction being neglected or disobeyed, adducing as examples of such sacrifice among the ancients, Menoecus, son of Creon, Macaria, daughter of Heracles; and in latter times, Pherecydes the wise man, who was put to death by the Lacedaemonians, and whose skin was preserved by their kings, in accordance with some oracle; and Leonidas, who, in obedience to the oracle, sacrificed himself (Cf. Herod. 7.220),

(2)

Plutarch

Pelopidas

(21.3) as it were, to save Greece; and still further, the youths who were sacrificed by Themistocles to Dionysus Carnivorous before the battle of Salamis (cf. Themistocles 13.29); for the successes which followed these sacrifices proved them acceptable to the gods. Moreover, when Agesilaus, who was setting out on an expedition from the same place as Agamemnon did, and against the same enemies, was asked by the goddess for his daughter in sacrifice, and had this vision as he lay asleep at Aulis, he was too tender hearted to give her, and ~~that~~ thereby brought his expedition to an unsuccessful and inglorious ending. Others, on the contrary, argued against it, declaring that such a lawless and barbarous sacrifice was not acceptable to any one of the superior beings above us, for it was not the fabled typhons and giants who governed the world, but the father of all gods and men; even to believe in the existence of divine beings who take delight in the slaughter and blood of men was perhaps a folly, but if such beings existed, they must be disregarded, as having no power; for only weakness and depravity of soul could produce

(4)

or harbor such unnatural and cruel
desires.

(22.1) while they were debating a filly broke
away from the herd of horses

(22.2) Theocritus the seer, after taking
thought, cried out to Pelopidas: "Thy
sacrificial victim is come, good man;
so let us not wait for any other
virgin, but do thou accept and use the one
which Heaven offers thee."

Pelopidas from Thebes

Vision came before a battle against the
Lacedaemonians at Leuctra.

Phenomenology of Spirit S. W. F. Hegel

309 Individuality has now become the object for observation, or the object to which observation now turns.

310 But since the individual is at the same time only what he has done, his body is also the expression of himself which he has himself produced; it is at the same time a sign, which has not remained an immediate fact, but something through which the individual only makes known what he really is, when he sets his original nature to work.

312 This outer, in the first place, acts only as an organ in making the inner visible or, in general, a being-for-another.

Speech ... lets the inner get completely outside of him, leaving it to the mercy of something other than himself. For that reason we can say with equal truth that these expressions express the inner too much ... too much, because the inner self breaks out in them and there remains no antithesis between them and it; they give not merely an expression of the inner, but directly the inner itself.

thus putting itself at the mercy of the element of change, which twists the spoken word and the accomplished act into meaning something else than they are in and for themselves.

their relationship to the inner which they contain, they behave as a separated, indifferent externality, they can *qua* inner, through the individual himself, be something other than they appear to be: either the individual intentionally makes them appear to be other than they are in truth.

326 Plato even assigns the liver something still higher, something which is even regarded by some as the highest function of all, viz. prophesying, or the gift of speaking of holy and eternal things in a non-rational manner.

(Cf. Timaeus 71, 72)

347 Self-consciousness found the Thing to be like itself, and itself to be like a Thing; i.e. it is aware that it is in itself the objectively real world.

Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle

2.5 This is the reason why it is ~~said~~ usually said of successful works that it is impossible to take anything from them or add anything to them

The Politics Aristotle

(1260 b 27) §1 Our purpose is to consider what form of political association is the ideal for those who can count upon the material conditions of their life being, as nearly as possible, just what they would themselves wish.

- §2
- (a) All citizens must have all things in common.
 - (b) or they must have some things in common, and others not.
 - (c) they should have nothing in common (impossible).

(1.) a common place of residence.

(1261a) To be fellow-citizens is to share in one state, and to have one state is also to have one place of residence.

Is it

It is better that a state which is to be well conducted should share in all the things in which it is possible to share?

Plato's Republic (Πολιτεία ἢ Περὶ Δικαιοσύνης)
← Polity, or concerning righteousness

(a) share children (b) wives (c) property

The object for which Socrates states that is ought to be instituted is evidently not established by the arguments which he uses.

∴ The object which Socrates assumes as his premiss is contained in the principle that 'the greatest possible unity of the whole polis is the supreme good.' Yet it is obvious that a polis which goes on and on, and becomes more and more of a unit, will eventually cease to be a polis at all. A polis by its nature is some sort of aggregation

∴ Not only is the polis composed of a number of men: it is also composed of different kinds of men, for similars cannot bring it into existence

~~Ver~~
N. 102

nisi - if not unless

is: he, she, it
ea
f. nom sing - f. abl. sing
neut. nom. pl.
" acc. pl.

iis - masc. dat. pl.
f. dat. pl.
neut. dat. pl.

privo - to bereave, deprive, rob, strip
or private

privatis - masc. abl. pl.
" dat. pl.

memorem - pres. sub. act. 1st sing

videre - pres. inf. act. to see, discern, perceive

(credibilis) credibilia - neut. nom. pl.
neut. acc. pl.
to be believed

nemo - no man, no one, nobody

nemine - masc. dat. sg.
f. dat. sing

350. Reason is present here as the first
essential substance, an unchangeable simple
thing that yet bursts asunder into
many completely independent beings, just
as light bursts asunder into stars
countless self-luminous points, which
in their absolute being - for self are
disolved - not merely implicitly, but

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348 Just as Reason, in the role of observer, repeated, in the element of the category, the movement of Consciousness, viz. sense-certainty, perception, and the Understanding, so will Reason again run through the ~~the~~ double movement of self-consciousness, and pass over from independence into its freedom.

349 if we look on this still inner Spirit as Substance that has already advanced to the stage of having an outer existence, then in this Notion there is disclosed the realm of ethical life.

The single individual consciousness, conversely, is only this existent unit in so far as it is aware of the universal consciousness in its individuality as its own being, since what it does and is, is the universal ~~ethic~~ custom.

350 Reason is present here as the fluid universal Substance, as unchangeable simple thinghood, which yet bursts asunder into many completely independent beings, just as light bursts asunder into stars as countless self-luminous points, which in their absolute being-for-self are dissolved, not merely implicitly in the unity.

Simple substances independent substance, but explicitly for themselves. They are conscious of being these separate independent beings through the sacrifice of their particularity, and by having this universal substance as their soul and essence.

351 The purely particular activity and occupation of the individual refers to the ... needs is due to the universal sustaining medium, to the might of the entire nation

The labour of the individual for his own needs is just as much a satisfaction of the needs of others as of his own, and the satisfaction of his own needs he obtains only through the labour of others. ... The individual in his individual work ... unconsciously performs a universal work, so again he also performs the universal work as his conscious object; the whole becomes, as a whole, his own work, for which he sacrifices himself and precisely in so doing receives back from it his own self.

This unity of being-for-another or making oneself a Thing, and of being-for-self, this universal substance, speaks its universal language in the customs and laws of its nation.

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351 But this existent unchangeable essence is the expression of the very individuality which seems opposed to it; the laws proclaim what each individual is and does; the individual knows them not only as his universal self objective thinghood, but equally knows himself in them, or knows them as particularized in his own individuality, and in each of his fellow citizens ... finding in the actual world nothing but himself; he is as certain of the others as he is of himself ... just as this unity exists through me, so it exists through the others too - I regard them as myself and myself as them.

354 Reason ^{must} withdraw from this happy state; for the life of a free people is only in principle or immediately the reality of an ethical order.

355 The individual, resolved itself into its abstract moments, and therefore he is not aware of himself as being a pure individuality on his own account ... isolated and on his own, it is he who is now the essence, no longer universal Spirit.

In thus establishing himself - and each moment, because it is a moment of the essence, must succeed in exhibiting itself as the essence - the individual has thereby placed himself in opposition to the laws and customs. These are regarded as mere ideas having no absolute essentiality, an abstract theory without any reality.

356 Or, self-consciousness has not yet attained this happy state of being the ethical substance, the Spirit of a people.

Since this unity means happiness, the individual is sent out into the world by his own spirit to seek his happiness.

357 In so far as it has not yet become the ethical substance, this movement presses forward to it, and what is superseded in the movement are the individual moments which for consciousness self-consciousness are valid in their isolation.

The ethical substance has sunk to the level of a predicate devoid of self, whose living subjects are individuals who themselves have to provide the filling for their universality and so fulfil their essential nature through their own efforts.

~~Cannibalism and Human Sacrifice~~

~~Garry Hogg GN409.H6 1966
New York: Citadel Press~~

The Black Nativity, Langston Hughes.

The Idea of History Collingwood

p.132 The refusal to judge the facts came to mean that history could only be the history of external events, not the history of the thought out of which these events grew.

The Black Nativity

Characters: Mary, F, American, Black, Hetero

Act I

"Did you hear about it - a woman named Mary, they won't let her in at the hotel

all caps

Woman: There's Fire in the East /
There's Fire in the West /
There's Fire among the Methodists,
SATAN'S Mad and I'm so glad he
He missed the soul he thought he

This year of Jubilee / The Lord hath come to set us free.

ΘΥΝΤΟΣ
m. acc. sing. who
mortal

ΕΠΙΣΤΕΛΛΩ
aorist, ind. act.
to send as a letter

χριστος
m. acc. sing.
best

ΟΤΕ ΤΟ ΘΥΝΤΟΝ ΕΠΙΣΤΕΛΛΕΝ

ΓΕΝΟΣ ΩΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΝ ΕΣΣΥΝΑΜΕΝ

ΠΛΗΡΗ ΠΡΟΕΙΝ, ΟΥΤΩ ΔΗ

ΚΑΤΟρθΟΥΤΕΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ~~φρα~~ ΦΑΥΛΟΝ

ΥΠΕΡ ΗΜΩΝ.

face stock
family
mom
n. acc.
sing

ΠΡΟΕΙΩ
pres. inf act
to make.

φαυλος
easy, slight
single, ordinary

ΚΑΤΟρθΩ to set upright, erect
pres. act. participle m. nom. pl.

300 by behaving as a being-for-itself, similar to see itself as another independent being. This is why. End is to become aware of itself as an individual in the other self-consciousness, or to make the other into itself; it is certain that this other is in principle already itself has left behind the law of custom and existence.

300 Its action is only in one sense an action of desire. It does not consist in the destruction of objective being.

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359 Its primary End, however, is its immediate abstract being-for-self; in other words, seeing itself as ⁱⁿ this particular individual in another, or seeing another self-consciousness as itself.

In carrying out this law of the heart, however, it learns that the individual, in doing so, cannot preserve himself, but rather that the good can only be accomplished through the sacrifice of the individual: and self-consciousness becomes virtue. . . happiness is found directly in the action itself, and that action itself is good.

360 by behaving as a being-for-self, aims to see itself as another independent being. This primary End is to become aware of itself as an individual in the other self-consciousness, or to make this other into itself; it is certain that this other is in principle already itself . . . it has left behind the law of custom and existence.

362 Its action is only in one respect an action of desire. It does not aim at the destruction of objective being in

its entirety, but only at the form
of its otherness or its independence,
which is a ~~stow~~ devoid of essence.

363 its experience is of a ~~destruction~~
contradiction in which the attained reality of
its individuality sees itself destroyed by the
negative ~~essence~~ confronting it, which is
devoid of reality and content, and which yet
is the power which destroys it.

it ~~is~~ no longer has the form of ~~immediate~~
~~simple~~ being, as it has for Reason in its
~~by~~ observational role where it is abstract
~~being~~ or, posited in the form of an alien
being, is thinghood in general. Here in
this thinghood there has entered being-for-self
and mediation.

27 It is what is called ~~necessity~~; for
necessity, fate, and the like, is just that
about which we cannot say ~~what~~ it
does, what its specific law and positive
content are.

Unity, difference, and relation are
categories each of which is nothing in
and for itself, but only in relation to
its opposite, and they cannot therefore
be separated from one another.

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364 It experiences the double meaning implicit in what it did, viz. when it took hold of life and possessed it; but in doing so it really laid hold of death.

365 Consciousness, therefore, through its experience in which it should have found its truth, has really become a riddle to itself.

366 The final moment of its existence is the thought of the loss of itself in necessity, or the thought of itself as a being that is absolutely alien to it.

367 It knows that it has the universal of law immediately within itself, and because the law is immediately present in the being-for-self of consciousness, it is called the law of the heart.

369 This heart is confronted by a real world; for in the heart the law is, in the first place, only for its own self, it is not yet realized, and is therefore at the same time something other than what the Notion is... a humanity that does not follow the law of the heart... is subjected to an alien necessity... this real world... is nothing else, but the foregoing discordant relationship of individuality and its truth,

the relationship of a cruel necessity by which the former is oppressed.

370 This individuality therefore directs its energies to getting rid of this necessity which contradicts the law of the heart, and also the suffering caused by it. And so it is no longer characterized by the levity of the previous form of self-consciousness, which only wanted the particular pleasure of the individual; on the contrary, it is the earnestness of a high purpose which seeks its pleasure in displaying the excellence of its own nature, and in promoting the welfare of mankind.

The realization of the immediate undisciplined nature passes for a display of its excellence and as productive of the welfare of humanity.

371 The law, on the other hand, which confronts the law of the heart is separated from the heart, and exists in its own right. Humanity which is bound by this law does not live in the blessed unity of the law with the heart.

372 Consequently, what the individual brings into being through the realization of his law, is not his law; on the contrary, since the realization is in principle his own, but actually for him an alien affair, what he brings about is merely the entanglement of himself in the actual ordinance, an

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372 entanglement in it, moreover, not as a superior power which is only alien to him, but one which is hostile

By his act he places himself in... and his act is supposed to have... the value of universal ordinance

This doing, therefore, has the reverse significance it contradicts the universal ordinance. For the individual's act is supposed to be the act of his particular heart, not a free universal reality; and at the same time he has in fact recognized the latter, for his action has the ^{intrinsic} significance of positing his essential being as a free reality, i.e. of acknowledging the real world to be his own essential being.

373

His deed, ^{in its actuality}, belongs to the universal; but its content is his own individuality which, as this particular individuality, want to preserve itself in opposition to this universal.

Consequently, others do not find in this content the fulfilment of the law of their hearts, but rather that of someone else; and, precisely in accordance with the universal law that each shall find in what is law ^{his} own heart,

they turn against the reality he set up, just as he turned against theirs. Thus, just as the individual at first finds only the rigid law, now he finds the hearts of men themselves, opposed to his excellent intentions and detestable.

374 it does not know that this realization as what affirmatively is, is in truth rather the implicit universal in which the individuality of consciousness ... really perishes; instead of acquiring a being of its own, it therefore attains to being the alienation of itself ... It took this divine and human ordinance which it found as an accepted authority to be a dead authority in which not only its own self, ... but also those subject to that ordinance would have no consciousness of themselves; but it finds that this ordinance is really animated by the consciousness of all, that it is the law of every heart,

for this means nothing else than that individuality becomes an object to itself in the form of universality in which, however, it does not recognize itself.

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375 The law of this particular heart is alone that in which self-consciousness its own essential being and its own reality.

377 The heart-throb for the welfare of humanity therefore passes into the ravings of an insane self-conceit ... It therefore speaks of the universal order as a perversion of the law of the heart and of its happiness ... a perversion which has led to the nameless misery of a deluded humanity. In this derangement, consciousness declares individuality to be the source of this derangement and perversion, but one that is alien and accidental.

that is itself the source of this derangement and perversion, and the outcome of its action is merely that its consciousness becomes aware of this contradiction. For the True is for it the law of the heart — something merely intended which, unlike the established order, has not stood the test of time, but rather when thus tested is overthrown.

The heart learns rather that its self is not real, and that its reality is an unreality.

378 spiritual universality and Substance

378 This universal ordinance, since it is the law of all hearts, i.e. of what is perverted, is no less itself essentially perverted, as the ravings of the deranged consciousness declared. On the one hand, this ordinance proves itself to be a law of all hearts, by the resistance which the law of one individual heart encounters from other individuals. The established laws are defended against the law of an individual, because they are ... a spiritual universality and substance, in which those in whom this spiritual substance has its actuality live as individuals ... they cling to it with their hearts, as being their essential being; and, if this ordinance is taken from them, or they place themselves outside it, they lose everything. Since it is precisely in this that the reality and power of public order consist ... But this ordinance is equally a perversion.

379 The consciousness which sets up the law of its heart therefore meets with resistance from others ... The universal that we have here is, then, only a universal resistance and struggle of all against one another, in which each claims validity for his own individuality, but at the same time does not succeed in his efforts, because each meets with the same resistance from the others, and is nullified by their reciprocal resistance.

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G.W.F. Hegel

379 What seems to be public order, then, is this universal state of war, in which each wrests what he can for himself, executes justice on the individuality of others and establishes his own...

It is the 'way of the world', the show of an unchanging course that is only meant to be a universality, and whose content is rather the essenceless play of establishing and nullifying individualities.

380 this latter universality has for its content the restless individuality which regards [mere] opinion or individuality as law, what is real as unreal, and what is unreal as real... [it] still has no reality only by getting rid of the individuality which has arrogated reality to itself.

Virtue

1st shape of active Reason

① ^(a) pure individuality / ^(b) empty universality

② the two sides of the antithesis each had moments within them
(a) law (antithesis)
(b) individuality (thesis)

- (3) (a) virtue
(b) the 'way of the world'

each a movement of law and individuality towards one another, but a movement of opposition.

381 For the virtuous consciousness law is the essential moment, and individuality the one to be nullified, and therefore both its own consciousness as well as in the 'way of the world'.

In the former case, one's own individuality is to be brought under the discipline of the universal, ... True discipline requires nothing less than the sacrifice of the entire personality as proof that individual peculiarities are in fact no longer insisted on.

In the 'way of the world', individuality behaves in a way which is the reverse of its behaviour in the virtuous consciousness, viz. it makes itself the essential moment.

382 The 'way of the world' is thus, on the one hand, the single individuality which seeks its own pleasure and enjoyment. It is true that in doing so it destroys itself, and thus satisfies the universal.

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382 The other moment of the 'way of the world' is the individuality which claims to be law in its own right, and in its own conceit disturbs the existing order. The universal law, it is true, preserves itself in face of this conceit, and no longer makes its appearance as something opposed to consciousness and empty of content, as a blind-necessity, but as a necessity within consciousness itself.

383 It is from virtue now that the universal is to receive its true reality by nullifying individuality, the principle of the perversion. Virtue's purpose is, by so doing, to reverse again the perverted 'way of the world'... This ~~now~~ true essence is at first only implicit in the 'way of the world'... not yet actual, and consequently virtue only believes as it

... whether, by sacrifice it makes ^{of} itself, the 'way of the world' succumb, while virtue triumphs - this must be decided by mistake the nature of the living weapons borne by the combatants.

u

u

384 the good, in making its appearance in the conflict with the 'way of the world', thereby presents as being for an other, as something that does not have a being of its ^{own} to own, for otherwise it would not want to make itself true by conquering its opposite.

385 the good or universal
(a) gifts (b) capacities (c) powers

This universal is put to good use by the principle of individuality, in so far as this principle lives in the virtuous consciousness, but is misused in so far as it clings to the 'way of the world', as ~~was~~

386 Since this universal is equally at the disposal of the virtuous consciousness and the 'way of the world', it is not apparent whether virtue thus armed will conquer vice.

As a matter of fact, therefore, the knight of virtue's own part in the fighting is, strictly speaking, a sham-fight which he cannot take seriously - because he knows that his true strength lies in the fact that the good exists absolutely in its own right, i.e. brings itself to fulfilment - a sham-fight which he also ^{will} not allow to become serious.

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A. W. F. Hegel

386 For what he turns against the enemy and finds turned against himself, and what he runs the risk of wasting and damaging both in his own case as well as that of the enemy, is not to be the good itself.

What are risked in the fight are only gifts and capacities which are ~~themselves~~^{not} themselves at issue.

The virtuous consciousness, however, enters into conflict with the 'way of the world', as if this were something opposed to the good.

not only can it not use its own weapons, it must also preserve intact those of the enemy and protect them against its own attack.

387 For this enemy, on the other hand, what is the essence is not the in-itself, the implicit universal, but individuality; its power, therefore, is the negative principle for which nothing is established or absolutely sacred, but which can risk and endure the loss of anything and everything.

What virtue holds to be an intrinsic being, the 'way of the world' regards as merely an [indifferent] object; it is free from

every principle that virtue holds to be established, and by which it is bound.

389 the consciousness of virtue rests on this distinction between the in-itself and being, a distinction which has no truth.

390 it glories in this pompous talk about doing what is best for humanity, about the oppression of humanity, about making sacrifices for the sake of the good, and the misuse of gifts. Ideal entities and purposes of this kind are empty, ineffectual words which lift up the heart but leave reason unsatisfied, which edify, but raise no edifice; ... the individual who professes to act for such noble ends and who deals in such fine phrases is in his own eyes an excellent creature

Virtue in the ancient world had its own definite sure meaning, for it had in the spiritual substance of the nation a foundation full of meaning

391 With this lesson in mind, the idea of bringing the good into existence by means of the sacrifice of individuality is abandoned.

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Phenomenology of Spirit H. W. F. Hegel

400 In action and the consciousness of action the simple original nature now splits up into the distinction which action implies. Action is present at first in the form of object, an object, too, as ~~not~~ pertaining to consciousness, as End, and hence opposed to a reality already given. The second moment is the movement of the End conceived as passive, and realization conceived as the relation of the End to the wholly formal actuality, hence the idea of the transition itself, or the means. The third moment is, finally, the object, which is no longer in the form of an End directly known by the agent to be his own, but as brought out into the light of day and having for him the form of an 'other'.

401 action simply translates an ~~what~~ initially implicit being into a being that is made explicit.

Consciousness must act merely in order that what it is in itself may become explicit for it; in other words, action is simply the coming-to-be of Spirit as consciousness. What the latter is in itself, it knows therefore from what it actually is. Accordingly, an individual cannot know what he [really] is until he has made himself a reality through action.

Talent is likewise nothing else but the determinate, original individuality considered as an inner means, or as a transition from End to achieved reality. But the actual means and the real transition are the unity of talent with the nature of the matter at hand

What we have, therefore, is a set of given circumstances which are in themselves the individual's own original nature; next, the interest which treats them as its own an or as its End; and finally, the union [of these] and the abolition of the antithesis in the means.

404 Whatever it is an individual does, and whatever happens to him, that he does himself, and he is that himself'. He can have only the consciousness of that the simple transference of himself from the night of possibility into the daylight of the present. ... and can have only the Certainty that what happens to him in the latter is nothing else but what lay dormant in the former.

Reason that is aware that individuality in its own self is reality, is nothing more than illusory show

Revised, edited w/ general introduction by David Farrell
Krell Harper San Francisco 1993

Basic Writings Martin Heidegger

Introduction to Being and Time

p 41 (γ' ἄνατομία περὶ τῆς οὐσίας)

"a Battle of Giants concerning Being"
Sophist 245e 6-246e 1

p 42 It is said that "Being" is the
most universal and the emptiest concept.

Wiederholung - repetition, recapitulation,
retrieval or reprise.

Three prejudices

(1) Being is the most universal concept:
τὸ οὐ εἶναι καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο τι
πᾶντων πάντων (cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics
III, 4, 1001a21)

Illud quod primo cadit sub
apprehensione est ens, cuius
intellectus includitur in omnibus,
quaecumque quis apprehendit
(Summa Theologiae II, 1. Qu. 91, a2.)

οὐτε τὸ οὐ γένος (Being is not a genus)
(Metaphysics III. 3. 998b22)

p 43 Hegel finally defines "Being" as the
"indeterminate Immediate"

If one says accordingly that "Being" is the
most universal concept, that cannot mean that
it is the clearest ... The concept of "Being"
is rather the most obscure of all.

(2) The concept of "Being" is undefinable.

Being must be predicated against
something hence: "It is ..."

if definitio fit per genus proximum
et differentiam specificam

Then "Being" cannot be defined by
attributing beings to it.

Enti non additur aliqua
natura.

Being cannot be derived from higher concepts
by way of definition and cannot be
represented by lower ones.

(3) "Being" is the self-evident concept

Being and Time

Martin Heidegger

p 45 formulating the question.

perspicuity - perspicuous: plain to the understanding (L. perspicuus: transparent).

questioning is seeking
seeking is directed toward the sought

The meaning of Being is the question to be formulated.

questioning needs previous guidance from what it seeks. The meaning of Being must therefore already be available to us in a certain way.

p 46 what is asked about in the question to be elaborated is Being, that which determines beings as beings. The Being of beings "is" itself not a being.

The middle term is "is"; thus "Being" is the middle term of existence which draws a relation between beings.

The first philosophical step in understanding the problem of Being consists in avoiding the $\mu\omicron\delta\omicron\nu\ \tau\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\ \sigma\eta\gamma\epsilon\iota\omicron\omicron\alpha\iota$ (cf. Sophist 242c) not "telling a story" is not determining

beings as beings by tracing them back ⁱⁿ to their origins to another being.

Dasein - Existence: from Dass-sein "that it is"

Was-sein - "what it is"

p 50 what is distinctive about the question of Being will fully come to light only when that question is sufficiently delineated with regard to its function, intention, and motives.

p 51 Fundamental concepts are determinations in which the area of knowledge underlying all the thematic objects of a science attain an understanding that precedes and guides all positive investigation. ... this preliminary research that creates the fundamental concepts amounts to nothing else than interpreting these beings in terms of the basic constitution of their Being.

p 53 * NB: "ontological" refers to the Being of beings (οντα) or to any account (λογος) of the same. "ontic" refers to any manner of dealing with beings that does not raise the ontological question.

Being and Time

Martin Heidegger

p 53 Dasein is a being that does not simply occur among other beings. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that in its Being this being is concerned about its very Being.

p 54 Understanding of Being is itself a determination of the Being of Dasein.

p 214 Heidegger's Letter on Humanism

Marx: "The question whether human thought achieves objective truth is not a question of theory but a practical question... Dispute over the actuality or non-actuality of any thinking that isolates itself from praxis is a purely scholastic question."

p 217 The actuality of the effect is valued according to its utility. But the essence of action is accomplishment. To accomplish means to unfold something into ~~this~~ the fullness of its essence, to lead it forth into fullness - produce. Therefore only what already is can really be accomplished... Thinking accomplishes the relation of Being to the essence of man. It does not make or cause the relation... Language is the house of Being. In its home man

divells. Those who think and those who create with words are the guardians of this ~~house~~ home.

Plato and Aristotle: take thinking itself to be a technē (τέχνη), a process of reflection in service to doing and making

(α) πρᾶξις (β) ~~πρᾶξις~~ ποιοῦσις

Being as: (a) actus / (b) potentia
 essentia / essentia

p 221 When thinking comes to an end by slipping out of its element it replaces this loss by procuring a validity for itself as technē, as an instrument of education and therefore a classroom matter and later a cultural concern.

p 223 But if man is to find his way once again into the nearness of Being he must first learn to exist in the nameless.

man: homo → human: humanus

humanitas really does remain the ~~concern~~ main concern of such thinking. For this is humanism: meditating and caring, that man be humane and not inhumane, "inhuman," that is, outside his essence. But in what does the humanity of man consist? It lies in his essence.

Phenomenology of Spirit G. W. F. Hegel

407 the work, qua the content of the whole individuality, when transferred from the doing of it, which is the negative unity holding captive all the moments of that content, now lets the moments go free.

408 The necessity of the action consists in the fact that purpose is related simply to actuality ... action takes place because action is in and for itself the essence of actuality

409 for that in which the work vanishes or what vanishes in the work, and what is supposed to give ~~experience~~ experience, as it was called, its supremacy over individuality's own Notion of itself, is the objective reality ... that truth consists solely in the unity of this consciousness with the action, and the true work is only that unity of doing and being, of willing and achieving.

In this way, then, consciousness is reflected out of its perishable work into itself ... This unity is the true work; it is the very heart of the matter [die Sache selbst] which completely holds its own and is experienced as that which endures, independently

of what is merely the contingent result
of an individual action.

411 In the 'matter ⁱⁿ ~~at~~ hand', then, in which
the interfusion of individuality and objectivity
has itself become objective, self-consciousness
has come into possession of its true Notion

412 Consciousness is called honest when it
has on the one hand attained to the
idealism which the 'matter in hand' expresses,
and on the other hand possesses the truth
in it qua this formal universality

413 If Consciousness does not convert its
purpose into a reality, it has at least
willed it, i.e. it make the purpose qua
purpose, the mere doing which does nothing,
the 'heart of the matter', and can therefore
explain and console itself with the fact that
all the same something was taken in hand
and done.

415 But just because he is concerned merely
with being active and busy, he is not
really in earnest about it

Phenomenology of Spirit H. W. F. Hegel

417 An individuality set about carrying out something; by so doing it seems to have made something its own affair... The others therefore take its action for a sign of its interest in the 'matter at hand' as such, and its purpose to be the carrying-out of the matter per se.

418 It is, then, equally a deception of oneself and of others if it is pretended that what one is concerned with is the 'matter in hand' alone

the nature of the 'matter in hand' really is, viz. that it is neither merely something which stands opposed to action in general, and to individual action which stands opposed to a ~~cor~~ continuing being and which would be the free genus of these moments as its species. Rather is its nature such that its being is the action of the single individual and of all individuals and whose action is immediately for others, or is a 'matter in hand' and is such only as the action of each and everyone; the essence which is the essence of all beings, viz. spiritual essence.

418 Thus the 'matter in hand' no longer has the character of a predicate, and lose the characteristic of lifeless abstract universality.

419

420 what is object for consciousness has significance of being the True; it is and it is authoritative, in the sense that it exists and is authoritative and in and for itself. It is the absolute 'matter in hand', which no longer suffers from the antithesis of certainty and its truth, between universal and individual, between purpose and its reality, but whose existence is the reality and action of self-consciousness. This 'matter in hand' is therefore the ethical substance; and consciousness of it is the ethical consciousness.

It has the value of the Absolute, for self-consciousness cannot and does not want any more to go beyond this object, for in it, it is in communion with itself.

Phenomenology of Spirit G.W.F. Hegel

422 Since self-consciousness knows itself to be a moment of the being-for-self of this substance, it expresses the existence of the law within itself as follows: sound Reason knows immediately what is right and good.

The laws are determinate; the law is the 'matter in hand' itself filled with significant content.

424 'Everyone ought to speak the truth'

(a) if he knows the truth

(b) everyone ought to speak the truth at all times, according to his knowledge and conviction

in the very act of saying the commandment, it really violates it ... what is said is different from what is meant; and to speak otherwise than one means, means not speaking the truth.

(c) everyone ought to speak the truth according to his knowledge and conviction at the time

But with this conviction, what the proposition wanted to enunciate as universally necessary and intrinsically wanted to enunciate as universally necessary and intrinsically valid, has really turned ~~around~~ round into something completely contingent.

propositional form

Contradicts itself by the content being contingent

Thus then this has dropped out the demand that we should know the truth; for this refers to knowing in general: we ought to know

425 'Love thy neighbor as thyself'

remove an evil from someone and being good to him.

(a) what is good for him.

(b) what is bad for him.

love him intelligently. Unintelligent love will perhaps do him more harm than hatred.

Richard Hope New York 3 of Michigan Ave
1980
Phenomenology of Spirit G.W.F. Hegel.

426 The Commandment ~~is~~ in its simple absoluteness itself expresses an immediate ethical being.

428 The ethical nature, therefore, is not itself simply as such a content, but only a standard for deciding whether a content is capable of being a law or not, i.e. whether it is or is not self-contradictory. Reason as the giver of laws is reduced to a Reason which merely critically examines them.

429 Laws are no longer given, but tested; and for the consciousness which tests them they are already given.

430 Ought it to be an absolute law that there should be property?

Property & non-Property

431 tautology, the maxim of contradiction, which is admitted to be only a formal criterion for the cognition of theoretical truth

434 The law, as a specific law, has a contingent content; this means that there here that it is the law of a single consciousness and has an arbitrary content. To legislate immediately in that way is thus the tyrannical insolence which makes caprice into a law and ethical behaviour into obedience to such caprice.

insolence of a knowledge which argues itself into a freedom from absolute laws, treating them as an alien caprice.

436 The law is equally an eternal law which is grounded not in the will of a particular individual, but is valid in and for itself; it is the absolute pure will of all. Also, it is not a commandment, which only ought to be; it is and is valid.

the obedience of self-consciousness is not the serving of a master whose commands were arbitrary, and in which it would not recognize itself.

Ethical self-consciousness is immediately one with essential being through the universality of its self. It has put its merely individual aspect behind it, this mediation is finished and complete.

(Cf. Antigone 2.456-7)

trans. Richard Hope
1960

New York: U of Michigan Press

Metaphysics

Aristotle

(981a1) From memory men can get experience; for by often remembering the same thing they acquire the power of unified experience. (ἔμπειρα)

Art ~~is~~ (τέχνη, ars) is born when out of the many bits of information (ἔννοιμα) derived from experience there emerges a grasp of those similarities in view of which they are a unified whole (καθόλου).

Knowledge - εἰδέναι (scire, noscere)

intelligence - φρονησις (prudentia)

nature - φύσις (nature)

perceive - φαντασία (phantasia, imaginatio)

knowledge - ἐπιστήμη (scientia)

information - ἐννόημα (conceptio)

group - εἶδος (species)

individuals - καθ' ἕκαστον (singulare)

incidentally - κατὰ συμβεβηκός (secundum)
per accidens

happens - συμβαλεν, (accidere)
(contingere)

reasons
principles > λόγος: (ratio, sermo, oratio, mentio)

knowing - εἶδεναι (scire)

understanding - επαίεν (obviare, audire)

wiser - σοφία (sapientia)

explain - αἰτία, αἴτιον (causa, causalitas)

habit - ἔθος (consuetudo)

That - ὅτι (quia)

Why - διότι (propter quod)

(98168) In general, too, it is a sign that a man knows when he can teach... For men of knowledge can teach; whereas men only experienced cannot.

sensitive (αἰσθησις, sensus)

Metaphysics

Aristotle

981b

Common sense - $\alpha\lambda\omicron\theta\alpha\nu\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$, sentire

[22] the priestly caste was set apart as a leisure class.

first principles - $\alpha\rho\chi\eta$

theoretical - $\theta\epsilon\omega\rho\eta\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$, speculativus,
speculatrix, theoreticus

all - $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$, omne

by-products - $\alpha\pi\theta\beta\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\sigma\tau\alpha\iota$, contingere

controlling - $\alpha\rho\chi\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$, principalis

982a19 for the wise man is a ruler rather than a subject, and he should not be under another, since the less wise should obey the wiser.

$\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\kappa\epsilon\upsilon$, (principium) propter quod
wherefore.

$\alpha\gamma\alpha\theta\omicron\nu$, bonum, good, excellent

Ποιητής, poeta (production)

γένεσις, generatio, becoming, generation
production, origination

(982b) a man is free whose aims are his own and not another's.

Θεῶν, divinum, divine

(983a)

(a) God is thought to be one of the reasons for all things and to be in some sense a beginning (ἀρχή)

(b) this kind of science would be the only kind or the most appropriate kind for God to have.

All other sciences, then, are more necessary than this; but none is more excellent.

it seems curious that there is something which cannot be measured even with the smallest unit,

Metaphysics

Aristotle

Primary Factors [83] αἰτία, αἰτιον
Causa, causalitas; αἰτιος, Causa,
responsible, guilty; αἰτιόθετος, Causari
account for blame; explanation, basic
factor

① ^{the} primary factor is a thing's essential
character. [26] οὐσία, Substantia
primary being.

OR primary factor = primary being
pf = pb

τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, quod quid erat esse
What is meant to be something;
essential character.

definitions (λογος) ratio, et al.

② we mean the material (ὕλη, materia)
or what persists in change.
(ὑποκειμένον, subiectum, suppositum)

③ that whereby the movement is
started.

ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως
unde principium motus

ἀρχηγός, princeps, ~~princeps~~
pioneer

④ the very opposite factor, that is,
the "wherefor", or the "good";
for this is the end of any ~~good~~ generation
or change.

τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα (Quod est) cuius causa
causa finalis, causa causarum,
The "wherefor".

ἀγαθόν, bonum. : good excellent.

τέλος, finis; end

γένεσις, generatio, becoming, generation

κίνησις, motus, movement.

ὄντα, entia, existentia, beings

γένος, genus, kind

(983b) That from which all beings come,
that from which they first arise and into
which they at last go, the primary being
persisting through its many transformations,
this, it is, they say, that is elemental
(στοιχεῖον, elementum) and primary
(ἀρχή) in things. Hence they think that
nothing is either ~~created~~ originated or
destroyed, since such a nature is
always conserved.

Metaphysics Aristotle

(983b20) To be sure, that "wherefrom" anything comes to be is its source or ~~beginning~~ beginning

Ocean and Tethys: parents of becoming and water as that by which the gods swore, which these people styled the "Styx."

For what is oldest is most honorable, and what anyone swears by is the most honorable.

Thales: water

Anaximenes and Diogenes: air

Hippasus and Heraclitus: fire

Empedocles: earth, air, fire, water

Anaxagoras: beginnings are innumerable
ἀπείροισι, infinitum

hence the idea that the material was the basic factor,

yet: the thing spoken of ~~is~~ can not itself effect its own transformation.

What is the transforming factor?
μεταβολή, mutatio, permutatio,
transmutatio: change, and persistence.

motive force

this one being must be immovable

None of those, then, who pronounce everything to be a unity, succeeded in locating an efficient cause.

Parmenides: two factors in question.

ἐνδέχασθαι, contingere.

κόσμος, mundus, order.

love or desire



ἔργος, amor, love



ἐπιθυμεῖν, cupere

Parmenides: Love was made by Aphrodite first of all the gods.

Hesiod: First of things was Chaos.

Metaphysics

Aristotle

opposites: ἑναντιόων, contrarium

order: τάξις

content: δεινόν, mens, intellectus

τρόπον τινα: quodammodo, aliquo modo

Empedocles: good and evil are principles
he explained everything good by referring
referring it to the good itself, everything
evil by referring it to evil itself.

(a) material

(b) prime mover

Anaxagoras introduced mind (νοῦς) to
create world (κοσμογονία, mundi generatio)

Leucippus and Democritus: being and
non-being.

ἦθος (mode) +

ἦθος (behavior)

Pythagoreans: numbers are the principal
thing.

human affairs (ἀνθρώπινα, humanus)

random - (τυγχάνειν, contingere)

indefinite - (ἄδιορίστως, indeterminate)

986b Contraries are principles of things (ὄντα, entia) and from the Pythagoreans we learn also how many and what principles there are.

regard - μετατρέχειν, transpondere

idea - θεωρεῖν, speculari, considerare

expositions - καλῶς, bene

facts - φύσις, natura

Theory - λέγειν, dicere

grasp - ἄψη, tactus, touch

Xenophanes - "Unity is God"

Critically - βλέπειν, videre

when he insists that there is no nonbeing in competition with being, he must believe that there is only being and nothing else.

Plato's Cosmology

F. M. Cornford

p.19 How true is the saying that what we learn in childhood has a wonderful hold on memory! (Tim. 26b)

p.21

(1) The eternal is intelligible; what comes to be is the sensible. Since the world is sensible, it must be a thing that comes to be.

(2) Whatever comes to be must have a cause. Therefore the world has a cause — a maker and father; but he is hard to find.

(3) The work of any maker will be good only if he fashions it after an eternal model. The world is good; so its model must have been eternal.

Conclusion: any account that can be given of the physical world can be no better than a 'likely story', because the world itself is only a 'likeness' of unchanging reality.

That, Socrates, is what all do, who have the least portion of wisdom: always, at the outset of every undertaking, small or great, they call upon a god.

(28a)

(1) What is that which is always real and has no becoming, and

(2) what is that which is always becoming and is never real?

⚡ (3) (a) That which is apprehensible by thought with a rational account is the thing that is always unchangeably real.

⚡ (b) that which is the object of belief together with unreasoning sensation is the thing that becomes and passes away, but never has real being.

All that becomes must needs become by the agency of some cause.

Heaven (οὐρανός, entire world not the sky)

Plato's Cosmology

F. M. Cornford.

(29b) an account is of the same order
(οὐστρενής) as the things it sets forth.

(29c)

as reality is to becoming, so is truth to belief.

likeness (εἶκον) of an eternal model

becoming (γένεσις, γενεοθεῖν)

Being and Becoming

μετὰ λόγου
rational account

(α) the existence of two orders: (A) the unchangeable, eternal, the true, the object of reason, the real ον, or Being. (ὄν, ens, etc.)

(β) Becoming, the changeable, the perishable, the likeness of truth, faith, the object of belief, the unreal, sensible, non-Being or the Becoming. (γένεσις, generatio)

→ this is also the (ἐνδεχέοθαι, contingere)
cf. Parmenides "two factors": desire and the world, (κόσμος, mundus)

→ this is also the "motive force"
which is therefore, incontingent

ἄρα μετ' ἀληθοῦς λόγου - rational understanding ~~always~~ is always accompanied by a 'true account' where as 'true opinion' can give no rational account of itself. hence: (ἄλοχον).

The reason why can only be apprehended by the higher faculty of understanding.

p 29

the objects of physics, as distinct from mathematics and dialectic - belongs to the lower world of existence

Did the world have a beginning?

γένεσις - The ambiguity: (a) maker and father as a father begets ~~children~~ offspring, or as a maker who fashions his product out of his materials, or (b) meaning 'to be in the process of change'

τέλος - ideal or end (a) internal (b) external

Divine Craftsman (ἄποτελεῖσθαι 2861)

(a) divine agency (b) human agency

Plato's Cosmology

F. M. Cornford

divine craftsmanship (ΘΕΟῦ ΣΥΜΠΟΡΥΓΟΥΝΤΟΣ) which is 'a causation which, working with reason and art, is divine and proceeds from divinity.'

(a) divine plan, or (b) spontaneous impulse

Philebus (26E) all things that become must have some cause (αίτιαι) which is 'the maker' (τὸ ποιοῦν)

what (a) becomes and (b) what is made are ~~one thing~~ two names for one thing.

* the cause (a) Intelligence
(b) the King of Heavens and Earths

(Tim 28dE)

has become vs. always becoming but never has real being.

p 26

Was the Demiurge mythical?

The cause of becoming must be perpetually sustaining.

Metaphysics

Aristotle

(987a) from the sages who have sat in council with us during this discussion, we have acquired this much.

the beginning is material but there is a moving principle (ὄθεν ἢ κίνησις) unde motus

two kinds of beings: (a) ideas (b) things

ὁὐνωμοσ (the designated) univocus synonymous.

11.9

From Religion to Philosophy F.M. Cornford

p. v.

- (α) Religion
- (β) Philosophy

These could be seen as "two distinct provinces of thought."

"... It is, ~~possible~~ however, also possible to think of them as two successive phases or modes of the expression of man's feelings and beliefs about the world."

Philosophy inherited from religion ~~the~~ the following ideas: God, Soul, Destiny, Law

modes of thought that attain to clear definition and explicit statement in philosophy were already implicit in the unreasoned intuitions of mythology.

Philosophers : (α) Ionian (β) Italic

(α) Anaximander

(β) Pythagoras

p. vi

- (α) scientific
- (β) mystical

moved by two distinguishable impulses along lines diverging, more and more widely, towards opposite conclusions.

two permanent needs of human nature, and characterize two familiar types of human temperament.

ANAXIMANDER

- (α) mastering the world by understanding it (science)

Science works steadily towards its goal - a perfectly clear conceptual model of reality, adapted to explain all phenomena by the simplest formula that can be found.

Malheur au vague. mieux vaut le faux!

- (α) Ionian school: Atomism: the soul is reduced to a dust of material particles; in a word, Life has gone out of Nature.

*

it strikes a chill of horror into men of an opposite temperament, who will not seek the living among the dead.

From Religion to Philosophy F.M. Cornford

Pythagoras

To Pythagoras, philosophy was not an engine of curiosity, but a way of life and death.

... these western philosophies present themselves as a series of attempts to justify faith to reason.

Parmenides

Empedocles

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Behind Anaximander stands the Ionian Homer.

Pythagoras: Orpheus and Dionysus

Two types of Greek religion:

(α) Olympian

(β) Dionysian

Μοίρα: Destiny

Φύσις: nature of things: (α) the concrete
(β) and a material

↳ a substance w/ mythical properties

continuum:
Soul & God.

Datum of Philosophy ($\psi\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$) which was derived from religious thought.

Ms. Jane Harrison's Themis (1912)

Concatenation

p5 Nature is moral.

The earliest Greek philosophers express this conviction - that the order of Nature is a moral order - as an obvious, unchallengeable truth, and, indeed, the most important truth about world.

Thales : "The All has soul in it and is full of spirits"
spirits

(α) Nature

(β) God

(γ) Soul.

$\Pi\epsilon\pi\iota$ $\psi\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$

p7 the primary meaning of $\psi\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ is 'growth'

the Milesian school Hylozoist - "the All is alive"

11

019

From Religion to Philosophy F.M. Cornford

p 7 (α) Destiny (β) Law

Thales - water

Anaximenes - air: the indefinite limitless thing (τὸ ἄπειρον)

Anaximander - τὸ ἄπειρον or the 'indefinite' or 'limitless thing'

Anaximander it was who first stated a systematic theory of the Nature of the world - not only of the stuff it is made of, but also of the process of its growth out of the 'limitless thing' into the manifold of definite things.

Anaximander: "Things perish into those things out of which they shall have their birth..."

(α) things (ὄντα)

- (1) primary stuff (φύσις)
- (2) order, disposition, or structure
- (3) the process by which this order arose

p 37 Herodotus (2.52) learnt at Dodona that the Pelasgians worshiped nameless gods, whom they called simply θεοί, because they had set all things in order (κόσμον θεῶν) and all dispensations (νομῶν) were in their hands.

p10

The secular process of birth and perishing is described in moral language.

(α) making reparation

(β) paying the penalty of injustice

existence is stolen from the ἄπικρον

one primary stuff Nature w/ four domains 'elements'

this was conceived as a moral order

p11 "according to what is ordained"
(κατὰ τὸ χρεών)

χρεών - means a power which ordains both what must be and what ought to be.

(α) Destiny

(β) Justice

Μοίρα : Homer and Hesiod

↳ Destiny : The Gods were subordinate to a remote power : Μοίρα

p12 The Gods of Homer are limited...

they are younger than the world into which they were born.

From Religion to Philosophy F. M. Cornford.

p 12 'It is impossible even for a God to avoid the fate that is ordained.'

Herod. i. 91 τὴν πεπρωμένην μοῖραν
ἄδύνατον ἔστι ἀποφεύγεσθαι καὶ θεῶν.

Eurip. 1486 uses (τὸ χρεῖον)

Fate is a moral decree

Homer: ὑπὲρ μόρον, ὑπὲρ κρίσαν

ἄδύνατον - the impossible, is rather that which lies beyond one's power (δύναμις)

nemesis - resentment

p 14

we find a profound belief in Destiny (Μοῖρα) as an ordinance which limits all individual powers, whether human or divine... this ordinance is even more a decree of moral obligation than a barrier of sheer physical impossibility.

(α) Earth (β) Sea (γ) Sky

(Iliad 1.186) ἔκηλος ... μενέτω
Ἐπιτάτη ἐνὶ μοίρῃ


P16 Μοίρα simply means 'part', 'allotted portion'; from that primary meaning it is agreed that the meaning 'destiny' is derived (cf. Iliad 1.209 'ὅπποτ' ἔν' ἰσομορον καὶ ὅμῃ πεπρωμένον ἀλόη III')

τιμῆ status

δέρας privilege

Hesiod Μοίραι, daughters of night (Theog. 220)

Theog. 116 Chaos, Earth, Eros.



Earth (γῆα)

Heaven (Οὐρανός) Πόντος (Sea)

From Religion to Philosophy F. M. Cornford.

p. 19 The physical order is guarded by the same powers that punish mortal transgression — those ministers of Justice or Erinyes, the Moirai in their darkest aspect, who 'if the sun should overstep his measures, would find him out.' (Heraclitus 94 Diels)

ἥλιος γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα·
εἰ δὲ μή 'Ερινύες μὲν Δίκης
ἔπικουρος ἔξευρήσουσιν.

Hesiod: narrative layers superimposed on one another, which correspond to distinct stages of religious development.

polytheism has the singular merit of allowing the order of the world, the cosmos, to come into being without the intervention of any purposeful intelligence. All the Gods being merely departmental powers, no one of them can first claim to have designed and created the whole disposition of things by an arbitrary, if benevolent, act of will. Such a claim will only gradually come to be advanced on behalf of a supreme God, as polytheism gives way to monotheism.

p20 If we are to dwell on the freedom of
Greek thought from dogmatic prejudice,
we cannot be too grateful for the absence
of this particular belief in a divine creator.

Μοίρα ... was not credited with foresight,
purpose, design; these belong to man
and to the humanized Gods. Μοίρα is the
blind automatic force.

Μοίρα is a representation of the Necessity
and Justice (Must and Ought) of the
elemental disposition.

Destiny: (α) Must (β) Ought.

Ἐξομῶς - division of wealth and honors.

Μοίρα: Lady of the Lots: Lachesis Λάχεσις

Pindar: Olympian Ode 7.54 ΕΚΕΛΕΥΘΕΝ
δ' αὐτίκα χρυσάμπυκα μὲν
Λάχεσιν.

p23 Great Oath of the Gods (Θεῶν ὄρκος μέγας)

The importance of this conception is that
it opens another avenue by which the
will of the God can assert its claim
to supersede Destiny.

From Religion to Philosophy F. M. Cornford.

Θεῶν ὄρκος μέγας - 15th Iliad (83)

~~p. 24~~ p. 24 Now, when we remember that Horkos, Oath, is the same word as herkos, 'fence,' we can understand why Styx is the Great Oath of the Gods.

An oath is a fence which can be visibly symbolized in ritual, when he who takes an oath stands between the pieces of the divided victim, surrounding himself on all sides by the sacred thing, charged with the dangerous, inviolable power of sanctity.

might - βίη

στουγέουσι - shuddering awe

κράτος - mastery

χερῶν - privileges

τιμῆν - status

three stages: (α) apportionment by Μοῖρα (Destiny)
(β) distribution by Lots (Λαχεῖος)
(γ) distribution by legislation
(νομοθεσία) Zeus.
dispensation
personal will (βουλή)

Zeus as lawgiver

p 27 Aeschylus P.V. 244 νεμειν (νεμεειν)

→ Nomos, Law

lawgiver - nomothetes (νομοθετες) who establishes νομοι

Lawgiving, to the Greek mind, was not the progressive occupation of a deliberative assembly, but the work, done once and for all, of a single person of extraordinary wisdom, a Solon or a Lycurgus.

νομοι - is a written constitution

the act of lawgiving was especially conceived as a redistribution of provinces and powers.

Dionysius De Halicarnasus : περὶ τοῦ πλεῖστο
τε καὶ ἴσου Antiquities 2.62.

p 28 Some of the plebians were unsettled, having received no portion of land (στῆς μοίρας) nor other advantages. Numa, by distributing (δὲνα εἰμας) land to them, and giving a new status (τεμαίς) to settlers, put an end to dissention.

From Religion to Philosophy F.M. Cornford

p 29 Nomos → verb νομεῖν 'to distribute'
or 'dispense,'

Σανομαί - dispensations

μοίρας - apportionments

p 30

ΝΟΜΕΥΣ - 'dispenser,' is of course more commonly used of shepherds who take their flock to feed on their allotted pasture — their ΝΟΜΟΣ or ΝΟΜΗ, both of which substantives denote both 'pasturage,' or 'feeding-place' and secondarily 'dwelling-place,' 'quarters.'

n2 range: 'Wide is the range of words'
Ἐπὲων Πόλις Νόμος ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα
Il. 20. 249

ἔννομος - 'Keeping with the law'

behind the familiar sense of Nomos, 'custom,' 'use,' 'law,' lie traces of an older spatial significance. (Lat. provincia)

For the understanding of the Greek word, it is necessary to grasp that Nomos does not suggest uniformity of temporal sequence, but exercise of power within spatial or departmental boundaries.

preternatural -

Cognates of Nemos & νέμεσις

(α) nemos (β) Nemesis

Nemos (Lat. nemus) - grove

p 31 There is reason to believe that a nemos was at first rather a sacred enclosure or clearing in a wood, perhaps a clearing round a sacred tree.

Sacred - 'not to be entered, not to be set foot on' (ἄδυστος, ἀβυστος) by the profane

p 32

Now, one ancient title of the sacred presence inhabiting a grove or nemos is none other than Nemesis (cf. A. B. Cook's Zeus) @ Phamnia and Amyna

p 33

Nemesis: She is figured holding an apple-branch or an apple, with miniature stags as ornaments in her hair. She is the Woodland Goddess, identical with Diana Nemorensis, Diana of the Woods.

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From Religion to Philosophy F.M. Cornford

p 34 ἔθεα : 'laws' later customs, established behavior, habits

μοῦρα : limit Od. 19.592 ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῦ
ἐκάστω μοῦραν ἔθηκεν ἑαυτοῦ
ὄνητοῦσσι

ἔμεν κράτος, "to wield authority," "to dispense power."

p 35

The Golden Age of Kronos

Politics 271D, 272E (δαίμων)

Erga 276

living creatures according to their kinds were assigned to daemons (δαίμων), as it were flocks to divine shepherds (βομῆς), each daemon being sufficient in himself in all things for his own flock (ὅτι οἷς αὐτὸς ἔμεν), so that there was no savagery, no devouring of one another, no war nor strife of any sort among them."

Κριταίς : " as shepherds (βουηῆς) over their flocks, they fostered us, their creatures and nurslings," ruling us not by violence, but by persuasive reason.

Third trope

" All things were confounded together when Reason came and introduced distinction and order." Reason takes the place of Zeus, as Zeus had taken the place of Μοίρα.

Διακόμεις

apportionment : μοίρα

distinction

dispensation : Διακρίσις

dispensation

~~dispense~~

δευρομή

lawgiving : νομοθεσία

ordering : Διακόμεις

αγαθοὶ δαίμονες

nascent -

From Religion to Philosophy F.M. Cornford

p40

[for the Greeks] the most significant truth about the universe is that it is portioned out into a general scheme of allotted provinces or spheres of power. The elements come into possession of their fixed regions ... Anaximander 'the limitless thing.' The Gods ... by ... Lachesis and Moira,

p43

Collective representation

It would be long indeed before anything presented to his unbiassed perceptions would lead him to suppose that Nature had any respect whatever for moral standards. Wherever and whenever a professed man of science upholds such an opinion, we may be certain that he is not formulating a description of observed facts, but turning his knowledge to the defence of a belief which he has learnt, not direct from Nature, but at his ~~mother's~~ mother's knee; in other words, a collective representation.

'Representations called collective can be recognized by the following marks: They are common to members of a given social group, ~~and~~ within which they are transmitted from generation to generation ...'

p 44 (Cf. L. Lévy-Bruhl. Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés)

when we speak of collective representation, it is not dogma, ... that we mean.

But, when we have eliminated all such formulas and creeds and put aside the supernatural, there remains embedded in the very substance of all our thoughts about the world and about ourselves an inalienable and ineradicable framework of conception, ... within which and by means of which all our individual thinking, however original and daring, is compelled to move.

imposed upon us and limits our intellectual movements in countless ways, ... being inherent in the very language we must use to express the simplest meaning, it is adopted and assimilated before we can so much as begin to think for ourselves at all.

p 46. "Custom touched with emotion" is morality

p 53 the Roman comitium was inaugurated as a templum

Plutarch: The original comitium was actually called mundus - the Latin equivalent of cosmos.

sacred, taboo, ἱερὸν (C.F. Plut. Pomulus)

Phenomenology of Spirit G.W.F. Hegel

437 Ethical disposition consists just in sticking steadfastly to what is right, and abstaining from all attempts to move or shake it, or derive it.

Alteration of the point of view is not contradiction.

438 Reason is Spirit when its certainty of being all reality has been raised to truth, and it is conscious of itself as its own world, and of the world itself.

the object of consciousness, the pure category, rose to be the Notion of Reason. In Reason as observer, this pure unity of the I and being, of being for itself and being in itself, is determined as the in-itself or as being, and the consciousness of Reason finds itself.

439 Its spiritual essence has already been designated as ethical substance; but Spirit is the actuality of that substance.

As substance, Spirit is unshaken righteous self-identity; but as being-for-self it is a fragmented being, self-sacrificing and benevolent, in which each accomplishes his own work, renders asunder the universal being, and takes from it his own share.

Just because it is a being that is resolved in the self, it is not a dead essence, but is actual and alive.

441 Spirit is the ethical life of a nation in so far as it is the immediate truth - the individual that is a world. It must advance to the consciousness of what it is immediately, must leave behind it the beauty of ethical life, and by passing through a series of shapes attain to a knowledge of itself. These shapes, however, are distinct distinguished from the previous ones by the fact that they are real spirits, actualities in the strict meaning of the word, and instead of being shapes merely of consciousness, are shapes of a world.

442 Spirit, which henceforth is divided within itself, traces one of its worlds, the realm of culture, in the harsh reality of its objective element; over against this realm, it traces in the element of thought the world of belief or faith, the realm of essential truth.

insight [of the individual] and the diffusion of that insight, known as the Enlightenment, then and the realm which was divided and expanded into this world and the beyond.

Phenomenology of Spirit

G.W.F. Hegel

445 It thus splits itself up into distinct ethical substances, into a human and a divine law. Similarly, the self-consciousness confronting the substance assigns to itself according to its nature one of these powers, and as a knowing, is on the one hand ignorant of what it does, and on the other knows what it does, ... a deceptive knowledge.

this particular self has become the actuality of what it is in essence; but precisely in this development the ethical order has been destroyed.

446 just as the consciousness of abstract sensuous being passes over into perception, so also does the immediate certainty of a real ethical situation... the plurality of ethical moments become [s] the duality of a law of individuality and a law of universality

2 The more conventional opinion gets fixated on the antithesis of truth and falsity, the more it tends to expect a given philosophical system to be either accepted or contradicted; and hence it finds only acceptance or rejection. It does not

Comprehend the diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive unfolding of truth, but rather sees in it simple ~~contradictions~~ disagreements.

3 For the real issue is not exhausted by stating its aims, but by carrying it out, nor is the result the actual whole, but rather the result together with the process through which it came about.

This concern with aim or results, with differentiating and passing judgement on various thinkers is therefore an easier task than it might seem.

447 individuality in general, not of a particular, contingent consciousness. In this determination, therefore, the ethical substance is actual substance, absolute Spirit realized in the plurality of existent consciousness; this spirit is the Community... and here has emerged on its own account in its truth as ~~Consciousness~~ ethical essence.

It is Spirit which is for itself in that it preserves itself in its reflection in individuals; and it is implicitly Spirit, or substance, in that it preserves them within itself. As actual substance, it is a nation, as actual consciousness, it is the citizens of that nation.

Phenomenology of Spirit G.W.F. Hegel

449 Confronting this clearly manifest ethical power there is, however, another power, the Divine Law. For the ethical power of the state, ... finds its antithesis in the simple and immediate essence of the ethical sphere; as actual universality it is a force actively opposed to the individual being-for-self.

450 each of the opposites ... contains the entire substance, and all the moments of its content

Family

Penates -

452 This universality which the individual as such attains is pure being, death

the dead, the universal being, becomes a being that has returned into itself ... the powerless, simply isolated individual has been raised to universal individuality.

453 This last duty thus constitutes the perfect divine law, or the positive ethical action towards the individual.

the divine right and law has for its content and power the individual who is

beyond the real world, yet he is not without power.

455 Government is the reality of Spirit that is reflected into itself, the simple self of the entire ethical substance.

In order not to let them become rooted and set in this isolation, thereby breaking up the whole and letting the [Communal] Spirit evaporate, government has from time to time to shake them to their core by war. By this means the government ... violates their right to independence.

462 The power which inflicts this wrong on the conscious individual of making him into a mere Thing, is Nature.

463 The ethical realm is in this way in its enduring existence an immaculate world, a world unsullied by any internal dissension.

From Religion to Philosophy F.M. Cornford.

p 58

Aeschylus' Agamemnon 1451-1576

Clytaemnestra diverts attention to the
Στέμνω γένους of the house of Tantalus

the further we go back into the prehistoric past
of any race of mankind, the less the individual
will count.

→ hereditary guilt

p 59 the circumference of the group is, so to
say, the moral frontier... this frontier is
the surface at which moral friction occurs...

Society, in a word, is a system of moirai
(μοίραι); and the boundaries of its groups
are also the boundaries of morality. Within
them lies Nomos - all that you ought to do
and must do... Beyond them lies all you
must not do - all that is taboo. The
sentinel at the frontier is Death

μοίρα (Destiny) ↔ μῦθος (Death)

'the grievous doom of death'
(μοῖρ' ὀλόν θανάτου)

Greek philosophy

(α) four elements (β) pairs of contraries

Empedocles (α) Philia (β) Neikos

Anaximander: 'separating out' ($\epsilon\kappa\kappa\rho\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma$, $\alpha\pi\omicron\kappa\rho\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma$), from the indeterminate One, of 'contraries' ($\epsilon\nu\alpha\nu\tau\iota\alpha$)

(α) hot & cold: fire and air

(β) wet & dry: water and earth

p64

Empedocles Frag. 17, l. 27

ταῦτα γὰρ ἴσα τε πάντα καὶ
ἴλικα γένναν ἕκαστος,

τῆμῃς δ' ἄλλης ἄλλο μέδου, τὰρα
δ' ἴσος ἕκαστω

For all of them are equal, and of equal birth. Each is lord of a different function, each has its wonted range, and in turn they gain the mastery, as the cycle of time come round.

Hatred (Neikos) & Feud (Eis)

Love (Philia) & Agreement (Harmonia)

From Religion to Philosophy F.M. Cornford

p. 66 Before cosmology were cosmogony and theogony

Becoming ($\gammaένεσις$) was conceived as birth, and birth is the result of marriage. The primal marriage in the early cosmogonies is the union of Sky and Earth

Hesiod : $\chiάος$ (yawning gap) Theog. 116

Theog. 700 $καὶ μὴ δὲ θεοπέτολον κατέχευεν$
 $\chiάος$

Euripides : Heavens and Earth were once one form (Frag. 484 N, Diod. Sic 1.72)

Babylonian Cosmogony

Why suppose that things were ever joined into one thing?

The One thing signifies man as being at once united with universal being it wasn't until Reason came to be, and with it Representation and individuality that any distinction between things could have been identified. "The world was without form and void" etc.

Letter on Humanism Martin Heidegger

p 224 But whence and how is the essence of man determined?

Marx: der menschliche Mensch

(cf. Economic-philosophic Manuscripts of 1844)

Marx demands that "man's humanity" be recognized and acknowledged.

Humanitas, explicitly so called, was first considered and striven for in the age of the Roman Republic. Homo humanus was opposed to homo barbarus.

Renaissance 14th and 15th centuries was renascentia romanitatis.

p 225 Every humanism is either grounded in a metaphysics or is itself made to be the ground of one. Every determination of the essence of man that already presupposes an interpretation of being without asking about the truth of Being

animal rationale (Gr. zōon logon echon or ζῷον λογὸν ἔχον)

Metaphysics does not ask about the truth of Being itself. Nor does it ~~ask~~ therefore ask in what way the essence of man belongs to the truth of Being.

homo animalis : anima (soul) →
animus sive mens (spirit or mind)

Geist (Spirit)

ΕΚΣΤΑΣΙΣ (~~εκ~~ (ecstatic))

p 228 The human body is something essentially other than an animal organism. Nor is the error of biologism overcome by adjoining a soul to the human body, a mind to a soul, and the existentiell to the mind - only to let everything relapse into "life-experience"

p 229 the "essence" of man - lies in his ek-sistence. But ek-sistence thought in this way is not identical with the traditional concept of existentia, which means actuality in contrast to the meaning of essentia as possibility.

p 230 language is not the utterance of an organism; nor is it the expression of a living thing... Language is the clearing - concealing advent of Being itself.

Letter on Humanism

Martin Heidegger

p 230 Existential (existence) means in contrast actualitas, actuality as opposed to mere possibility as Idea. Ek-sistence identifies the determination of what man is in the destiny of truth. Existential is the name for the realization of something that is as it appears in its Idea.

"essence" is neither esse essentialis nor esse existentialis but rather from the ek-static character of Dasein.

p 231 ek-sistence is not the realization of an essence, nor does ek-sistence itself even effect and posit what is essential.

representational positing

~~Heidegger~~ Sartre - Existence precedes essence.

p 232 from Plato's time on has said that essentia precedes existential. Sartre reverses this statement.

We have yet to consider why the question about the destiny (μοίρα) of Being (ὄν, ens) was never asked and why it could never be thought.

p 232

Concealed in its essential provenance,
the differentiation of essentia (essentiality)
and existentia (actuality) completely
dominate the destiny of Western history
and of all history determined by Europe.

p 233

The ek-sistence of man is his substance

Substance : ousia (οὐσία)

p 234 The advent of beings lies in the
destiny of Being. ∴ Man is the shepherd
of Being.

outward appearance : idea

p 235 Within the destiny of Being in
metaphysics the clearing first affords a
view by which what is present comes
into touch with man, who is present to
it, so that man himself can in apprehending
(νοεῖν) first touch upon Being (θηγεῖν
Arist. Met. IX, 10)

Letter on Humanism

Martin Heidegger

p 235

Because man as the one who ek-sists comes to stand in this relation that Being ~~destines~~ destines for itself ... he at first fails to recognize the nearest and attached himself to the next nearest. He even thinks that this is the nearest. But nearer than the nearest and at the same time for ordinary thinking farther than the farthest is nearness itself: the truth of Being,

ensnarement [Verfallen]

- * p 237 So the point is that in the determination of the humanity of man as ek-sistence what is essential is not man but Being - as the dimension of the ecstasis of ek-sistence

Parmenides: εἶπεν γὰρ εἶναι. "for there is Being."

p 238 The primal mystery for all thinking is concealed in this phrase ... The εἶπεν γὰρ εἶναι of Parmenides is still unthought today. That allows us to gauge how things stand with the progress of philosophy. When philosophy attends to its essence it does not make forward strides at all. It remains where it is in order to constantly think the same.

*

History does not take place primarily as a happening. And its happening is not evanescence. The happening of history occurs essentially as the destiny of the truth of Being and from it.

(α) $\mu\omicron\iota\pi\alpha$ (β) $\text{N}\omicron\mu\omicron\varsigma$

Thus man does not determine Being for all determinations are fixed (~~static~~ stasis) while all Being is Becoming ($\gamma\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\omicron\iota\varsigma$)

History is an ever becoming event repeatedly confirming the $\mu\omicron\iota\pi\alpha$ of existence where the moral determinations become are the ad hoc $\nu\omicron\mu\omicron\varsigma$. The ethical substance is perpetually affirmed through the $\nu\omicron\mu\omicron\varsigma$ whereas social praxis is dynamic ($\delta\upsilon\lambda\lambda\alpha\mu\omicron\varsigma$) and $\nu\omicron\mu\omicron\varsigma$ are static hence there is a forgetting of man's proper bounds. The ethical philosopher knows these limits and functions as the Shepherd ($\nu\omicron\mu\iota\tau\eta\varsigma$, cf. Plato, $\text{K}\rho\iota\tau\eta\varsigma$ 109)

"as shepherds ($\nu\omicron\mu\iota\tau\eta\varsigma$) over their flocks, they fostered us, their creatures and nurslings."

(cf. Cornford, *From Rel. to Phil.* pp 35-36)

Letter on Humanism

Martin Heidegger

p 239

Being comes to destiny in that It, Being, gives itself

Hegel's definition of history as the development of "Spirit" is not untrue. Neither is it partly correct and partly false. It is as true as metaphysics ... Absolute metaphysics, with its Marxian and Nietzschean inversions, belongs to the history of the truth of Being. Whatever stems from it cannot be countered or even cast aside by refutations ... All refutation in the field of essential thinking is foolish. Skife among thinkers is the "lovers quarrel" concerning the matter itself.

p 240

Being is the transcendens pure and simple

p 242 Only thus does the overcoming of homelessness begin from Being, a homelessness in which not only man but the essence of man stumbles aimlessly about. Homelessness so understood consists in the abandonment of Being by beings. Homelessness is the symptom of oblivion of Being. Because of it the truth of Being remains unthought.

p 243 Homelessness is coming to be the destiny of the world.

The essence of materialism does not consist in the assertion that everything is simply matter but rather in a metaphysical determination according to which every being appears as the material of labor.

p 244

The essence of materialism is concealed in the essence of technology ... Technology is in its essence a destiny within the history of Being and of the truth of Being, a truth that lies in oblivion. For technology does not go back to the *technē* of the Greeks ~~in name only but derives~~ historically and essentially from ~~technē~~ as a mode of *alētheuein*, a mode, that is, of rendering beings manifest [Offenbar machen]

τεχνή → qua ἀληθεύειν

p 245

Man is not the lord of beings. Man is the shepherd of Being. Man loses nothing in this "less"; rather, he gains in that he attains the truth of Being.
Dasein - human existence

He gains the essential poverty of the shepherd, whose dignity consists in being called by Being itself into the preservation of Being's truth.

Letter on Humanism

Martin Heidegger

p 246 the difficulty is not a matter of indulging in a special sort of profundity ... rather, it is concealed in the step back that lets thinking enter into a questioning that experiences

as long as philosophy merely busies itself with continually obstructing the possibility of admittance into the matter for thinking, i.e. into the truth of Being, it stands safely beyond any danger of shattering against the hardness of that matter. Thus to "philosophize" about being shattered is separated by a chasm from a thinking that is shattered.

Everything depends upon this alone, that the truth of Being come to language and that thinking attain to this language.

p 247 Things that really matter, although they are not ~~defined~~ defined for all eternity, even when they come very late still come at the right time.

Whether the realm of the truth of Being is a blind alley or whether it is the free space in which freedom conserves its essence is something each one may judge after he himself has tried to go the designated way.

lucus a non lucendo

p 256

Heraclitus (119) ~~ἦθος~~ ἀποπολιτικὸς δαίμων

"A man's character is his daemon."

Ethos means abode, dwelling place

The fragment really says, according to Heidegger,
"Man dwells, insofar as he is man, in
the nearness of god."

Habit, practice

p 260

The essence of evil does not consist in the
mere baseness of human action, but rather
in the malice of rage

healing / raging

Every "no" is simply the affirmation of
the "not." Every affirmation consists in
acknowledgment. Acknowledgment lets
that toward which it goes come toward it.

Letter on Humanism

Martin Heidegger

p 262

In Greek, to assign is nemein (νεμεειν). Nomos (νομος) is not only law but more originally the assignment contained in the dispensation of Being.

Thinking attends to the clearing of Being in that it puts its saying of Being into language as the home of ek-sistence. Thus thinking is a deed. But a deed that also surpasses all praxis. Thinking towers above action and production, not through the grandeur of its achievement and not as a consequence of its effect, but through the humbleness of its inconsequential accomplishment.

For thinking in its saying merely brings the unspoken word of Being to language.

p 264

Being is as the destiny of thinking. But destiny is in itself historical. Its history has already come to language in the saying of thinkers. To bring language ever and again this advent of Being that waits remains, and in its remaining waits for man, is the sole matter of thinking.

For this reason essential thinkers always say the same. But that does not mean identical. Of course they say it only to one who undertakes to think back on them. ... To flee into the identical is not dangerous. To risk discord in order to say the same is the danger.

The fittingness of the saying of Being, as the destiny of truth, is the first law of thinking.

Threefold thing

p. 265

- (α) rigor of meditation
- (β) carefulness in saying
- (γ) frugality with words.

Phenomenology of Spirit A. W. F. Hegel

466 The ethical consciousness is, *qua* self-consciousness, in this opposition and as such it at once proceeds to force into subjection to the law which it accepts, the reality which is opposed to it, or else to outwit it. Since it sees right only on one side and wrong on the other, that consciousness which belongs to the divine law sees in the other side only the violence of human caprice, while that which holds to human law sees in the other only the self-will and disobedience of the individual who insists on being his own authority. For the commands of the government have a universal, public meaning open to the light of day; the will of the other law, however, is locked up in the darkness of the nether regions.

467

The absolute right of ethical self-consciousness comes into conflict with the divine right of essential being. For self-consciousness, *qua* consciousness, the world of objective reality as such has an essential being; but according to its substance it is the unity of itself and this opposite; and ethical self-consciousness is the consciousness of that substance; therefore

the object, in its opposition to the subject, has lost entirely the significance of having an essential being of its own.

468 By this act it gives up the specific quality of the ethical life, of being the simple certainty of immediate truth, and initiates the division of itself into itself ... By the deed, therefore, it becomes guilty. For the deed is its own doing, and 'doing' is its inmost nature. And the guilt also acquires the meaning of crime; for as simple, ethical consciousness, it has turned towards one law, but turned its back on the other and violates the latter by its deed.

On the contrary, the action is itself this splitting into two, this explicit self-affirmation and the establishing over against itself an alien external reality ... Innocence, therefore, is merely non-action.

469 The two laws being linked in the essence, the fulfilment of the one evokes the other ... calls it forth as a violated and now hostile entity demanding revenge.

Actuality therefore holds concealed within it the other aspect which is alien to this knowledge ... the son does not recognize

Phenomenology of Spirit G.W.F. Hegel

469 his father is the man who has wronged him and whom he slays, nor his mother is the queen whom he makes his wife. In this way, a power which shuns the light of day ensnares the ethical self-consciousness, a power which breaks forth only after the deed is done, and seizes the doer in the act. For the accomplished deed is the removal of the antithesis between the knowing self and the actuality confronting it.

the significance of the deed is that what was unmoved has been set in motion, and that what was locked up in mere possibility has been brought out into the open.

470

But the ethical consciousness is more complete, its guilt more inexcusable, if it knows beforehand the law and the power which it opposes, ~~it~~ if it takes them to be violence and ~~was~~ wrong, to be ethical by mere accident, and, like Antigone, knowingly commits the crime. The accomplished deed completely alters its point of view;

the very performance of it declares that what is ethical must be actual; for the realization of the purpose is the purpose of the action. Doing directly expresses the unity of actuality and substance.

The ethical consciousness must, on account of his actuality and on account of its deed, acknowledge its opposite as its own actuality, must acknowledge its guilt.

"Because we suffer we acknowledge we have erred." (Antigone 1.926)

Παθος

472 The victory of one power and its character, and the defeat of the other, would thus be only the part and incomplete work ... Only when in the downfall of both sides alike is absolute right accomplished omnipotent and righteous Destiny (μοιρα), steps on the scene.

Two Brothers

Phenomenology of Spirit H. W. F. Hegel

473 The youth comes away from the unconscious Spirit of the Family, and becomes the individuality of the Community

he emerges in the contingent form of two brothers, each of whom with equal right takes possession of the Community; the inequality of the earlier and later birth ... But the government, as the unitary soul or the self of the national Spirit, does not tolerate a duality of individuality

(α) ethical necessity of unity

vis-a-vis

(β) natural accident of there being more than one.

These two brothers therefore fall into dispute and their equal right to the power of the state destroys them both, for the were equally wrong.

Catiline vs. Cicero (two brothers)

For individuality, which for the sake of its being-for-self, puts the whole in peril, has expelled itself from the community, and is the source of its own destruction. The community, however, will honor the one who was found on its side; but

474 The publically manifest spirit has the root of its power in the nether world. The self-certainty and self-assurance of a nation possesses the truth of its oath, which binds all into one, solely in the mute unconscious substance of all, in the waters of forgetfulness. Thus it is that the fulfillment of the spirit of the upper world is transformed into its opposite, and learns that its supreme right is a supreme wrong, that its victory is really its downfall.

479 Personality, then, has stepped out of the life of the ethical substance... The non-actual thought of it which came from renouncing the actual world appeared earlier as the Stoical self-consciousness

Phenomenology of Spirit G.W.F. Hegel

486 This Spirit constructs for itself not merely a world, but a world that is double, ⁱⁿ divided and self-opposed. The ~~world~~ world of the ethical Spirit is its own present world, ... what is present has the significance only of an objective reality, the consciousness of which exists in a beyond.

Now, just as the ethical world (α) divine law, (β) human law, ... returns from that dividedness into its destiny, ~~into~~

487 The world of this Spirit breaks up into two.

488 This world it looks on as something alien, a world, therefore, of which it must now take possession. But the renunciation of its being-for-self is itself the product of the actual world, and by this renunciation, therefore, self-consciousness directly takes possession of this world.

489 This individuality moulds itself by culture into what it ^{is} intrinsically is, and only by so doing is it an intrinsic being that has an actual existence; the measure of its culture is the measure of its actuality and power. Although here the self knows itself as this self, yet its actuality consists solely in ^{the} setting-aside of its natural self.

If, therefore, individuality is erroneously supposed to be rooted in the particularity of nature and character, then in the actual world there are no individualities and no characters, but everyone is like everyone else, but this presumed individuality really only exists in someone's mind, an imaginary existence which has no ~~existence~~ abiding place in this world, where only that which externalizes itself, and, therefore, only the universal, obtains an actual existence. That is why such an imagined existence is still esteemed for what it is, for a kind of being.

490 What, in relation to the single individual, appears as his culture, is the essential moment of the substance itself, viz. the immediate passage of the mere thought-form of its universality into actuality, or, culture is the simple soul of the substance by means of which, what is implicit in the substance, acquires an acknowledged, real existence.

Although this world has come into being through individuality, it is for self-consciousness immediately an alienated world which has the form of a fixed and solid reality over and against it. But at the same time, certain that this world is its substance, it sets about making it its own.

Phenomenology of Spirit G. W. F. Hegel

491 The self knows itself as actual only as a transcended self.

the alienation will alienate itself, and the whole will, through this alienation, return into its Notion.

494 these simple thoughts of Good and Bad are likewise immediately self-alienated; they are actual and are present in actual consciousness as objective moments.

: (α) state power (β) wealth

State power is the simple substance, so too is it the universal 'work' - the absolute 'heart of the matter' itself in which individuals find their essential nature expressed, and where their separate individuality is merely a consciousness of their universality... it remains the absolute foundation and subsistence of all they do.

Wealth

Although this is indeed something passive, something devoid of inner worth, it is equally the perpetually produced result of the labour and activity of all.

415 In these two spiritual powers, then, Self-consciousness recognizes its substance, content, and purpose; in them it beholds its dual nature: in one it sees what it implicitly is, in the other what it is explicitly for itself.

Dominion and wealth therefore confront the individual as objects, i.e. as things from which he knows himself to be free, and between which he ~~list~~ believes he can choose, or even choose neither.

The Origin of the Work of Art Martin Heidegger

p. 143

Origin here means that from which and by which something is what it is and as it is. What something is, as it is, we call its essence. The origin of something is the source of its essence.

essential source:

The artist is the origin of the work. The work is the origin of the artist.

artist and work are each of them by virtue of a third thing which is prior to both.

Art: is nothing more than a word to which nothing actual any longer corresponds... what is meant by the word could exist only on the basis of the actuality of works and artists.

αὐτὸ ἀποφύσει

p. 145

The work makes public something other than itself; it manifests something other; it is an allegory. In the work of art something other is brought together with the thing that is made. οὐ μὲν ἔστιν ἔκείνη: The work is a symbol.

p 146

Allegory and symbol provide the conceptual frame within whose channel of vision the artwork has long been characterized.

p 147

all beings that in any way are, are called things

the work of art is also a thing, so far as it is some sort of being.

We thus see ourselves brought back from the widest domain, ~~with~~ within which everything is a thing (thing = res = ens = a being), including even the highest and last things, to the narrow precinct of mere things.

p 148

το ὑποκείμενον

a thing is not merely an aggregate of traits, nor an accumulation of properties by which that aggregate arises. A thing, as everyone thinks he knows, is that around which the properties have assembled. We speak in this connection of the core of things. This core of the thing was something lying at the ground of the thing, something always already there.

The Origin of the Work of Art Martin Heidegger

p 149

τὰ συμπεβηκότα - that which has always turned up already along with the given core and occurs with it.

Romanization of Greek concepts

ὑποκειμενον → subiectum

ὑποστασις → substantia

συμβεβηκος → accidens

Beneath the seemingly literal and thus faithful ~~word~~ translation there is concealed, rather, a translation of Greek experience into a different way of thinking. Roman thought takes over the Greek words without a corresponding, equally original experience of what they say, without the Greek word. The rootlessness of Western thought begins with this translation.

subject : predicate

p 150 The question as to which comes first and functions as the standard, proposition - structure or thing - structure, remains to this hour undecided

~~##~~ the sentence structure does not provide the standard for the pattern of thing-structure, nor is the latter simply mirrored in the former.

p.151

The hankering after the irrational, as abortive offspring of the unthought rational.

ἕκαστον

p.152

matter - ὕλη

form - μορφή

co-positd

matter stands together with form.

appearance - εἶδος

The thing is formed matter ... the thing solicits us by its outward appearance.

Matter is the substrate and field for the artist's formative action.

p.153 The distinction between matter and form is the conceptual schema which is used, in the greatest variety of ways, quite generally for all art theory and aesthetics.

Heidegger
~~W. M. W. W. W.~~

The Origin of the Work of Art

p 153 Form and Content are the most hackneyed concepts under which anything and everything may be subsumed.

(α) Logic : a logic

(β) matter : forms

(γ) subject : object

p 156

These three modes of defining thingness conceive of the thing as a bearer of traits, as the unity of a manifold of sensations, as formed matter.

Thus they give rise to a mode of thought by which we think not only about thing, equipment, and work but about all beings in general.

equipment is the middle term between thing and work.

- ① equipmental character of equipment
- ② thingly character of the thing
- ③ workly character of the work

thing : equipment \rightarrow work.

p 159

The equipmental quality of equipment consists in its usefulness.

The equipmental being of equipment, reliability, keeps gathered within itself all things according to their manner and extent.

p 160 equipment is perishable

In such wasting, reliability vanishes.

This being [the artwork] emerges into unconcealment of its being. The Greeks called the unconcealment of beings $\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\alpha\iota$.

p 162 In the work of art the truth of beings has set itself to work. "To set" means here "to bring to stand."

The essence of art would then be this: the truth of beings setting itself to work. But until now art presumably has had to do with the beautiful and beauty, and not with truth.

In fine art the art itself is not beautiful, but is called so because it produces the beautiful.

Being and Time Martin Heidegger

p 78

$\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ as speech really means $\delta\eta\lambda\omicron\upsilon\nu$, to make manifest "what is being talked about" in speech. Aristotle explicates this function of speech more precisely as $\alpha\pi\omicron\varphi\alpha\lambda\upsilon\epsilon\omicron\theta\alpha\iota$ (De Interpretatione 1-6 & Metaphysics 7.4 & Nicomachean Ethics 6)

$\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ lets something be seen ($\varphi\alpha\lambda\upsilon\epsilon\omicron\theta\alpha\iota$), namely what is being talked about, 'and indeed for the speaker (who serves as the medium) or for those who speak with each other. Speech "lets us see," from itself, $\alpha\pi\omicron$..., what is being talked about. In speech ($\alpha\pi\omicron\varphi\alpha\lambda\upsilon\omicron\varsigma$), insofar as it is genuine, what is said should be derived from what is talked about.

$\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ is $\varphi\omicron\nu\eta$, indeed $\varphi\omicron\nu\eta$ $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha$ $\varphi\alpha\upsilon\tau\alpha\omicron\upsilon\omicron\varsigma$ — vocalization in which something always is sighted.

p 79

Furthermore, because $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ lets something be seen, it can therefore be true or false.

The "being true" of $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ as $\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\iota\upsilon$ means: to take beings that are talked about in $\lambda\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\iota\upsilon$ as $\alpha\pi\omicron\phi\alpha\iota\upsilon\epsilon\omicron\theta\omicron\iota$ out of their concealment; to let them be seen as something unconcealed ($\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\varsigma$); to discover them. Similarly "being false," as $\pi\tau\omicron\epsilon\upsilon\delta\epsilon\omicron\theta\omicron\iota$ is tantamount to deceiving in the sense of covering up: putting something in front of something else (by way of letting it be seen) and thereby proffering it as something it is not.

Because $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ is a specific mode of letting something be seen, $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ simply may not be acclaimed as the primary "place" of truth.

$\acute{\lambda}\iota\omicron\theta\eta\omicron\iota\varsigma$ (aesthetics) - the straightforward sensuous apprehension of something.

To the extent that an ~~is~~ $\acute{\lambda}\iota\omicron\theta\eta\omicron\iota\varsigma$ aims at its $\acute{\iota}\delta\epsilon\alpha$ [what is its own] - the beings genuinely accessible only through it and for it...

p80 What is in the purest and most original sense "true" - that is, what only discovers in such a way that it can never cover up anything - is pure $\nu\omicron\epsilon\iota\upsilon$

(α) Apprehension - $\nu\omicron\epsilon\iota\upsilon$ (β) non-apprehension
 $\acute{\lambda}\gamma\nu\omicron\epsilon\iota\upsilon$

Being and Time

Martin Heidegger

ἄγνοεῖν - not sufficing for straightforward, appropriate access.

λογος → λεγεῖν → λεγόμενον
(what is pointed to)
λεγόμενον ↘
 ↘
 ἑπισημασμένον

The preliminary concept of phenomenology

(α) λεγεῖν τὰ φαινόμενα

↘ λεγεῖν means ἀποφαινεσθαι

p 81

phenomenology means ~~αὐτὸ~~: ἀποφαινεσθαι
τὰ φαινόμενα - to let what shows itself
be seen from itself, just as it shows itself
from itself. "To the things themselves!"

"Phenomenology" neither designates the object of
its researches nor is it a title that
describes their content. The word only tells
us something about ~~how~~ the how of the
demonstration and treatment of what this
discipline considers.

182

Manifestly it is something that does not show itself at first and for the most part, something concealed, in contrast to what at first and for the most part does show itself.

Ontology is possible only as phenomenology.

There are various ways phenomena can be covered up.

(α) a phenomenon can be covered up in the sense that it has not yet been discovered at all. There is neither knowledge nor lack of knowledge of it.

(β) a phenomenon can be buried over. This means it was once discovered but then got covered up again. This covering can be total, but more commonly, what was once discovered may still be visible, though only as a semblance

~~Distortion~~ Distortion: where there is semblance there is ~~being~~ "Being." This kind of covering up, "distortion," is the most frequent and the most dangerous kind because here the possibilities of being deceived and misled are especially pertinacious

Being and Time Martin Heidegger

αααααααα autochthony -

p 83 The covering up itself, whether it be understood in the sense of concealment, being buried over, or distortion, has in turn a twofold possibility. (α)

(α) accidental coverings

(β) necessary ones.

p 84 The λόγος of phenomenology of Dasein has the character of ἐπιηνεύειν

Phenomenology of Dasein is hermeneutics ... which designates the work of interpretation

p 85 To the extent that this hermeneutic elaborates the historicity of Dasein ontologically as ontic condition of the possibility of the discipline of history ... the methodology of the historical humanistic disciplines.

Being is the transcendens pure and simple.
The transcendence of the Being of Dasein is a distinctive one since in it lies the possibility and necessity of the most radical individuation. Every disclosure of Being as the transcendens is transcendental knowledge.

Phenomenological truth (disclosedness of Being) is veritas transcendentalis

Philosophy is universal, phenomenological ontology, taking its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which as an analysis of existence has fastened the end of the guideline of all philosophical inquiry at the point from which it arises and to which it returns.

Edmund Husserl: Logical Investigations

Parmenides

Metaphysics 7.4

The Origin of the Work of Art Martin Heidegger

p 162

But perhaps the proposition that art is ~~#~~ truth setting itself to work intends to revive the fortunately obsolete view that art is an imitation and depiction of something actual?

* The reproduction of something at hand requires, to be sure, agreement with the actual being

adaequatio (Middle Ages)

~~ἁρμογή~~ ὁμολογία (Aristotle)

Agreement with what ~~is~~ ^{is} has long been taken to be the essence of truth.

Is it our opinion that the painting draws a ~~like~~ likeness from something actual and ~~then~~ transposes it into a product of artistic — production? By no means.

it is, on the contrary, the reproduction of things' general essence

p 163

The currently predominant thing-concept, thing as formed matter, is not even derived from the essence of the thing but from the essence of equipment.

p 164

We allowed a work to tell us what equipment is. By this means, almost clandestinely, it came to light what is at work in the work: the disclosure of the particular ~~is~~ being in its Being, the happening of truth.

If, however, the actuality of the work lay primarily in its thingly substructure we were going astray.

MAX

Plato's Cosmology F.M. Cornford

p. 28

In the application here it is argued that, since the visible world is, in fact, good, its maker must have copied a model which is eternal.

the visible world being only a likeness of the real, no account of it can be more than a likely story.

Demiurge: Craftsman: τὸ ἐγχεύμενον

Not all images are made by artists. Among likenesses, Plato often instances reflections in water or in a mirror... If the world is an image of that sort, we can dispense with a maker in any literal sense.

- (α) Being Timeaus 52D
(β) Becoming
(γ) Space.

and the symbol of the father is there transferred to Being, which serves as the model for Becoming (50D), as if the Forms themselves could be credited with the power to beget Becoming in the womb of Space, or to cast their reflections on that medium.

Cardinal doctrine of Platonism

the visible world is an image of the eternal
if the world is only a likeness of the real,
then any account of it can be no more than
the likely story.

p 28 This means that there can be no exact,
or even self-consistent, science of Nature.

Pythagoreans agreed w/ the atomists that the
visible world is real.

Aristotle, Metaphysics

For in his youth Plato became familiar
through Cratylus with the Heraclitean doctrines,
that among things sensed there is a
perpetual flux and that to know ($\epsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$)
such things is impossible, and he continued
in this conviction also later on.

p 29 The objects of mathematical science are timeless
and invariable; the things of sense are
always in the process of becoming. An
'account' must be of the same order as its
objects.

(CF Republic vi) (α) $\delta\omicron\epsilon\alpha$ (β) $\pi\iota\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$

Plato's Cosmology

(308 F.M.) Cornford

p 30

"likely" - ~~εἰκός~~ εἰκώς : plausible, probable

myth (μῦθος)

(α) no account of the material world can ever amount to an exact and self-consistent statement of unchangeable truth.

(β) the cosmology is presented as a cosmogony, a 'story' of events spread out in time.

p 31 no matter whether you prefer to analyse the world or construct it piece by piece, the account can never be more than 'likely', because of the changing nature of its object; it can never be revised and amended into exact truth.

p 32 Plato declares that his account, so far from being exact, cannot even be consistent with itself.

Plan of Timaeus

47c (α) Reason : τὰ δὲ δὴ Νοῦ δεδημιουργημένα

(β) Necessity : τὰ δὲ δὴ Ἀνάγκης γινόμενα

Motive (29D - 30c)

true reason - αἰτία

§ 29E for what reason becoming and this universe were framed by him who framed them.

(α) He was good

(β) there is no contradiction (jealousy) in the good

(γ) therefore He brought desired self-sameness (identity) with creation.

30a Desiring the good and the perfect, God brought order out of Chaos.

Because: he judged order to be better than disorder

(α) The supremely good is best always best

(β) works of intelligent design are better than those of ignorance

(γ) intelligence is present in the soul.

Therefore reason is within soul and soul is within body.

(εἰχάρς) This is the likely account: this world came to be by a living creature with soul and reason.

Agricola

Tacitus

~~off~~ Auffere trucidare rapere falsis
nomibus imperium, atque ubi
solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant.

Agricola
(Agricola 30.6)

dot/abl. pl.
names.

pres. inf. act. to take away, carry off, remove.

pres
inf. act.

pres. inf. act. slaughter, massacre,
butcher.

to rape, ^{to} pillage, ^{burn} to slaughter.

To rape, pillage and burn are the names
~~falsely~~ ~~by~~ ~~the~~ ~~name~~ ~~named~~ ~~of~~ ~~imperialism~~

~~false names of imperialism.~~

Raping, murdering, pillaging are the
false names of government. and where
they make desolation, they declare peace.

Plato's Cosmology

F.M. Cornford

p. 34 Plato is introducing into philosophy for the first time the image of the creator god. ... he denies, as he had done before (cf. Phaedrus 247A φθόρος γὰρ ἔγω θεοῦ χοροῦ ἄτακτου) the current notion that the gods grudge to man a perfection and felicity like their own. ... man's reason is divine and that ~~it is~~ his business is to become like the divine by reproducing in his own nature the beauty and harmony revealed in the cosmos, which is itself god. ... a living creature ... Hence he repudiates the old maxim warning man not to provoke νεμεσις:
νεμεσις - to irritate
νομος - law
~~νομος~~
νεμος - grove
νομος - constitution

p. 36

His Necessity is irregular and disorderly, and not inexorably determined, but open to the persuasion of Reason.

p. 37 Plato's Demiurge, like the human craftsman in whose image he is conceived, operates on materials that he did not create, and whose inherent nature sets a limit to his desire for perfection in his work.

for the disorder he is not responsible...
The Demiurge is not the sole cause of
Becoming.

- (α) Demiurge
- (β) Necessity
- (γ) Becoming
- (δ) Receptacle
- (ϵ) Forms.
- (ζ) Reason
- (η) Chaos.
- (θ) Order.

p 37 We shall be led to the conclusion
that both the Demiurge and chaos are
symbols

p 38 The whole purpose of the Timaeus is
to teach men to regard the universe as
revealing the operation of such a Reason,
not as the fortuitous outcome of blind
and aimless bodily motion.

The visible universe is a living creature,
having soul ($\chi\upsilon\chi\eta$) in body and reason
($\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$) in soul.

$\mu\epsilon\rho\omicron\varsigma$ or $\mu\omicron\rho\epsilon\omicron\upsilon\upsilon$, 'part' is Plato's term for
species.

or $\Sigma\iota\delta\iota\pi\epsilon\omicron\upsilon\lambda\varsigma$

Moral Forms Phaedrus 250A

From Religion to Philosophy F. M. Cornford

p 74

τὸ θεῖον - binding obligation

'Custom' - τὰ νομικά, τὰ νομιζόμενα
reminds us of the active content of Nomos,
which, before it means a prohibitive
enactment, stands for behaving
in a certain way, (group-behavior)

Against this, sometimes intolerable, imposition
of herd usage, our individual 'nature'
occasionally cries out and denounces
convention as 'unnatural.' Custom and Nature
are set at variance. In earlier days,
[Custom] and [nature] were at one.
[νομος] [φύσις]

p 75

the φύσις is the νόμος and both words
denote the active, socially organized force
expressed by a group, or κοινόν.

p 76 μιμητική μέθεξις

mimetic - 'Imitation' suggests to us the
act of deliberately copying or mimicking the
external appearance of something unlike oneself,
with the object of creating an illusion in the
spectator.

p 77 in the early stage now under consideration, magical action consists in actually doing what you want done.

ΜΕΘΕΞΙΣ - participation

p 251 The Idea is a group-soul, related to its group as a mystery-daemon, like Dionysus, is related to the group of worshippers, his Θεοοσ

The relation of the Idea to the group (Plato)

(α) ΜΕΘΕΞΙΣ

(β) ΠΑΡΟΥΣΙΑ

(γ) ΚΟΙΝΟΝ

Plato ∴ Mimesis is not 'imitation' in the sense of an external resemblance; there is no 'likeness' in this sense between the Idea 'Man' and a human being ∴ Mimesis has its old sense of 'embodying,' 'representing': it is like the relation which an actor has to the character he impersonates, only that it is essentially between a group and a unity. Cf. Arist. Met 6. 987b9

From Religion to Philosophy F.M. Cornford.

p 80

The group is composed of individuals, each of whom has his own private world of inner and outer experience ... Over and above their individual experiences, all the members of the group alike partake of what has been called the Collective Consciousness of the group as a whole. Unlike their private experiences, this pervading consciousness is the same in all (though forms) ... the psychological force which diffuses them is known as 'suggestion' or 'herd-suggestion'.

(α) individual

(β) state

p 81

There exists in the world a power which is greater than any individual (Monad)

↓ In so far as this power is not myself and greater than myself, it is a moral and restraining force, which can, and does, impose upon the individual the necessity of observing of observing the uniform behaviour of the group.

With the first drawing of a distinction between myself and the social consciousness comes the first shadowy representation which can be called religious or moral.

p 81

Its dominance is absolute because the force is not wholly external. The collective consciousness is also immanent in the individual himself, forming within him that unreasoned impulse, call conscience. Small wonder that obedience is absolute in primitive man. All the higher levels of mentality are occupied by this overpowering force. ~~It~~

p 82

We conclude, then, that ~~that~~ the first religious ~~consciousness~~ representation is a representation of the collective consciousness itself.

The negative aspect of this superindividual moral power - its aspect of repression, imposing an external constraint - will give rise to conceptions such as Avenging Anger (Νεμεσις), Justice (Δικη), and
Destiny (Μορρα)

From Religion to Philosophy F. M. Cornford

p. 83

Heraclitus : λόγος

Parmenides : ~~ἀλ~~, ~~λογίζεσθαι~~ εἶπε δὲ ἅπαντα ἐκείνα

Anaxagoras : Νους

Empedocles : Νεκρός / φύξις

Kleian

p. 87

Social group (κοινότητα)
Collective functions (κοινωνία)
nature of the group (φύσις) } Culture

Cultural Monad

Letter on Humanism

Martin Heidegger

p 224

No matter which of the various positions one chooses to adopt toward the doctrines of Communism and to their foundation, from the point of view of the history of Being it is clear certain that an elemental experience of what is world-historical speaks out in it. Whoever takes "Communism" only as a "party" or a "Weltanschauung" is thinking too shallowly.

498

The state expresses its essence in two ways: in part the established law, and in part government and command, which regulates the particular activities within the activity of the whole. The individual thus finds therein his ground and essence expressed, organized, and manifested.

499

In the first case, consciousness judges the state to be essential, and the individual finds in it the thing itself of which he is a part.

Phenomenology of Spirit

G. W. F. Hegel

497

the consciousness that is in and for itself does find in the state power its simple essence and subsistence in general, but not its individuality as such ... it finds that the state power disowns action ^{qua} individual action and subdues it to obedience. The individual ~~finds~~. therefore, faced with this power reflects himself into himself; it is for him an oppressor and the Bad; for, instead of being of like nature to himself, its nature is essentially different from that individuality

498

the state power expresses its essence; this power is in part the established law, and in part government and command, which regulates the particular activities within the action of the whole ... The individual thus finds therein his ground and essence expressed, organized, and manifested

499

in the first case consciousness judges the state power to be essentially different from it, and the enjoyment of wealth to accord

with its own nature; while in the second case it judges the state power to accord with its nature and the enjoyment of wealth to be essentially different from it.

501 The consciousness which adopts the other relation is, on the contrary, ignoble. It clings to the disparity ~~between~~ ^{between} the two essentialities, thus sees in the sovereign power a fetter and a suppression of its own being for self, and therefore hates the ruler, obeys only with secret malice, and is always on the point of revolt.

loving yet hating wealth.

502 in the first instance, the judgement, the determination, of what these two essential realities are as objects ⁱⁿ for consciousness, not as yet what they are in and for themselves.

506 It is not yet a government, and therefore not yet in truth an actual state power. . . The sacrifice of existence which happens in the service of the state is indeed complete when it has gone as far as death

507 the true sacrifice of being-for-self is solely that in which it surrenders itself as completely as in death, yet in this renunciation no less ~~you~~ preserves itself. . . The separated inner spirit, the

A Latin Grammar

Charles E. Bennett

Boston: Allyn and Bacon 1896

258 Principal tenses: Present time
Future time

Historical tenses: Past in time

Principal tenses: Present, Future, Present Perfect,
Future Perfect.

Historical tenses: Imperfect, Historical Perfect,
Pluperfect.

Present Indicative: denotes a general truth
called the (Axiomatic truth).

Virtus conciliat amicitias et conservat
virtute establishes ties of friendship and
maintains them.

Cognitive Present: attempted action.

dum vitant vitia, ^{into th} in contraria currunt.
while they try to avoid vices, they rush into
opposite ones.

Historical Present: ^{lively} narration of past action

Caesar Aedui obsides imperat
demands of
Caesar ~~demanded~~ hostages from the Aedui

iam diu cupio ^{you} te visere
to visit

I ~~desire~~ have long desired to visit you

Present progressive

Imperfect: on going past action

(a) on going action: librum legebam

(b) repeated action: legatos interrogabat

(c) Cognitive Imperfect: attempted action

~~Hostes~~

hostes ~~in~~ nostros intra munitiones
progredi prohibebant.

the enemy tried to prevent our men from
advancing among the fortifications

Phenomenology of Spirit G. W. F. Hegel

507

self as such, having come forward and renounced itself, the state power is at the same time raised to the position of having a self of its own. Without this renunciation of self, the deeds of honour, the deeds of the noble consciousness, and the counsels based on its insight would retain ambiguity possessed by that private reserve of particular intention and self-will.

508

But this alienation takes place ~~only in speech~~ solely in language... It is the power of speech, as that which performs what has to be performed. For it is the real existence of the pure self as self; in speech, self-consciousness, qua independent separate individuality, comes as such into existence, so that it exists for others.

Language, however, contains it in its purity, it alone expresses the 'I', the 'I' itself.

That it is perceived or heard means that its real existence dies away; this otherness has been taken back into itself.

510 The two extremes, the state power and the noble consciousness, are split up by the latter: the state power into the abstract universal which is obeyed, and into the self centered will

What consciousness lacks is the actual transference to it of the state power.

511 The heroism of silent service becomes the heroism of flattery.

Latin Grammar

Bennett

262 Present perfect: a state resulting from a completed act.

263 pluperfect: action completed in the past.

267 Sequence of Tenses

Principal tenses are followed by principal tenses (present and future)

Historical tenses by historical tenses (past)

- (a) video quid facias, I see what you are doing.
- (b) videbo quid facias, I shall see what you are doing
- (c) videro quid facias, I shall ~~see~~ have seen what you are doing.
- (d) videro quid feceris, I see what you have done.
- (e) videbo quid feceris, I shall see what you have done.
- (f) videro quid feceris, I shall have seen what you have done.

Historical sequences

used to see
not

videbam quid faceres, I sawⁿ what you were doing.

vidi quid faceres, I saw what you were doing.

videram quid faceres, I had seen what you were doing.

videbam quid fecisses, I ~~saw~~ saw what you had done.

vidi quid fecisses, I saw what you had done.

videram quid fecisses, I had seen what you had done.

Metaphysics

Aristotle

knowledge - ἐπιστήμη, scire, noscere

Nature - φύσις, natura

intelligent - φρόνησις, prudentia;
intelligence

perceive - φαντασία, phantasia

experience - ἐμπειρία, experientia

art - τέχνη, ars.

From memory men can get experience; for by often remembering the same thing they acquire the power of unified experience.

ἐπιστήμη - scientia

information - ἐκδυμνησκή ἐννοήμα
Conceptio

Art is born when out of the many bits of information (conceptio) derived from experience there emerges a grasp of those similarities in view of which they are a unified whole (καθόλου).

universale
universaliterque

group - εἶδος

attatist

metaphysics

experienced men

reasons - λόγος, ratio, sermo, oratio, mentis.

individuals - καθ' ἑκάστον, singulare

generally καθόλου, universale (whole)

incidentally - κατὰ συμβεβηκός, secundum, accidens, per accidens

happens συμβαίνειν, accidere, contingere

principals

knowing - εἶδέναι, scire, noscere

explain αἰτία, αἴτιον, causa, causalitas, explanation

That - ὅτι, quia (the fact) that

Men of reason discern the fact "that" (ὅτι)

but not the reason "why" (ἵνα, propter

quid, (the reason) why; whereas

experts know the reason why and explanation.

Metaphysics

Aristotle

Inanimate objects produce their effects somehow by nature ($\varphiύσις$); and manual workers, by habit ($ἔθος$, consuetudo). Master workers are presumably wiser ($σοφία$, sapientia), then, not because they are practical, but because they have their reasons ($λόγος$) and can explain ($αἰτεῖν$) what they are doing.

In general, too, it is a sign that a man knows ($εἰδέναι$) when he can teach. Hence we believe that art is more scientific ($ἐπιστημική$) than experience. For men of knowledge can teach; whereas men only of experience cannot.